Scenic downtown Vancouver financial district building near Robson square.

Equity markets have continued to reach new highs despite a backdrop that, on the surface, should be far less supportive. War in the Middle East, elevated oil prices, tighter financial conditions and policy uncertainty have done little to derail risk appetite. There have been periods of volatility along the way, but none have meaningfully disrupted the broader trend higher. Instead, equities have rallied, credit markets have remained firm, and investors have repeatedly looked through shocks that, in prior cycles, may have triggered a more meaningful repricing.

The engines behind the rally

The strength in equity markets is being driven by an alignment of two forces that are both unusually powerful and highly concentrated.

At the centre is the AI-led investment cycle, which stands out not simply due to the scale of the capex cycle (Chart 1), but its structure. Investment is being driven by a small group of hyperscalers committing unprecedented sums to data centres and supporting infrastructure that by some estimates could reach USD$5 trillion over the next five years; increasingly, companies are tapping global credit markets to fund it. Credit markets, notably, are not acting as a constraint. Heavy issuance has been readily absorbed, with strong demand keeping spreads tight even as supply increases. In Canada, Alphabet’s inaugural maple bond issue amounted to a record CAD$8.5 billion and was very well absorbed. In effect, funding conditions are enabling, not limiting, the economic expansion.

Chart 1: US tech investment has surged
A line graph showing US tech investment against its trendline illustrated as percentage of GDP from 1980 to present.Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis, Macrobond

At the same time, corporate earnings have been unequivocally strong. The S&P 500 is on track to deliver approximately 28% year-over-year earnings growth in Q1, the fastest pace since 2021. More importantly, this strength has been broad-based. Ten sectors are reporting earnings growth, with seven sectors posting double-digit gains, spanning technology, financials, industrials and materials (Chart 2).

Chart 2: US earnings growth strong and broad-based
Bar graph illustrating the S&P 500 earnings growth year over year for the first quarter of 2026 with broad-based growth across sectors.Source: FactSet. Note: As of May 21, 2026

While earnings are broad, what is driving revisions, sentiment and capital allocation is a relatively small group of AI and AI-adjacent companies. Yet despite the scale of investment, its direct contribution to GDP growth is still limited. What makes the current environment unusual is that the rally is not purely speculative, as earnings are delivering. So long as the combination of broad earnings resilience holds alongside a concentrated growth engine, the path higher can remain intact.

Disappearing downside risks

If the engine explains the direction of markets, the persistence of the rally reflects the repeated failure of risks to materialize. Geopolitics is the clearest example, with the disruption in the Strait of Hormuz raising oil prices significantly, but not to levels consistent with the scale of the shock. Meanwhile, other macro risks are also being largely looked through. Labour markets continue to soften, though this appears to be bottoming, leaving employment and income growth still sufficient to sustain consumption.

Importantly, inflation has proven persistent. April US producer prices rose sharply, with headline PPI increasing 1.4% month over month, reflecting a surge in energy-related components. Beneath the surface, however, the picture appears benign. Core consumer goods prices in the April CPI report were flat on the month, and core services, while sticky, have not accelerated meaningfully (Chart 3). Additionally, the transmission mechanism appears weaker than in prior cycles – including the post-pandemic period – when rapid wage gains and highly stimulative fiscal and monetary policy reinforced inflation across the economy.

Chart 3: Core services prices relatively contained
Line graph illustrating core (ex energy and rent of shelter) services CPI inflation over time from 2015 to present.Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics, Macrobond

Markets are not ignoring risks – they are observing that those risks are not translating into negative earnings or growth outcomes and are adjusting accordingly. With each risk that passes without consequence, markets grow more conditioned to look through shocks. Concern fades faster, and positioning rebuilds more quickly.

What could break this positive risk sentiment?

Bond yields have been moving higher, with front-end rates rising sharply and yield curves flattening, a combination typically associated with tightening financial conditions. Since the start of the conflict, US 10-year yields have risen materially, and 30-year yields have breached the psychologically important 5% threshold. Front-end rates have risen even more aggressively, reflecting both inflation pressure and resilient growth. At the same time, risk assets have continued to rally alongside this move, an unusual late-cycle dynamic that is resulting in a system drifting toward ever higher interest rates. Interestingly, the same forces supporting risk assets are also contributing to this tightening. The AI-driven investment cycle is sustaining demand, reinforcing inflation pressures (Chart 4), and keeping policy more restrictive than markets might otherwise expect. In that sense, the optimism driving the rally is also what prevents policy from easing.

Chart 4: Near-term inflation pressures building
Line graph illustrating the producer price index for electronic components and accessories on a year-over-year basis, showing a sharp increase since Q2 2025.Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics, Macrobond

This creates a growing tension. Historically, higher discount rates and tighter financial conditions have weighed on equity valuations. Policy adds another layer of uncertainty. Central banks are moving away from an easing bias, with growing inflation risks. They are concerned about allowing inflation expectations to become unhinged from their target levels, should the narrow commodity price shock pass through into a reacceleration of core inflation (although the current assumption is that energy disruptions are temporary and manageable). Additionally, in the US, the transition to a new Federal Reserve Chair introduces another unknown that could reverse the previous regime’s flexibility.

Portfolio strategy

In balanced portfolios, positioning remains modestly underweight equities and fixed income. This stance was implemented at the end of the first quarter as markets entered an “inflation shock first, growth risk later” phase. Recession risks have since moderated, leading equities to now trade near all-time highs, embedding relatively optimistic growth assumptions. As a result, patience and flexibility remain important. We look to add risk opportunistically during periods of market weakness or positioning-driven selloffs. We favour Canadian equities over US equities, with a secular positive view on Canada.

Within fixed income portfolios, the environment remains challenging as strong growth, sticky inflation and higher energy prices continue to put upward pressure on bond yields. Markets have steadily reduced expectations for interest rate cuts and begun to price the possibility of rate hikes in both Canada and the US. This has resulted in yield curve flattening and higher rates. We expect this trend to continue, though not in a linear fashion. Duration exposure will continue to be managed tactically with a bias to be shorter-than-benchmark, with an emphasis on flexibility rather than large directional positions.

Fundamental equity portfolios remain positioned around businesses with resilient earnings. While the broader recovery remains intact, we have paused further increases in cyclical exposure to help mitigate downside risk. We have also reduced exposure to business models most vulnerable to AI-driven disruption, while selectively increasing exposure to sectors positioned to benefit from the broader AI-related capex and infrastructure cycle, including commodity-linked industries.

The current environment continues to favour an opportunistic approach, and we look to add to risk cautiously.

Panoramic skyscrapers reflection along False Creek riverside in Vancouver, BC, Canada.

At the heart of our organization is the commitment and desire to provide superior performance and service to our clients. Our primary objective is to meet our clients’ expectations while ensuring our people are highly motivated and enthusiastic. This requires that we keep the business narrowly defined on what we do best, and endeavour to remain at the cutting edge of research and development initiatives within financial markets.

Standing still is not an option

Each year, we take the opportunity to provide our clients with an update on our business, outlining how we are directing our efforts within Connor, Clark & Lunn Investment Management (CC&L) to fulfill our commitment to delivering investment performance and superior client service.

Our business has always been defined by continual reinvestment and innovation – standing still is not an option. As we navigate a volatile financial and policy environment, we have focused our efforts on three core areas that are foundational to the long-term strength and sustainability of our firm: our people, our technological capabilities and our physical infrastructure.

Our most important investment is in our people. In 2025, we welcomed 28 new colleagues to the firm, and we plan to add approximately the same number in 2026. These additions span investment and client functions, reinforcing both our current capabilities and our future leadership pipeline. This growth reflects our commitment to building a sustainable business across generations. By investing in talent development, succession planning and the cultivation of emerging leaders, we are ensuring that our clients will continue to benefit from a strong, stable and forward-looking organization.

Technology is the second pillar of our reinvestment strategy. We are upgrading systems across our back- and mid-office functions to enhance operational resilience, improve data integration and expand reporting capabilities. These enhancements strengthen the infrastructure that supports our investment processes and client service delivery. In parallel, we are developing a disciplined approach to artificial intelligence (AI). Our strategy is focused on enabling each area of our business to leverage AI tools and technology to improve investment and business processes. The introduction of AI tools requires adequate and deliberate oversight. Regardless of the complexity and sophistication of the AI integration, our people remain responsible for ensuring the quality and suitability of output and retain ultimate accountability for each function.

Finally, we are making meaningful investments in our office spaces in Vancouver and Toronto. These enhancements are intended to create environments that foster collaboration, creativity and connection. Our redesigned spaces support team-based work, cross-functional dialogue and stronger engagement across investment, client and operational teams. The goal is to create the conditions where ideas can be challenged, refined and implemented efficiently – ultimately benefiting our clients. We look forward to welcoming clients to our new offices in 2026 and sharing these updated spaces in person.

In closing, I extend my sincere gratitude to our clients for your trust, confidence and continued partnership.

Sincerely,

Photo of Martin Gerber
Martin Gerber
President & Chief Investment Officer

Our People

In 2025, our firm continued to grow, welcoming 28 new hires and bringing our personnel count to 150. Our business also benefits from the broader Connor, Clark & Lunn Financial Group, which employs over 500 professionals supporting business management, operations, marketing and distribution.

Our firm’s stability and specialization remain key drivers of our business. Succession planning and career development are central to our approach, ensuring continuity and long-term success.

We are pleased to share that several employees were promoted to Principal, effective January 1, 2026, in recognition of their important and growing contributions to our firm.

Photos of Lewis Arnold, James Burns, Sonny Cervienka, Jasmine Chen, Nick Earle, Calen Falconer-Bayard, Artem Kornev, Hien Lee, Jessica Quinn, Jian Wang and Alice Zhou.

CC&L’s Board of Directors is also pleased to announce the promotion of new business owners, effective January 1, 2026, in recognition of their leadership and impact in their roles.

Photo of Tim Elliott  Photo of Sandy McArthur

Fixed Income

Over the past decade, the Fixed Income team has invested meaningfully in building a quantitative framework to identify and harvest attractive premia in fixed income markets, initially within benchmark-relative strategies and subsequently in absolute return mandates. As these systematic return streams have proven both attractive and diversifying, client demand for dedicated solutions has begun to grow. In response, the team is developing these capabilities into dedicated quantitative strategies that can be implemented as total return solutions or as a source of portable alpha on top of a full suite of market return streams. We continue to invest in research, infrastructure and talent to deepen these capabilities and support growing client interest in resilient, diversifying sources of return across different market environments.

Sandy McArthur joined the Fixed Income team in May 2025 and quickly became a central driver of strategic initiatives across the platform. Sandy combines strong market experience with technical fluency, enabling the team to move faster and operate with greater discipline. His tenacity, cross-functional skillset and willingness to own complex workstreams have already had a meaningful impact on the business. We are pleased to welcome Sandy as a business owner in 2026.

Fundamental Equity

After more than a decade of US equity outperformance, the team believes the Canadian equity market is well positioned to outperform over the medium term. Attractive valuations, differentiated sector exposure and meaningful leverage to rising global commodity demand create a compelling backdrop for Canadian equities.

The Fundamental Equity team continues to support client investment objectives across mandates. In what has been a challenging environment for active managers in 2025, all strategies – including Canadian All Cap, income-oriented, and Small Cap equities – delivered top-quartile performance relative to their respective peers.

For several years, the Fundamental Equity team has been focused on developing the next generation of investment leaders. Three experienced Senior Research Associates joined the team over the past 12 months, further deepening research capabilities. This deliberate reinvestment underscores the team’s commitment to sustaining performance, enhancing analytical depth and maintaining a competitive advantage relative to peers over the long term. At the same time, the team is actively executing Gary Baker’s succession plan. Effective January 1, 2026, Michael McPhillips was appointed Co-Chief Investment Officer alongside Gary, sharing responsibility for equity strategy, portfolio leadership and overall investment direction. In 2027, Michael will transition into the CIO role, with Gary moving into an advisory role – ensuring continuity, mentorship and a seamless transition. Michael joined CC&L’s Board of Directors in 2026, succeeding Gary.

Photo of Michael McPhillips  Photo of Gary Baker

Quantitative Equity

2025 was a strong year for the Quantitative Equity team. The team met or exceeded added-value objectives across all key strategies, building on successful long-term track records, with sustained growth in clients and assets under management. To support that growth, the team continued to expand its capabilities, growing to 92 members, with 21 new hires in 2025. Investment professionals were added to all sub-teams during the year and investment in leadership resources across sub-teams will continue at a similar pace this year. The steady growth of the team reflects the need to continually expand and reinvest in our capabilities as the size and scope of the quantitative business has grown. At the same time, the focus on implementing differentiated insights remained front and centre, with a new investment model update that was successfully deployed in November.

To support clients in international markets, our pooled fund structures were expanded. This includes our Europe-based UCITS Fund platform for non-US-based investors, a Collective Investment Trust (CIT) platform in the United States for ERISA-regulated pension plans, a Cayman platform for US and other eligible global investors, and an LP Fund platform for eligible US investors. This investment will allow us to serve a broader client base.

Client Solutions

Consistent with the growth in our business, the Client Solutions team continued to grow. Tim Elliott joined the team in June. He was previously President & CEO of Connor, Clark & Lunn Funds Inc., a retail wealth affiliate he founded within the CC&L Financial Group 15 years ago. Tim started making an immediate impact on our business, bringing insights and specialist knowledge of the retail and wealth markets and increasing leadership in the team. He became a business owner in 2026.

Responsible Investing

2025 marked the passing of a decade since the creation of the CC&L ESG Committee. As such, our Board of Directors felt it was appropriate to undertake a review of the committee mandate and governance structure. The outcome of this undertaking led to confirmation that we continue to have the appropriate structure and resources to meet our responsible investing (RI) objectives and concluded that no material changes were warranted.

Business Update

Assets under management

CC&L’s AUM increased by CA$35 billion in 2025 to CA$112 billion as of December 31, 2025. We are pleased to report that our business grew through new client mandates across all investment teams. In 2025, CC&L gained over 100 new clients and 19 additional mandates from existing clients. Most new mandates were for quantitative equity strategies from global institutional investors.

Image of 2 pie charts. By Mandate Type*. Fundamental Equities: 14%. Quantitative Equities: 63%. Fixed Income: 10%. Multi-Strategy: 13%. By Client Type*. Pension: $46,720. Foundations & Endowments: $6,702. Government, Insurance Companies and Corporations: $30,710. Retail: $17,938. Private Client: $9,756. *Total AUM in CA$ as at December 31, 2025.

We are proud to be the recipient of a 2025 Coalition Greenwich Award: Best Asset Manager for Institutional Investors in Canada.* This award reflects excellence across both investment performance and client service, as measured by the Greenwich Quality Index.

Final Thoughts

We sincerely appreciate the trust and support of our clients and business partners. We look forward to continuing to help you achieve your investment objectives in the years ahead.

*Throughout 2025, Crisil Coalition Greenwich conducted interviews with 147 of the largest corporate pension funds, public pension funds, financial institutions, endowments and foundations in Canada and other global regions. Senior fund professionals were asked to provide detailed evaluations of their investment managers, assessments of those managers soliciting their business, and insights on important market trends. Connor, Clark & Lunn Investment Management did not provide Crisil Coalition Greenwich with any compensation for this survey.

Person standing on a snowy mountain cliff looking at the sunset on Mount Seymour, North Vancouver, BC, Canada.

This year’s Forecast begins with a synopsis of 2025 before delving into the secular themes shaping our outlook, and then examines the shorter-term cyclical factors affecting the economy, inflation and monetary policy. We assess market valuations and, considering these elements, establish our portfolio strategy.

Throughout the next year, updates to our forecasts will be highlighted in our quarterly newsletter Outlook.

 

Introduction

2025 was a year of shocks followed by resilience. Despite extreme policy uncertainty, equity markets delivered a third consecutive year of strong gains as investors looked through geopolitics and focused on earnings durability and AI-driven investment. Canadian equities outperformed, benefiting from relative policy stability, resilient growth and a surge in gold prices amid geopolitical and institutional uncertainty.

Entering 2026, markets face fewer immediate stresses than in prior years, but outcomes remain highly sensitive to policy, inflation and confidence. In the coming pages, we present our portfolio strategy and positioning, and discuss the long-term and cyclical shorter-term influences on markets.

Chart 1: Strong equity market gains in 2025 led by Canada
Total returns in local currency rebased at 01/01/2025 = 100
Line chart showing total equity market returns in local currency during 2025, rebased to 100 at the start of the year. The S&P/TSX Composite rises the most over the period, outperforming both the S&P 500 and the MSCI All Country World Index. All three indices end the year higher, indicating broad global equity gains, with Canadian equities leading.
Source: TMX, S&P Global, MSCI, Macrobond

 

Chart 2: Gold surged in 2025
Line chart showing the price of gold in U.S. dollars per troy ounce during 2025. Gold prices trend sharply higher over the year, reaching new highs by year-end, reflecting strong performance amid heightened geopolitical and policy uncertainty.
Source: CME group, Macrobond

2026 portfolio strategy and positioning

Equity markets begin 2026 with a favourable backdrop. Supportive monetary and fiscal policy as well as solid nominal growth underpin a positive environment for equities. Company earnings remain resilient, supported by healthy nominal growth and easing cost pressures. AI-driven investment continues to shape capital allocation across technology, industrials, energy infrastructure and utilities, while related productivity expectations remain a meaningful contributor to valuations. At the same time, high valuations in the United States temper upside potential, but represent better value in Canada and other non-US markets.

Bond markets reflect a balance between the moderating labour markets and longer-term inflation and fiscal concerns. Long-end yields remain bounded in a “higher-for-longer” range by persistent fiscal expansion, reconfiguration of global power structures and sustained investment needs. Policy easing is expected to continue early in the year, amid ongoing concerns around the central banks’ credibility in the face of stubborn underlying inflation.

Chart 3: Earnings growth to remain solid
Trailing earnings growth
Line chart showing year-over-year trailing earnings growth for the S&P 500 and the S&P/TSX Composite. Both indices display positive earnings growth, with fluctuations over time but no sustained downturn, indicating resilient corporate profitability in both U.S. and Canadian equity markets.
Source: I/B/E/S, Bloomberg, Macrobond

Asset allocation

The macroeconomic environment favours a balanced approach that recognizes both the progress made on disinflation and the persistence of structural forces keeping long-term rates elevated. While policy easing supports risk assets, we hold a neutral allocation across equities and a modest underweight in fixed income. We prefer Canadian and emerging market equities relative to global equities.

Fundamental equity positioning

Our fundamental equity portfolios have added high-quality cyclical companies that will benefit from broadening economic growth, such as financials and autos. We increased infrastructure exposure to benefit from AI-related capex as well as deglobalization and protectionist policies. We also added to mid-cap gold producers given spot prices will support strong free cash flow generation over the year. We have reduced lower-growth and interest rate-sensitive companies given expectations of interest rate volatility.

Chart 4: Limited scope for further expansion
Line chart showing trailing price-to-earnings multiples for the S&P 500 and the S&P/TSX Composite. Valuations remain elevated, particularly for the S&P 500, while the Canadian market trades at lower multiples. The chart suggests limited potential for further valuation expansion, especially in the U.S. market.
Source: I/B/E/S, Bloomberg, Macrobond

Fixed income positioning

In fixed income portfolios, we are managing duration exposure tactically within the recent range in bond yields, as interest rates fluctuate alongside downside economic surprises and upside pressures on long-end yields. Long-term rates are expected to see upside pressure, a global trend. We maintain a yield curve steepening bias. Meanwhile, short-term rates in Canada, currently pricing in central bank rate hikes, should see limited upside from here.

The backdrop of easing inflation and stable demand supports credit fundamentals, and the strong profits, income and policy backdrop are likely to persist. However, the tightest spreads in over a decade, combined with asymmetric risk-reward dynamics, lead to a neutral overall exposure. Within credit, we prefer corporate bonds over provincials.

Secular themes shaping the outlook

Inflation: A higher, more volatile floor

Disinflation over the past two years reflects the unwinding of acute shocks, not a return to pre-2020 levels. Global trade networks are adapting to shorten supply chains, prioritize resilience and elevate geopolitical considerations over cost efficiency. Aging populations and reduced immigration imply a shrinking of working-age populations and tighter labour markets. Large-scale infrastructure renewal, defence modernization and expansion, coupled with energy transition investment, all reinforce upward pressure on costs. Persistent momentum in nominal GDP will anchor growth rates higher for wages, rents, earnings and government outlays. In this environment, maintaining confidence in central bank independence remains critical, as any erosion of the US Federal Reserve’s (the Fed) credibility would raise the long-term risk that inflation expectations become less firmly anchored. Inflation is likely to trend lower, but with a higher floor, greater volatility and an increased risk of resurgence if demand firms or policy eases prematurely.

AI and the productivity wildcard

AI is reshaping capital allocation, labour demand and corporate strategy, but its macro impact remains uneven. Near-term effects are capital intensive as adoption has accelerated, boosting investment in data centres, semiconductors and power infrastructure. To fund this buildout, companies are increasingly turning to credit issuance, both public and private. This reflects the scale of ambition but also introduces financial stability risks, should funding conditions tighten or expected returns fail to materialize. While early adopters remain confident in the displacement of routine cognitive roles, AI has not yet delivered on the promised broad productivity gains. Longer-term benefits depend on diffusion into enterprise processes, organizational redesign and workforce adaptation, which historically take time. A deeper question concerns the long-term social consequences, notably how the distributional and employment impacts will be managed. AI represents both a powerful growth opportunity and a source of uncertainty around labour displacement, inequality and financial stability.

Bigger government and fiscal dominance

Fiscal policy has shifted from cyclical support to a persistent structural force. Even as central banks have cut interest rates, politically entrenched deficits, industrial policies, defence spending and climate-related investments are creating a potent blend of policy support . This encourages growth and employment, reducing the likelihood of a downturn. However, it constrains monetary policy from deploying restrictive policy as debt service costs surge. This dynamic implies asymmetric responses to inflation, leaving the risk of inflation settling above target. Elevated bond issuance and debt-servicing sensitivity imply higher term premiums, wider yield ranges and greater volatility in long-term rates.

Geopolitics and a fragmented world

Globalization is giving way to regionalization and strategic alignment. Trade, capital flows and supply chains are increasingly shaped by security concerns rather than efficiency. Countries at the intersection of the realignments, such as Mexico, parts of Southeast Asia and Canada are positioned to benefit. However, this global reordering raises costs, complicates coordination and sustains higher risk premiums . As a result, global allocators are reassessing concentrated exposure to US dollar denominated assets. While the US dollar remains dominant, diversification across currencies, jurisdictions and real assets is gradually increasing.

Hyper-financialization and fragility

Financial markets now exert outsized influence on real economic outcomes. Consumption, hiring and investment are increasingly sensitive to asset prices, particularly equities. The concentration of wealth effects at the top of the income distribution has so far supported spending growth. However, this also introduces overall consumer vulnerability to a reversal in market confidence. This is particularly true in light of higher interest rates (punitive for borrowers and more rewarding for savers) as well as high inflation that is borne disproportionately by lower income earners . Financial market risks are compounded in private markets where leverage is higher, transparency is lower and liquidity is thinner. This can lead to valuation mismatches as refinancing pressures, particularly to fund the AI buildout, rise.

Cyclical outlook over the year

The United States: A mid-cycle expansion continues, with inflation risks

The United States enters 2026 in a mid-cycle expansion supported by fiscal stimulus, easing financial conditions and sustained AI-related capex. High-income consumers remain resilient, and credit availability is improving. However, labour markets are gradually softening, services inflation remains sticky and tariffs are beginning to pass through to prices. Inflation risks are asymmetric: renewed demand or overly accommodative policy could reaccelerate inflation and force a less dovish Fed than markets expect.

Europe: Gradual stabilization amid structural headwinds

Europe shows signs of gradual stabilization as fiscal flexibility increases and rate cuts ease financial conditions. Defence and infrastructure spending support activity, notably in Germany. However, political fragmentation with coalition governments and populism imply rising fiscal strains as there is no appetite for fiscal austerity. Trade pressures and energy transition costs will constrain growth across the region. Inflation is moderating, but wage dynamics from challenging demographics, combined with rising food and energy costs, all remain upside risks.

China: Managed moderation

China continues a path of controlled slowdown, with growth driven by manufacturing, exports and state-directed investment rather than consumption. The property-sector correction remains a key drag on household confidence. Inflation is persistently below target with pressure on the downside from weak pricing power and industrial capacity. Policy support is targeted, as authorities prioritize financial stability and do not want to reflate housing aggressively. External risks persist, especially with trade, but incremental easing and stabilization efforts should help reduce deflation risks into this year.

Canada: Renewed potential output growth

Canada weathered 2025 better than expected despite significant trade shocks and housing weakness. Household leverage, mortgage resets, slower population growth and subdued business sentiment remain constraints. Looking ahead, risks are easing. Fiscal spending on infrastructure, housing and defence provides a positive thrust, while contained inflation gives the Bank of Canada room to remain accommodative. Trade frictions may resume in light of the USMCA renegotiations, but Canada enters 2026 with improving labour dynamics and renewed potential output growth.

Conclusion

After three consecutive years of strong equity returns, the investment environment entering 2026 is shifting. Equity performance is increasingly expected to be driven by earnings growth rather than valuation expansion, against a macro backdrop that remains broadly supportive. Canada’s combination of commodity exposure, improving earnings momentum and relatively attractive valuations stands in contrast to the highly valued US market, while bond yields appear range bound as inflation and interest-rate pressures offset one another.

Beyond the near-term cycle, markets are being shaped by powerful secular forces. Geopolitical fragmentation, sustained large fiscal deficits and rapid AI-driven investment are reshaping growth, inflation and policy constraints. Inflation is easing, but is likely to remain more volatile than in the pre-pandemic era.

Skyline of downtown Vancouver, BC, Canada.

This summer, markets have looked calm. Bond yields have been range-bound, interest rate and equity market volatility collapsed, credit spreads tightened and stock markets are again reaching their all-time highs. For many investors, it has felt like the tariff-induced storm had finally passed. But calm waters can be misleading. Beneath the surface, powerful undercurrents are shaping the outlook.

Bond markets are behaving as though disinflation is a sure thing and that rate cuts are guaranteed. Yet upstream pressures are bubbling again – producer prices, tariffs and unit labour costs all hint at inflation that may not go quietly. The risk lies not in what we see today, but in what the market may be ignoring.

Rates are trapped in a box

Interest rates are caught in a tug-of-war. On one side, politics, fiscal strategy and the general state of the US economy all limit how high yields can go. That is, the US Treasury’s preference for short-term bill issuance (rather than long-term bonds), the ever-present risk of financial repression tools like yield curve control (a monetary policy tool that targets interest rates at specific points of the yield curve) and the fragility of housing and consumer demand (where even modestly higher yields could tip them into deeper weakness) all act as a ceiling. On the other side, yields are also unlikely to decline significantly. Rising fiscal spending (see Chart 1) and persistent government deficits have led to a continuous supply of bonds, while elevated term premia (the extra compensation investors demand for holding a longer-term bond) keep longer maturities resistant to downward movement. Additionally, producer price indices are rising once again, and labour costs remain elevated. Together, these forces explain why yields can swing within a range but are unlikely to break out decisively in either direction.

Chart 1: US spending set to soar
A stacked bar chart showing US federal spending from 1980 through forecasts to 2035. Spending rises steadily over time, with a sharp spike in 2020 from pandemic support. Components include mandatory outlays (largest share), defense, discretionary non-defense, and net interest. Forecasts show continued growth, with net interest rising rapidly as a share of spending.
Source: US Congressional Budget Office, Macrobond

Recent statements from the US Federal Reserve (Fed) have reflected a cautiously dovish stance, supportive of easier monetary policy. During the Jackson Hole Economic Symposium in late August, Fed Chair Powell indicated a dovish position in the near term regarding employment, while reaffirming the Fed’s commitment to the 2% inflation target. Market participants interpreted these remarks as a signal for potential rate cuts. In reality, while rate reductions are indeed anticipated as soon as September, unless there is a significant deterioration in labour market data, the inflation threshold will keep the easing path confined.

Calm at the wrong time

Markets are treating today’s calm as though it was permanent. Yet, underlying pressures tell a different story. Core producer prices are up 3.7% over last year, nearing the upper end of the range since 2022. The wages and salaries component of the employment cost index at 3.6% y/y remains well above its 25-year average. Direct tariff impacts on consumers have so far been muted by businesses working off previous inventory accumulation. Most recently, the independence of the US central bank appears to be under question, which has historically been associated with higher long-term inflation. Meanwhile, the MOVE index, which tracks bond market volatility, sits near cycle lows (see Chart 2), indicating a classic sign of complacency. History shows that moments of calm often precede periods of turbulence. If inflation re-emerges, today’s quiet will prove fragile.

Chart 2: Collapsing bond market volatility since April
A line chart of the MOVE Index (US Treasury market volatility) from January 2023 to July 2025. Volatility peaked sharply in early 2023 above 190 basis points, then trended downward with fluctuations. Volatility spiked again in April 2025, but has steadily declined, reaching near 70 bps by July 2025.
Source: ICE BofAML, Macrobond

The great disconnect: payrolls vs. profits

The most striking disconnect is between the labour market and corporate earnings. Employment growth is slowing, with downward revisions a consistent theme. In the US, job growth has slowed dramatically, averaging just 35K per month over May–July, the weakest stretch since the pandemic. Meanwhile, continuing jobless claims are on the rise (see Chart 3). Firms are maintaining a “no hire, no fire” stance, meaning that they are holding onto staff but are reluctant to add new employees. Despite that, corporate America is reporting resilient results. Margins, revenues and earnings in the most recent corporate earnings season have come in stronger than expected. Productivity gains, leaner operations and early adoption of AI may be helping. However, we believe this gap is unsustainable. If the labour market weakens further, demand will eventually soften and profits will be at risk. This question of whether earnings can remain resilient while the jobs picture fades will determine the next leg of market direction.

Chart 3: Rising continuing claims suggest difficulty finding jobs
A line chart of US continuing jobless claims from January 2023 to July 2025. Claims rose from about 1.55 million in early 2023 to nearly 2 million by mid-2025. The series shows periods of stabilization but an overall upward trend, suggesting more persistent unemployment.
Source: US Department of Labor, Macrobond

Capital markets

Economic momentum softened through the summer, but equity markets weathered the weak July jobs report and tariff uncertainty well. In August, both the S&P 500 and S&P/TSX Composite reached record highs, with the VIX falling to its lowest level since March. Year to date, US equities are up in the high single-digits, while Canadian, European and emerging markets have posted stronger double-digit gains.

Other asset classes have experienced less favourable performance. WTI crude oil’s June rebound quickly reversed, and crude prices remain negative year to date. The US dollar index maintained stability through the summer but remains negative on a year-to-date basis.

Bond yields continue to stay within established boundaries due to fluctuating market narratives and consistent policies from central banks. Indeed, both the Fed (4.25–4.50%) and the Bank of Canada (2.75%) held policy rates steady during the summer. Canadian corporate spreads tightened to pre-crisis levels in June and July before widening modestly in mid-August alongside a surge in issuance. The FTSE Canada Universe Bond Index is negative thus far in the third quarter and only slightly positive for the year to date.

Portfolio strategy

For investors, the current environment requires a selective approach.

Balanced portfolios have moved back to market weight in equities, reflecting decreased recession probabilities toward the end of the second quarter. Recent data has indicated a gradual economic softening instead of a significant downturn, which has reduced the degree of downside risk. At the same time, equities are being kept afloat by strong earnings. That disconnect still warrants some caution, but the adjustment acknowledges that downside risks are not as acute as earlier in the year. In fundamental equity portfolios, the emphasis is on quality. High-quality businesses with durable earnings growth remain core holdings. As the likelihood of a deep downturn has diminished, exposure to traditional defensive areas of the market has been pared back and selective positions in quality cyclical companies have been added where valuations are attractive.

In fixed income portfolios, the strategy remains cautious. With rates expected to stay range-bound, duration is managed tactically. The shape of the yield curve matters more than the outright level. Short-term rates will be anchored by monetary policy, while longer-term rates will be pressured by fiscal supply, leading to steeper yield curves. In credit, fundamentals are still supportive but credit spreads are too tight to offer much reward, warranting a neutral position.

Photo of TJ Sutter and Carolyn Kwan sitting down talking to each other

Introducing our new video series, Viewpoints. Portfolio managers TJ Sutter and Carolyn Kwan discuss what they see as possible trends for the markets in 2025. They look at how the year is shaping up with regard to risks for the Canadian economy, fixed income trends and the impact of potential tariffs.

Market outlook

A look at projected 2025 economic trends and policies in the US and Canada, focusing on interest rates, consumer growth and labour markets. View.

Photo of Carolyn Kwan and TJ Sutter.

Risks

Risks to the Canadian economy include increased volatility, policy uncertainty and inflation, not to mention the political changes in the US and Canada. View.

Photo of TJ Sutter.

Tariff war

The impact of US tariffs on Canada and potential economic responses. View.

Photo of Carolyn Kwan and TJ Sutter.

Fixed Income

In a volatile market, active fixed income strategies consider the risks and expectations for inflation, interest rates and market reflexivity. View.

Photo of Carolyn Kwan.

Monetary analysis suggests that the global economy will weaken into early 2025, while inflation will continue to decline. A cyclical forecasting framework, on the other hand, points to the possibility of strong economic growth in H2 2025 and 2026.

Are the two perspectives inconsistent? A reconciliation could involve downside economic and inflation surprises in H2 2024 triggering a dramatic escalation of monetary policy easing. A subsequent pick-up in money growth would lay the foundation for a H2 2025 / 2026 economic boom.

How would equities perform in this scenario? Bulls would argue that any near-term weakness due to negative economic news would be swiftly reversed as policies eased and markets shifted focus to the sunlit uplands of H2 2025 / 2026.

More likely, a significant fall in risk asset prices would be necessary to generate easing of the required speed and scale, and a subsequent recovery might take time to gather pace.

Global six-month real narrow money momentum has recovered from a major low in September 2023 but remains weak by historical standards and fell back in May – see chart 1. The assessment here is that the decline into the 2023 low will be reflected in a weakening of global economic momentum in H2 2024.

Chart 1

Chart 1 showing Global Manufacturing PMI New Orders and G7 plus E7 Real Narrow Money

A counter-argument is that a typical lead-time between lows in real money and economic momentum historically has been six to 12 months. On this basis, negative fall-out from the September 2023 real money momentum low should be reaching a maximum now, with the subsequent recovery to be reflected in economic acceleration in late 2024.

The latter interpretation is consistent with the consensus view that a sustainable economic upswing is under way and will gather pace as inflation progress allows gradual monetary policy easing.

The pessimistic view here reflects three main considerations. First, economic acceleration now would imply an absence of any negative counterpart to the September 2023 real money momentum low – historically very unusual.

Secondly, the lag between money and the economy has recently been at the top end of the historical range, suggesting that a significant portion of 2023 monetary weakness has yet to feed through.

Highs in real money momentum in August 2016 and July 2020 preceded highs in global manufacturing PMI new orders by 16 and 10 months respectively, while a low in May 2018 occurred a year before a corresponding PMI trough – chart 2.

Chart 2

Chart 2 showing Global Manufacturing PMI New Orders and G7 plus E7 Real Narrow Money

So a PMI low associated with the September 2023 real money momentum trough could occur as late as January 2025.

Thirdly, stock as well as flow considerations have been important for analysing the impact of money on the economy in recent years, and a current shortfall of real narrow money from its pre-pandemic trend may counteract a positive influence from the (tepid) recovery in momentum since September 2023 – chart 3.

Chart 3

Chart 3 showing Ratio of G7 and E7 Real Narrow Money to Industrial Output and 1995 to 2019 Log-Linear Trend

The decline in real money momentum into the September 2023 low began from a minor peak in December 2022, suggesting that the PMI – even allowing for a longer-than-normal lag – should have peaked by early 2024. Global manufacturing PMI new orders rose into March and made a marginal new high in May. However, two indicators displaying a significant contemporaneous correlation with PMI new orders historically – PMI future output and US ISM new orders – peaked in January. The future output series fell sharply in June, consistent with the view that another PMI downturn is starting – chart 4.

Chart 4

Chart 4 showing Global Manufacturing PMI New Orders and Global Manufacturing PMI Future Output / US ISM Manufacturing New Orders

Signs of weakness are also apparent under the hood of the services PMI survey. Overall new business has been boosted by financial sector strength, reflecting buoyant markets, but the consumer services component fell to a six-month low in June – chart 5.

Chart 5

Chart 5 showing Global Services PMI New Business

Could a weakening of economic momentum in H2 2024 snowball into a deep / prolonged recession? The cycles element of the forecasting process used here suggests not.

Severe / sustained recessions occur when the three investment cycles – stockbuilding, business capex and housing – move into lows simultaneously. The most recent troughs in the three cycles are judged to have occurred in Q1 2023, 2020 and 2009 respectively. Allowing for their usual lengths (3-5, 7-11 and 15-25 years), the next feasible window for simultaneous lows is 2027-28 – chart 6. Cycle influences should be positive until then.

Chart 6

Chart 6 showing Actual and Possible Cycle Trough Years

Major busts associated with triple-cycle lows, indeed, are usually preceded by economic booms. Such booms often involve policy shifts that super-charge positive cyclical forces. The 1987 stock market crash, for example, triggered rate cuts by the Fed and other central banks that magnified a late 1980s housing cycle peak.

Could significant policy easing in H2 2024 / H1 2025 similarly catalyse a H2 2025 / 2026 boom? Such a policy shift, on the view here, is plausible because negative economic news into early 2025 is likely to be accompanied a melting of inflation concerns.

The latter suggestion is based on the monetarist rule-of-thumb that inflation follows money trends with a roughly two-year lag. G7 broad money growth of about 4.5% pa is consistent with 2% inflation. Annual growth returned to this level in mid-2022, reflected in a forecast here that inflation rates would move back to target in H2 2024 – chart 7.

Chart 7

Chart 7 showing G7 Consumer Prices and Broad Money

The forecast is within reach. Annual US PCE and Eurozone CPI inflation rates were 2.5% in May and June respectively, with a fall to 2% in prospect by end-Q3 on reasonable assumptions for monthly index changes. UK CPI inflation has already dropped to 2.0%.

G7 annual broad money growth continued to decline into 2023, reaching a low of 0.6% in April 2023 and recovering gradually to 2.7% in May 2024. The suggestion from the monetarist rule, therefore, is that inflation rates will move below target in H1 2025 and remain low into 2026.

Central banks have been focusing on stickier services inflation, neglecting historical evidence that services prices lag both food / energy costs and core goods prices. Those relationships, and easing wage pressures, suggest that services resilience is about to crumble, a possibility supported by a sharp drop in the global consumer services PMI output price index in June to below its pre-pandemic average – chart 8.

Chart 8

Chart 8 showing Global Consumer Goods / Services PMI Output Prices

The approach here uses two flow measures of global “excess” money to assess the monetary backdrop for equity markets: the gap between global six-month real narrow money and industrial output momentum, and the deviation of annual real money growth from a long-term moving average.

The two measures turned negative around end-2021, ahead of 2022 market weakness, but remained sub-zero as global indices rallied to new highs in H1 2024. The latter “miss” may be attributable to a money stock overshoot shown in chart 3 – the flow measures of excess money may have failed to capture the deployment of existing precautionary money holdings.

Still, the MSCI World index in US dollars outperformed dollar deposits by only 3.9% between end-2021 and end-June 2024, with the gain dependent on a small number of US mega-caps: the equal-weighted version of the index underperformed deposits by 8.4% over the same period.

What now? The money stock overshoot has reversed. The first excess money measure has recovered to zero but the second remains significantly negative. Mixed readings have been associated with equities underperforming deposits on average historically, with some examples of significant losses. Caution still appears warranted.

An obvious suggestion based on the economic scenario described above is to overweight defensive sectors. Non-tech cyclical sectors gave back some of their outperformance in Q2 but are still relatively expensive by historical standards, apparently discounting PMI strength – chart 9.

Chart 9

Chart 9 showing MSCI World Cyclical ex Tech* Relative to Devensive ex Energy Price/Book and Global Manufacturing PMI New Orders

Accelerated monetary policy easing could be favourable for EM equities, especially if associated with a weaker US dollar. Monetary indicators are promising. EM equities have outperformed historically when real narrow money growth has been higher in the E7 than the G7 and the first global excess money measure has been positive – chart 10. The former condition remains in place and the second is borderline.

Chart 10

Chart 10 showing MSCI EM Cumulative Return vs MSCI World and "Excess" Money Measures

The MPC’s forecast in November was that annual CPI inflation would average 3.5% in Q2 2024 (November 2023 Monetary Policy Report (MPR), modal forecast assuming unchanged 5.25% rates). April’s drop to 2.3%, therefore, might be considered cause for celebration.

The negative market response reflected stronger-than-expected services price inflation, with the Bank of England’s “supercore” index rising by an annual 5.7%, a disappointingly small drop from 5.8% in March. This measure strips out “volatile and idiosyncratic” components, namely rents, package holidays, education and air fares.

The MPC has encouraged a focus on services inflation, citing it as one of three key gauges of “domestic inflationary persistence”, along with labour market tightness and wage growth. This prioritisation, however, is questionable, as there is no evidence that supercore leads other inflation components, whereas those components appear to contain leading information for supercore.

Chart 1 shows annual rates of change of three CPI sub-indices: supercore services (34% weight); other components of the core CPI index, i.e. core goods and non-supercore services (43%); and energy, food, alcohol and tobacco (22%).

Chart 1

Chart 1 showing UK Consumer Prices (% yoy)

Correlation analysis of this history suggests that supercore follows the other two series: correlation coefficients are maximised by applying a five-month lag on the other core components measure and a four-month lag on energy / food inflation.

Granger-causality tests show that inflation rates of the other core components sub-index and energy / food are individually significant for forecasting supercore. By contrast, supercore terms are insignificant in forecasting equations for the other two sub-indices*.

These results admittedly are strongly influenced by post-2019 data: supercore lagged the inflation upswing and peaked later than the other components.

A notable finding is that supercore inflation has been more sensitive to changes in energy / food prices that the rest of the core index, conflicting with the notion that it is a purer gauge of domestic inflationary pressure. This is partly explained by the one-third weight of catering services in the supercore basket: the associated price index is strongly correlated with food prices.

A forecasting equation for supercore including both other sub-indices predicts a fall in annual inflation to 4.7% in July.

The latest MPR claims that monetary trends are of limited use for inflation forecasting over policy-relevant horizons. Lagged terms in broad money growth, however, are significant when added to the above forecasting equation. The July prediction is lowered to 4.5% with this addition.

A fall in annual supercore inflation to 4.7% in July would imply a dramatic slowdown in the three-month annualised rate of change (own seasonal adjustment), from over 6% in April to below 3%.

A “monetarist” view is that aggregate inflation trends reflect prior monetary conditions, with the distribution among components determined by relative demand / supply considerations. From this perspective, supercore strength is partly the counterpart of weakness in the other sub-indices. Headline CPI momentum continues to track the profile of broad money growth two years ago, a relationship suggesting a further easing of aggregate inflationary pressure into H1 2025 – chart 2.

Chart 2

Chart 2 showing UK Consumer Prices & Broad Money (% 6m annualised)

*The regressions are based on 12-month rates of change and include lags 3, 6, 9 and 12 of the dependent and independent variables.

The Fed’s preferred core price measure – the PCE price index excluding food and energy – rose by an average 0.36% per month, equivalent to 4.4% annualised, over January-March.

The FOMC median projection in March was for annual core inflation to fall to 2.6% in Q4 2024. This would require the monthly index rise to step down to an average 0.17% over the remainder of the year – see chart 1.

Chart 1

Chart 1 showing US PCE Price Index ex Food & Energy

The judgement here is that such a slowdown is achievable and could be exceeded, based on the following considerations.

First, such performance was bettered in H2 2023, when the monthly rise averaged 0.155%, or 1.9% annualised, i.e. the requirement is within the range of recent experience.

Secondly, the monetarist rule of thumb of a two-year lead from money to prices suggests a strong disinflationary impulse during H2 2024. From this perspective, any current “stickiness” may reflect the after-effects of a second pick-up in six-month broad money momentum in 2021, following the initial surge into mid-2020– see chart 2.

Chart 2

Chart 2 showing US PCE Price Index & Broad Money (% 6m annualised)

Momentum returned to a target-consistent 4-5% annualised in April 2022, subsequently turning negative and recovering only from March 2023, with the latest reading still sub-5%. Allowing for the usual lag, the suggestion is that six-month price momentum will move below 2% in H2 2024, remaining weak through next year.

A third potential favourable influence is a speeding-up of the transmission of recent slower growth of timely measures of market rents to the PCE housing component. Six-month momentum of the latter was still up at 5.6% annualised in March but weakness in the BLS new tenant rent index through 2023 is consistent with a return to the pre-pandemic (i.e. 2015-19) average of 3.4% or lower – chart 3. With a weight of 17.5%, such a decline would subtract 3 bp from the monthly core PCE change.

Chart 3

Chart 3 showing US PCE Price Index for Housing (% 6m annualised) & BLS Tenant Rent Indices (4q ma, % 6m annualised)

A modest upside inflation surprise in March has been portrayed as confirming that inflationary pressures remain sticky, warranting further delay in policy easing.

The stickiness charge is bizarre in the context of recent aggregate data. The six-month rate of change of core consumer prices, seasonally adjusted, has fallen from a peak of 8.4% annualised in July 2023 to 2.4% in March – see chart 1.

Chart 1

Chart 1 showing UK Consumer Prices & Broad Money (% 6m annualised)

Six-month momentum, admittedly, has moved sideways over the last four months. This mirrors a pause in the slowdown in six-month broad money growth in early 2022, with the relationship suggesting a resumption of the core downtrend from around May.

Claims of stickiness focus on measures of core services momentum. Such measures gave no forewarning of the inflation upswing and are unsurprisingly also lagging in the downswing.

“Monetarist” theory is that monetary conditions determine trends in nominal spending and aggregate inflation, with the goods / services split reflecting relative demand / supply considerations.

Global goods prices have been under downward pressure because of rising supply and falling input costs (until recently), resulting in a diversion of nominal demand and pricing power to services.

So a monetarist forecast is that a recovery in goods momentum is likely to be associated with faster services disinflation within a continuing aggregate inflation downswing.

A subsidiary argument to the sticky inflation view is that the MPC can afford to be cautious about policy easing because the economy is regaining momentum.

Monetary trends have yet to support a recovery scenario. Of particular concern is a continued contraction in corporate real money balances, which chimes with weakness in national accounts profits data and suggests pressure to cut investment and jobs – chart 2.

Chart 2

Chart 2 showing UK Business Investment (% yoy) & Real Gross Operating Surplus of Corporations / Real PNFC* M4 (% yoy) *Private Non-Financial Corporations

The latest labour market numbers hint at negative dynamics. LFS employment (three-month moving average) fell sharply in December / January and is now down 346,000 from a March 2023 peak. Private sector weakness has been partly obscured by solid growth of public sector employment – up by 140,000 or 2.5% in the year to December.

Ugly unemployment headlines have been avoided only because of a sharp fall in labour force participation. The unemployment rate of 16-64 year olds would have risen by 1.2 pp rather than 0.3 pp over the last year if realised employment had been accompanied by a stable inactivity rate – chart 3.

Chart 3

Chart 3 showing UK Unemployment & Inactivity % of Labour Force, 16-64 Years

Claims of labour market resilience rest partly on the HMRC payrolled employees series but this fell for a second month in March, although numbers are often revised significantly. (A previous post argued that this series has been distorted upwards by rising inclusion of self-employed workers in PAYE.)

A recent revival in housing market activity, meanwhile, could prove short-lived unless mortgage rates resume a downtrend soon. The latest Credit Conditions Survey signalled that banks plan to expand loan supply in Q2 but the balance (seasonally adjusted) expecting stronger demand fell back sharply – chart 4. Majorities continue to report and expect higher defaults, consistent with gathering labour market weakness – chart 5.

Chart 4

Chart 4 showing UK Mortgage Approvals for House Purchase (yoy change, 000s) & BoE CCS Future Demand for / Availability of Secured Credit to Households

Chart 5

Chart 5 showing UK Unemployment Rate (3m change) & Net % of Banks Reporting Increase in Default Rate on Secured Credit to Households

Six-month core CPI momentum has returned to a target-consistent level in the Eurozone and UK, with January readings of 2.1% and 1.9% annualised respectively*. US momentum is significantly higher, at 3.6% – see chart 1. What explains this gap?

Chart 1

Chart 1 showing Core Consumer Prices (% 6m annualised)

One answer is that the US CPI is overstating core pressure. The six-month increase in the Fed’s preferred core PCE measure was 1.9% annualised in December. Assuming a monthly rise of 0.4% in January (the same as for core CPI), six-month momentum would firm to 2.4% – still little different from Eurozone / UK core CPI readings.

The stronger rise in the US CPI than the PCE index reflects a higher weighting of housing rents and a faster measured increase in “supercore” services prices.

Perhaps reality lies somewhere between the two gauges, i.e. the stickiness of US core CPI momentum is at least partly genuine. If so, the US / European divergence may be explicable by monetary trends in 2021-22.

Previous posts highlighted the close correspondence between the slowdowns in Eurozone and UK six-month CPI momentum and profiles of broad money growth two years earlier. Chart 2 updates the UK comparison to incorporate January CPI data.

Chart 2

Chart 2 showing UK Consumer Prices & Broad Money (% 6m annualised)

UK and Eurozone six-month broad money momentum peaked in summer 2020 and had returned to the pre-pandemic range by late 2021. This is consistent with the reversion of six-month headline and core CPI momentum to target-consistent levels around end-2023.

US broad money momentum followed a different path, with a more extreme surge in summer 2020, a return to earth in H2 2020 and a secondary rise in H1 2021, driven partly by disbursement of stimulus checks in December 2020 and March 2021 – chart 3.

Chart 3

Chart 3 showing US Consumer Prices & Broad Money (% 6m annualised)

The sharp fall in US six-month money growth during H2 2020 was echoed by a slowdown in CPI momentum into end-2022 – much earlier than occurred in the Eurozone and UK. More recent CPI stickiness may reflect the lagged effects of the secondary monetary acceleration into mid-2021.

What does this suggest for absolute and relative prospects? The judgement here is that broad money growth of 4-5% pa is consistent with 2% inflation over the medium term. US six-month money momentum crossed below both this range and UK / Eurozone momentum in May 2022, reaching an eventual low in February 2023, at a weaker level than (later) lows in the UK / Eurozone.

Assuming a two-year lead, this suggests that US six-month core CPI momentum will move down to 2% around mid-2024 on the way to a larger (though possibly shorter) undershoot than in the UK / Eurozone.

*Eurozone = ECB seasonally adjusted CPI excluding energy and food including alcohol and tobacco. UK = own measure additionally excluding education and incorporating estimated effects of VAT changes, seasonally adjusted.