A modest upside inflation surprise in March has been portrayed as confirming that inflationary pressures remain sticky, warranting further delay in policy easing.

The stickiness charge is bizarre in the context of recent aggregate data. The six-month rate of change of core consumer prices, seasonally adjusted, has fallen from a peak of 8.4% annualised in July 2023 to 2.4% in March – see chart 1.

Chart 1

Chart 1 showing UK Consumer Prices & Broad Money (% 6m annualised)

Six-month momentum, admittedly, has moved sideways over the last four months. This mirrors a pause in the slowdown in six-month broad money growth in early 2022, with the relationship suggesting a resumption of the core downtrend from around May.

Claims of stickiness focus on measures of core services momentum. Such measures gave no forewarning of the inflation upswing and are unsurprisingly also lagging in the downswing.

“Monetarist” theory is that monetary conditions determine trends in nominal spending and aggregate inflation, with the goods / services split reflecting relative demand / supply considerations.

Global goods prices have been under downward pressure because of rising supply and falling input costs (until recently), resulting in a diversion of nominal demand and pricing power to services.

So a monetarist forecast is that a recovery in goods momentum is likely to be associated with faster services disinflation within a continuing aggregate inflation downswing.

A subsidiary argument to the sticky inflation view is that the MPC can afford to be cautious about policy easing because the economy is regaining momentum.

Monetary trends have yet to support a recovery scenario. Of particular concern is a continued contraction in corporate real money balances, which chimes with weakness in national accounts profits data and suggests pressure to cut investment and jobs – chart 2.

Chart 2

Chart 2 showing UK Business Investment (% yoy) & Real Gross Operating Surplus of Corporations / Real PNFC* M4 (% yoy) *Private Non-Financial Corporations

The latest labour market numbers hint at negative dynamics. LFS employment (three-month moving average) fell sharply in December / January and is now down 346,000 from a March 2023 peak. Private sector weakness has been partly obscured by solid growth of public sector employment – up by 140,000 or 2.5% in the year to December.

Ugly unemployment headlines have been avoided only because of a sharp fall in labour force participation. The unemployment rate of 16-64 year olds would have risen by 1.2 pp rather than 0.3 pp over the last year if realised employment had been accompanied by a stable inactivity rate – chart 3.

Chart 3

Chart 3 showing UK Unemployment & Inactivity % of Labour Force, 16-64 Years

Claims of labour market resilience rest partly on the HMRC payrolled employees series but this fell for a second month in March, although numbers are often revised significantly. (A previous post argued that this series has been distorted upwards by rising inclusion of self-employed workers in PAYE.)

A recent revival in housing market activity, meanwhile, could prove short-lived unless mortgage rates resume a downtrend soon. The latest Credit Conditions Survey signalled that banks plan to expand loan supply in Q2 but the balance (seasonally adjusted) expecting stronger demand fell back sharply – chart 4. Majorities continue to report and expect higher defaults, consistent with gathering labour market weakness – chart 5.

Chart 4

Chart 4 showing UK Mortgage Approvals for House Purchase (yoy change, 000s) & BoE CCS Future Demand for / Availability of Secured Credit to Households

Chart 5

Chart 5 showing UK Unemployment Rate (3m change) & Net % of Banks Reporting Increase in Default Rate on Secured Credit to Households

Woman visiting beautiful town in Cinque Terre coast, Italy.

Despite ongoing macroeconomic uncertainties and some softness in business activity, financial results published from our holdings for 2023 reassured us. On average, both margins and earnings held up relatively well. Here are two examples of holdings that contributed positively during the first quarter of 2024.

Sopra Steria Group:

Sopra has historically managed mid-single digit organic growth in addition to consistent quality M&A to enhance topline growth. Its historical margins, however, have lagged larger peers like Accenture or CapGemini due to the acquisition of Steria in 2014 which was dilutive to margins [Steria was 350 basis points (bps) below Sopra’s margin], as well as some segments and geographies where management has somewhat sacrificed margins for growth. In 2023, despite additional margin dilution from recent acquisitions, Sopra achieved a 9.4% operating margin, its highest since 2011, and much closer to the 10% to 12% expectation for a major European IT service firm. This was driven by increased pricing, operational efficiencies and scale. We expect Sopra to reach and maintain this improved margin profile in the next couple of years, while maintaining a defensive end-market profile than peers. As such, we remain optimistic on the name.

Melia Hotels International:

After the initial collapse of travel in 2020, when Melia saw its sales drop 70% year over year, the resort hotel operator enjoyed explosive revenue growth due to what analysts coined “revenge travel.” While 2023 saw more normalized 14% topline growth after two years of high double-digit growth, there is still plenty of room for sustainable growth on both the top and bottom line. Despite reaching peak EBITDA from 2018, margins remain a full 200 bps before pre-COVID and there is no reason to believe pre-COVID margins cannot be reached again as the inflationary environment normalizes. Furthermore, the company announced earlier this year the sale of 38% of three of its hotels to Santander for €300 million, strengthening Melia’s balance sheet through deleveraging, while highlighting the bank’s confidence in Melia’s growth prospects. Overall, the company appears quite confident in its 2024 outlook. Despite concerns that inflation could impact discretionary spending including travel and lodging, Melia expects low double-digit RevPAR growth driven equally by price and occupancy, which seems supported by strong January and February data.

Over the next weeks, European companies will start publishing their Q1 revenues, and with it, their outlooks for 2024. The comparison basis with Q1 of 2023 could prove challenging, but we are still projecting companies to generate positive earnings growth for this calendar year. Here are some observations that tend to support our view that the economic improvement could continue:

Real wage growth and savings rates are supportive: After experiencing negative mid-single digit growth in 2022, the Eurozone and the UK are now back to positive real wage growth. As a result, saving rates have started to climb and the gap with the US has widen. As shown below, EU and UK gross savings rates are very supportive compared to the US. The economic activity could react positively to a scenario where households decide to shift a portion of that disposable income into consumption.

Savings rates across the US, the UK and the Eurozone

Chart 1: Line graph showing EU, UK and US gross savings rates, 2015 to 2024.
Source: Berenberg.

European optimism is growing: Business surveys and confidence indices are showing early signs of recovery, as indicated by the latest release on the German business outlook. Although it may not immediately translate into new orders, it could play an important role in how the second half of this year develops.

The housing market is stabilizing: Mortgage approvals in the UK bounced back in February to a level not seen since September 2022. A similar picture can be observed in Germany after two years of excessive contractions. Although corporate loans were still declining in the first quarter of 2024, we are starting to see credit conditions easing for mortgages, a first since 2021.

The destocking cycle is coming to an end: The destocking cycle that started in early 2023 has contributed to a very low level of stocks. Some industries might even carry too low a level of stocks in the event that pent-up demand returns in the second half. Any uplift in order intake would require a higher level of stocks, which would revitalize the manufacturing sector.

Valuation discount: The wide valuation gap that exists between Europe and Global could be narrowing as economic indicators and confidence improve. As shown by the 12-month forward earnings index below, small and mid-cap stocks are still trading at discount vis-a-vis Global. A potential rate cut, expected in June, combined with a reacceleration of demand, would likely drive small and mid-cap companies.

Forward 12-month earnings for European companies vs. the Global market

Chart 2: Line graph showing 12-month forward earnings index for Europe and Global small, mid- and large-cap indicies, 2019 to 2024.
Source: Berenberg.

In a world where the unexpected has become the norm, our holdings’ resilience through last year’s ups and downs offers a sense of stability and growth potential amid uncertainty – and an opportunity to think beyond the immediate to what could be on the horizon.

The quarterly commentary in mid-2023 noted that the cycle and monetary analyses were giving conflicting signals. The stockbuilding cycle appeared to be tracing out a low, a development usually associated with stronger performance of equities and other cyclical assets. However, greater weight was accorded to continued weakness in global real narrow money momentum, which suggested downside risk to economic activity and insufficient liquidity to support market gains.

The cycle signal has so far proved the correct one, with cyclical assets rallying strongly over the past five months. Monetary conditions have been more permissive than expected, probably reflecting continued deployment of “excess” money balances left over from the 2020-21 monetary surge, as well as unusual US deficit-financing operations.

What now? Valuations of some cyclical assets appear already to discount a solid and sustained economic upswing. Global real narrow money momentum has recovered slightly but remains negative, while the level of money balances may now be below “equilibrium”. Until money growth normalises, the risk is that an initial stockbuilding cycle recovery will prove disappointingly weak or even fail, with a retest of the 2023 low. A monetary revival, meanwhile, may have been pushed back by major central banks’ caution in reversing 2022-23 policy restriction, although an easing trend is under way in EM.

Commentaries in 2022 argued that the stockbuilding cycle was likely to bottom in 2023, probably in H2, based on the cycle’s 3.33-year average length and the prior low having occurred in Q2 2020. The possibility of an earlier trough was considered, on the view that the current cycle could be shorter than average to compensate for a longer prior cycle (4.25 years).

The key indicator used to monitor the cycle – the annual change in the stockbuilding share of G7 GDP – appears to have reached a major low in Q1 2023. A secondary indicator based on business surveys confirmed this trough in July – see chart 1.

Chart 1

Chart 1 showing G7 Stockbuilding as % of GDP (yoy change) & Business Survey Inventories Indicator

Stockbuilding cycle lows historically were usually associated with nearby major or minor lows in cyclical asset prices. Chart 2 shows the relationship with the relative performance of equity market cyclical sectors, excluding IT and communication services. A cyclical rally gathered pace from April 2023, consistent with a H1 cycle trough.

Chart 2

Chart 2 showing G7 Stockbuilding as % of GDP (yoy change) & MSCI World Cyclical ex Tech* Relative to Defensive ex Energy Sectors *Tech = IT & Communication Services

Why was a scenario anticipated in 2022 sadly underplayed in commentaries last year? The difficulty was that stockbuilding cycle lows historically were preceded by an upturn in global real narrow money momentum – chart 3. A marginal recovery in annual momentum occurred between February and June last year but a relapse to a lower low ensued. With no monetary improvement, and major central banks continuing to tighten into H2, it seemed unlikely that economic news and fund flows would support outperformance of cyclical assets.

Chart 3

Chart 3 showing G7 Stockbuilding as % of GDP (yoy change) & Global* Real Narrow Money (% yoy) *G7 + E7 from 2005, G7 before

One explanation for the disconnect is that real money momentum, while a reliable indicator historically, failed to capture the availability of money to support activity and markets because of an overhang of “excess” balances created by earlier monetary strength. The ratio of the stock of global real narrow money to industrial output at end-2022 was still 4% above its steeply rising pre-pandemic trend – chart 4.

Chart 4

Chart 4 showing Ratio of G7 + E7 Real Narrow Money to Industrial Output* & 1995-2019 Log-Linear Trend *Index, June 1995 = 1.0

The strength of US equities may also have partly reflected the US Treasury’s decision, following the suspension of the debt ceiling in June, to “overfund” the federal deficit via issuance of bills, which were purchased mainly by money-creating institutions. This had the effect of more than offsetting the monetary drag from the Fed’s QT, while low coupon issuance created space in investors’ portfolios for additional purchases of credit and equities.

Support from these influences should be at or close to an end. The ratio of global real narrow money to industrial output returned to its March 2020 level in mid-2023, moving sideways since and now 4% below the pre-pandemic trend – chart 4. The Treasury’s financing plans, meanwhile, envisage a reduction in the bill float in Q2, raising the possibility of renewed monetary US weakness unless the Fed swiftly tapers QT.

Global real narrow money momentum has firmed again since Q3 2023 but remains negative, in both annual and six-month terms. A revival could, in theory, continue even if major central banks delay policy easing: rising economic confidence could be reflected in a switch out of time deposits and money funds into demand / overnight deposits, while EM money trends may improve further in response to recent policy easing. More likely, a normalisation of money growth will require a significant reversal of 2022-23 DM policy rate hikes.

Without a further rise in real money momentum, the initial stockbuilding cycle recovery may prove disappointingly limp or even fizzle altogether, revisiting the H1 2023 low. Such a scenario would pose a major risk to some cyclical assets now apparently discounting solid / sustained economic growth, such as the DM cyclical equities sector basket – chart 5.

Chart 5

Chart 5 showing MSCI World Cyclical ex Tech* vs Defensive ex Energy Sectors Valuation Z-scores *Tech = IT & Communication Services

How could investors sharing the latter concern and favouring a defensive bias hedge against the possibility that a stockbuilding cycle upswing unfolds normally, implying economic acceleration into 2025? Some cyclical assets have lagged, including industrial commodity prices, the DM materials sector and EM cyclical sectors, which – unlike in DM – are at a low valuation versus defensive sectors relative to history.

Chart 6 shows six-month real narrow money momentum in major countries. The US remains above Europe but the gap has narrowed, while, as argued above, the US recovery could go into reverse into Q2. The UK, meanwhile, has crossed above the Eurozone, suggesting improving relative economic prospects following GDP underperformance in the year to Q4.

Chart 6

Chart 6 showing Real Narrow Money (% 6m)

China was a significant contributor to the recent rise in global real narrow money momentum, following record PBoC lending to banks in Q4. Such lending, however, contracted in January / February and a decline in term money rates has stalled, raising concern that the recovery in money growth will falter.

Other notable features include a pick-up in Australia, continued relative weakness in Switzerland and a relapse in Sweden. The suggestion is that the Australian economy will outperform, delaying rate cuts; by contrast, the Swiss National Bank has already embarked on easing, with the Riksbank expected to follow in Q2.

G7 inflation has continued to moderate in line with a simplistic monetarist forecast based on the profile of broad money growth two years earlier. A note in November 2022 suggested that annual consumer price inflation (GDP-weighted average), then at 7.8%, would fall below 3% by December 2023. The latest reading, for February, was 2.9%.

US annual core inflation on the Fed’s favoured PCE measure was 2.8% in February or 2.2% excluding lagging rents. Market concerns about inflation remaining “stubborn” are based on a rebound in shorter-term momentum measures but this has been mainly due to an outsized January gain, possibly reflecting residual seasonality (which could also explain unexpected weakness in late 2023), i.e. these measures are likely to fall back sharply as the January effect drops out.

G7 annual broad money growth continued to decline into April 2023, suggesting that the primary inflation trend will remain down into H1 2025. The reduction to date, however, was accelerated by post-pandemic normalisation of supply chains and weakness in commodity prices – the former effect is over and commodity prices usually rise during stockbuilding cycle upswings. The baseline view here remains that inflation rates will return to target by H2 2024 with significant risk of a subsequent undershoot and no sustained rebound before H2 2025.

US economic “resilience” in 2023, recent inflation stabilisation and buoyant risk asset markets raise the question of whether the current level of policy rates is restrictive.

A “neutral” level of rates, according to the monetarist view, is one that results in monetary growth consistent with target inflation. Based on 2010s experience, US broad money expansion of about 5% pa could reasonably be expected to yield medium-term inflation of 2%. (“Broad money” here refers to an expanded M2 measure – “M2+” – incorporating large time deposits at commercial banks and institutional money funds.)

The six-month rate of change of broad money recovered from negative territory in early 2023 to 3.7% annualised in January, remaining at this level in February – see chart 1. This might be taken to suggest that the economy is adjusting to the higher level of rates and the current deviation from “neutral” is modest.

Chart 1

Chart 1 showing US Broad / Narrow Money (% 6m annualised)

Money growth over the past year, however, was boosted by unusual deficit financing operations, which more than offset monetary destruction due to the Fed’s QT. The Treasury’s plans to scale back bill issuance imply a sharp reversal in Q2, as previously discussed.

Put differently, the “neutral” level of rates may have been temporarily lifted by the Treasury’s financing operations but a relapse is now likely.

Could a recovery in bank lending offset a near-term drag on money growth from less expansionary Treasury operations and ongoing QT? Six-month growth of commercial bank loans appears to have bottomed in late 2023 but was only 2.1% annualised in February, while the last Fed loan officer survey remained downbeat – chart 2.

Chart 2

Chart 2 showing US Commercial Bank Loans & Leases (% 6m annualised) & Fed Senior Loan Officer Survey Credit Demand & Supply Indicators* *Weighted Average of Balances across Loan Categories

The suggestion that “neutral” is significantly lower than the current level of policy rates is supported by narrow money trends. (“Narrow money” = M1A = currency in circulation plus demand deposits.) Six-month momentum also recovered during 2023 but peaked at only 1.7% annualised in December, easing to 1.2% in February – chart 1.

Narrow money may be re-entering contraction – monthly changes were negative in January and February.

The latest US data support concern that a minor recovery in global six-month real narrow money momentum is about to go into reverse.

Meanwhile, weakness in US “hard” economic data for January / February has, perhaps, received less attention than it deserves. Average levels of retail sales, industrial production, durable goods orders and household survey employment were lower than in Q4 – chart 3. March data could change the story but joint quarterly declines were historically characteristic of recessions.

Chart 3

Chart 3 showing US Activity Indicators (% qoq)

Global six-month real narrow money momentum – a key leading indicator in the forecasting approach employed here – has recovered from a low in September 2023 but remains negative and could be stalling. Allowing for the typical lead, this suggests a slide in economic momentum into mid-year with limited subsequent revival.

Monetary trends, therefore, cast doubt on the current market consensus view that a global cyclical upswing is under way.

The real money / economic momentum relationship is primarily directional, i.e. involving turning points rather than levels. Chart 1 highlights related troughs in six-month rates of change of global (i.e. G7 plus E7) real narrow money and industrial output since 2000. The average lead time at these lows was eight months, with a range of four to 14.

Chart 1

Chart 1 showing G7 + E7 Industrial Output & Real Narrow Money (% 6m)

So the September 2023 low in real money momentum could be associated with an output momentum low any time between January and December 2024.

The directional relationship was briefly disrupted during the pandemic but has since been reestablished: a trough in real money momentum in June 2022 was followed by an output momentum low in December 2022, with subsequent peaks in December 2022 and October 2023 respectively.

Six-month output growth in January was the slowest since May.

While the directional relationship is intact, output momentum in 2022-23 was much stronger than suggested by prior levels of real money momentum. As previously discussed, this is probably attributable to a monetary “overhang” from rapid growth in 2020-21. The ratio of the stock of global real narrow money to industrial output returned to its March 2020 level in September last year and has since moved sideways, arguing for a normalisation of the levels relationship of real money and economic momentum.

The recovery in real money momentum between September 2023 and January 2024 was broadly based across countries but the US pick-up reversed in January – see previous post – while Chinese / Japanese momentum declined in February – chart 2. So the global revival could be stalling with momentum still negative. (A February update will be provided following release of US / Eurozone monetary data next week.)

Chart 2

Chart 2 showing Real Narrow Money (% 6m)

How do monetary signals compare with messages from the yield curve?

Chart 3 shows a longer-term history of six-month rates of change of global industrial output and real narrow money, along with the differential between GDP-weighted averages of 10-year government bond yields and three-month money rates. (The chart splices together G7 data through 2004 with subsequent G7 plus E7 numbers.)

Chart 3

Chart 3 showing Global* Industrial Output (% 6m), Real Narrow Money (% 6m) & Yield Curve *G7 + E7 from 2005, G7 before

The directional leading relationship between real money and economic momentum is equally convincing pre-2000, with a similar average lead time.

The yield curve has broadly mirrored trends in real money momentum, with a slight tendency for money to lead. However, the curve predicted fewer output momentum turning points, particularly in recent years, i.e. monetary signals have been more informative and reliable.

Continued yield curve inversion is consistent with still-negative real money momentum. An increase in inversion since October, moreover, contrasts with the recent monetary recovery, supporting concern that the latter may be stalling.

Combinations of negative real money momentum and an inverted curve were always followed by global recessions. The longest interval between a joint signal and recession onset was in 1989-90: real money momentum and the yield curve were both negative in April 1989, with a recession judged to have started in November 1990*.

The most recent joint signal occurred in October 2022, when the yield curve moved into inversion. Based on history, a recession would be expected by May 2024 at the latest. Are markets premature in sounding the all-clear? Assuming no downturn through May, should the signal be disregarded? Do I feel lucky?

*The recession bands in the chart begin when the six-month change in industrial output turns negative ahead of a fall to below -1.25% (not annualised).

The Fed’s quarterly financial accounts provide information on sector money trends and funds flows. Several features of the Q4 accounts, released last week, are noteworthy.

First, net retirement of equities by non-financial corporations (via buy-backs and cash take-overs) reached a record dollar amount ($270 billion) in Q4, confirming that corporate buying was a key driver of the year-end rally – see chart 1.

Chart 1

Chart 1 showing US Non-Financial Corporations: Net Retirement of Equities ($ bn)

The rise in equity purchases followed strong growth of non-financial business broad money holdings in the year to end-Q3, discussed in a previous post. Such holdings, however, contracted slightly in Q4, pulling annual growth down from 10.6% to 6.2% – chart 2.

Chart 2

Chart 2 showing US Broad Money Holdings by Sector (% yoy)

Financial business money holdings had surged in the year to end-Q1 2023, perhaps partly reflecting cash-raising related to equity market weakness in 2022. These balances were run down during H2, though still finished the year slightly higher than at end-2022.

The recent weaker trends in non-financial and financial business money suggest less buying support for equities and other risk assets going forward.

Household broad money, by contrast, rose solidly in Q4, resulting in the annual change returning to positive territory. The ratio of money holdings to disposable income recovered slightly following six consecutive quarterly declines, remaining above its pre-pandemic trend, in contrast to shortfalls for corresponding Eurozone and UK ratios – chart 3.

Chart 3

Chart 3 showing Household Broad Money to Disposable Income Ratios

The Q4 financial accounts also contain initial estimates of corporate profits and gross domestic income (GDI). Profits after tax adjusted for stock appreciation and economic depreciation rose at a 2.5% annualised rate last quarter and remain below a peak reached in Q3 2022 – chart 4, blue line. The range-bound movement is consistent with S&P 500 earnings data and questions perceptions of economic / profits strength.

Chart 4

Chart 4 showing US National Accounts Corporate Profits & S&P 500 Aggregate Earnings ($ bn)

GDI is an alternative estimate of GDP and has consistently lagged the headline expenditure-based measure in recent quarters – see previous post. It did so again in Q4, rising at a 1.9% annualised rate versus headline GDP growth of 3.2% – chart 5. GDI grew by just 1.2% in the year to Q4.

Chart 5

Chart 5 showing US GDP / Gross Domestic Income (% qoq annualised)

US monetary conditions eased during H2 2023, reflecting the Treasury’s decision to skew debt issuance towards bills and the Fed’s December pivot. This loosening is now reversing, partly because of the recent sticky inflation scare and associated back-up in yields, and prospectively as the Treasury scales back bill financing in Q2.

January monetary statistics are consistent with a turnaround. The narrow M1A measure followed here contracted by 1.4% on the month, more than reversing a 1.0% December gain. Broad money M2+ stagnated after a 0.8% December rise*.

Six-month M2+ growth appears to be rolling over in line with the forecast in a previous post – see chart 1. To recap, sales of Treasury bills to money funds should continue to offset the monetary impact of the Fed’s QT during Q1 but the Treasury’s plans to redeem bills in Q2 imply a dramatic contractionary shift – unless the Fed simultaneously halts QT.

Chart 1

Chart 1 showing US Broad Money M2+ (6m change, $ bn) & Sum of Fed & Treasury QE / QT (6m sum, $ bn)

Prospective monetary weakness poses a threat to risk assets and could coincide with economic news that derails the current soft / no landing consensus. This consensus has been bolstered by a recent pick-up in the ISM manufacturing new orders index, a widely-watched cyclical indicator. A post in July signalled a coming ISM rebound but suggested that it would prove temporary.

That remains the base-case view here. A relapse is expected in reflection of global real narrow money weakness into last autumn and on the view that the 2022-23 stockbuilding cycle downswing has yet to reach a final low.

US six-month real narrow money momentum has led swings in ISM new orders historically. The currency component has displayed a slightly stronger correlation than the aggregate, probably because of a linkage with retail goods spending – chart 2. Real currency momentum signalled the current ISM recovery but has been moving lower since last summer. January retail sales weakness may have been more than weather-related and the ISM recovery may be about to abort.

Chart 2

Chart 2 showing US ISM Manufacturing New Orders & Real Currency in Circulation (% 6m)

*M1A = currency in circulation plus demand deposits. M2+ = M2 plus large time deposits at commercial banks and institutional money funds.

Chinese monetary statistics for January suggest that policy easing is starting to become effective.

Six-month growth of narrow money, as measured by true M1*, rebounded from a negative December reading to its highest level since May – see chart 1.

Chart 1

Chart 1 showing China Nominal GDP & Narrow Money (% 6m)

Q1 numbers can be volatile because of New Year timing effects, so improvement needs to be confirmed by February / March data.

True M1 can be broken down into “private” and “public” sector components. The former aggregates currency in circulation and demand deposits of households and non-financial enterprises. The latter is calculated as a residual and is dominated by demand deposits of government departments and organisations.

Six-month growth rates of both components rose in January but the public sector increase was much larger, consistent with funds being mobilised to boost fiscal spending – chart 2.

Chart 2

Chart 2 showing China True M1 Breakdown (% 6m)

Progress in implementing fiscal stimulus is also suggested by a strong rise in central government deposits – these are excluded from money definitions but deployment of funds will have a positive monetary impact.

The broader M2 measure continues to outpace narrow money, with six-month growth little changed in January, extending a recent sideways movement. In terms of the “credit counterparts”, domestic credit expansion has firmed since late 2023 but there has been an offsetting increase in non-monetary funding (“other liabilities”) – chart 3.

Chart 3

Chart 3 showing China M2 & Credit Counterparts Contributions to M2 % 6m

A reduction in the broad / narrow money growth gap driven by narrow acceleration is usually a positive economic signal, indicating a rise in broad money velocity.

The January narrow money recovery, as noted, partly reflects implementation of fiscal spending plans. A sustained pick-up requires monetary policy to be sufficiently accommodative. Recent developments are promising. PBoC lending to the banking system grew by a record amount in Q4. Banks’ excess reserve ratio rose to 2.1%, the highest since Q4 2020 – before the recent 0.5 pp further reduction in the requirement ratio. The reserves injection has contributed to three-month SHIBOR reversing half of its August-December rise since the start of the year – chart 4. Currency weakness has remained contained despite softer rates; indeed, the JP Morgan effective index has risen slightly year-to-date.

Chart 4

Chart 4 showing China Interest Rates

Monetary deterioration into late 2023 argues for economic weakness through H1 2024. Confirmation that monetary trends have turned would suggest improving prospects for H2.

*Official M1 plus household demand deposits. M1 conventionally includes such deposits but they are omitted from the Chinese official measure for historical reasons.

Six-month core CPI momentum has returned to a target-consistent level in the Eurozone and UK, with January readings of 2.1% and 1.9% annualised respectively*. US momentum is significantly higher, at 3.6% – see chart 1. What explains this gap?

Chart 1

Chart 1 showing Core Consumer Prices (% 6m annualised)

One answer is that the US CPI is overstating core pressure. The six-month increase in the Fed’s preferred core PCE measure was 1.9% annualised in December. Assuming a monthly rise of 0.4% in January (the same as for core CPI), six-month momentum would firm to 2.4% – still little different from Eurozone / UK core CPI readings.

The stronger rise in the US CPI than the PCE index reflects a higher weighting of housing rents and a faster measured increase in “supercore” services prices.

Perhaps reality lies somewhere between the two gauges, i.e. the stickiness of US core CPI momentum is at least partly genuine. If so, the US / European divergence may be explicable by monetary trends in 2021-22.

Previous posts highlighted the close correspondence between the slowdowns in Eurozone and UK six-month CPI momentum and profiles of broad money growth two years earlier. Chart 2 updates the UK comparison to incorporate January CPI data.

Chart 2

Chart 2 showing UK Consumer Prices & Broad Money (% 6m annualised)

UK and Eurozone six-month broad money momentum peaked in summer 2020 and had returned to the pre-pandemic range by late 2021. This is consistent with the reversion of six-month headline and core CPI momentum to target-consistent levels around end-2023.

US broad money momentum followed a different path, with a more extreme surge in summer 2020, a return to earth in H2 2020 and a secondary rise in H1 2021, driven partly by disbursement of stimulus checks in December 2020 and March 2021 – chart 3.

Chart 3

Chart 3 showing US Consumer Prices & Broad Money (% 6m annualised)

The sharp fall in US six-month money growth during H2 2020 was echoed by a slowdown in CPI momentum into end-2022 – much earlier than occurred in the Eurozone and UK. More recent CPI stickiness may reflect the lagged effects of the secondary monetary acceleration into mid-2021.

What does this suggest for absolute and relative prospects? The judgement here is that broad money growth of 4-5% pa is consistent with 2% inflation over the medium term. US six-month money momentum crossed below both this range and UK / Eurozone momentum in May 2022, reaching an eventual low in February 2023, at a weaker level than (later) lows in the UK / Eurozone.

Assuming a two-year lead, this suggests that US six-month core CPI momentum will move down to 2% around mid-2024 on the way to a larger (though possibly shorter) undershoot than in the UK / Eurozone.

*Eurozone = ECB seasonally adjusted CPI excluding energy and food including alcohol and tobacco. UK = own measure additionally excluding education and incorporating estimated effects of VAT changes, seasonally adjusted.

UK real money contraction warned of 2022 economic stagnation and 2023 recession. Weakness has abated but real money measures have yet to resume expansion, casting doubt on hopes of a sustainable economic recovery.

The latest ONS numbers are consistent with a recession having started in Q2 2023. Among key features of the GDP release:

  • Gross value added (GVA) at basic prices peaked in Q1 2023, falling by 0.03% in Q2, 0.16% in Q3 and 0.34% in Q4.
  • The cumulative decline in GVA / GDP of 0.5% between Q2 and Q4 is inconsistent with a description of the economy as “flatlining”.
  • Similarly, claims that the consumer has been holding up are no longer tenable given a 1.0% cumulative contraction in household consumption between Q2 and Q4.
  • GDP / GVA fell by 0.2% and 0.3% respectively in the year to Q4, meeting a stronger recession definition than the two-quarter rule (in contrast to Japanese GDP also released today).
  • Nominal as well as real GDP fell in Q4, with the GDP deflator rising at a 2.0% annualised pace between Q2 and Q4.

The suggestion of cyclical peak in Q1 2023 is supported by the LFS employment measure, which reached a high in the three-month period centred on March. (The LFS aggregate is 10% larger than the PAYE employment series, reflecting coverage of self-employment.) Aggregate hours worked also peaked then, falling 1.5% through November.

Real money measures began to contract in H2 2021. GDP stagnated from Q2 2022, consistent with the usual lag. The six-month rates of decline of real narrow and broad money reached a peak in March 2023, warning of H2 economic contraction – see chart 1.

Chart 1

Chart 1 showing UK GDP & Real Narrow / Broad Money (% 6m)

Six-month real money momentum has recovered significantly but has yet to turn positive. Slowing inflation has been a key driver, while nominal broad money is no longer contracting. Economic weakness may abate in H1 2024 but current monetary trends appear inconsistent with a meaningful recovery. Early rate cuts are urgently required to limit still-significant downside risk and head off an extended inflation undershoot.