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Recent policy upheavals may eventually prove inflationary but near-term risks are judged here to remain on the downside.

In common with conditions preceding the 2021-22 inflation upsurge, recent developments combine elements of a negative supply shock (tariffs, supply chain disruption, reduced US labour supply) with a potentially major demand boost (ramped-up European defence / infrastructure spending, US tax cuts).

The difference is that the earlier episode involved an immediate surge in money growth as fiscal blowouts were financed by money creation and central banks added fuel to the fire by slashing rates and launching large-scale QE.

Current fiscal developments will plausibly boost money growth as deficit financing needs expand and / or central banks and commercial banking systems are required to provide a greater proportion of funding to limit upward pressure on government borrowing costs. Unlike 2020, this will play out over years rather than months, however. Monetary financing is currently contributing little to G7 broad money growth, though has picked up in China – see chart 1.

Chart 1

Central banks, meanwhile, have turned more cautious rather than stepping on the gas, and policy uncertainty is suppressing business / consumer confidence, which may be reflected in less money growth support from private sector credit demand.

G7 annual broad money growth recovered further in January but, at 4.1%, is still below its 2015-19 average, which was associated with sub-2% headline / core inflation averages – chart 2.

Chart 2

Six-month growth is stronger, at an annualised 5.2%, but hardly ringing inflationary alarm bells.

Has potential economic growth fallen since the 2010s, so that a given level of money expansion is more inflationary than then? Arguments are mixed – possibly weaker labour supply expansion versus AI deployment and higher European investment spending.

The monetarist rule of thumb of a roughly two-year lag between changes in money growth and their maximum impact on inflation conceals significant historical variation but has worked near perfectly in recent years.

With annual money growth bottoming in H1 2023 and only now returning to a “normal” level, the suggestion was that annual inflation rates would fall further in 2025 and remain low through 2026.

Tariff hikes will have a price level impact but second-round effects are unlikely given the restrictive influence of earlier monetary weakness. A (small) lift to annual inflation this year should, therefore, reverse in 2026, raising the possibility that the lag between the H1 2023 money growth low and associated inflation low will extend to around three years on this occasion (still well within the historical range).

The forecast of a local peak in global industrial momentum – proxied by the manufacturing PMI new orders index – around end-Q1 appears to be on track. Monetary trends suggest a modest pull-back over Q2 / Q3 followed by renewed strength in late 2025. US policy actions threaten more pronounced and sustained weakness.

Global manufacturing PMI new orders rose further in February, moving above last year’s May peak to reach the highest level since March 2022 – see chart 1.

Chart 1

The upswing from a low last September, on the view here, reflects a rise in global six-month real narrow money momentum between September 2023 and April 2024 – turning points in money momentum have led the PMI by 10-13 months in recent years.

Real money momentum, however, eased between April and October 2024 before rising to new highs more recently. The suggestion was that the industrial pick-up would pause over spring / summer 2025 but strengthen further into 2026.

The view that the PMI new orders index is at or close to a peak is supported by a February fall in an alternative indicator combining forward-looking components of national business surveys (ISM for the US, NBS for China, Ifo for Germany etc.) – chart 2.

Chart 2

The global earnings revisions ratio also exhibits a contemporaneous correlation with the PMI and declined last month.

The baseline scenario of a modest PMI correction followed by renewed strength has, of course, been called into question by recent US policy actions.

Monetary trends are, for the moment, still giving a reassuring message, with global six-month real narrow money momentum rising slightly further in January – chart 1.

This increase, however, was due to additional strength in China, with US / Eurozone narrow money measures stalling in January, as previously discussed. In contrast to the global (i.e. G7 plus E7) measure, G7 six-month real money momentum has been moving sideways since August – chart 3.

Chart 3

A recent back-up in Chinese money market rates, meanwhile, could presage less upbeat monetary data – chart 4.

Chart 4

A renewed fall in global real narrow money momentum would suggest more lasting / self-reinforcing damage from the US policy shock.

Reciprocal tariffs represent an indirect tax rise on cross-border trade in goods.

The US might be expected to suffer less damage from a global rise in tariffs than China and the EU because trade is a lower share of GDP.

Such logic, however, does not apply currently because conflict is occurring in US bilateral relationships rather than globally. So the share of GDP potentially affected by tariffs is larger for the US than China / the EU.

Goods imports from countries currently on President Trump’s tariffs hit list represent about 7% of US GDP, with a suggested 20% blended hike implying an effective tax rise of 1.4% of GDP ($410 bn) – see chart 1.

Chart 1

Assuming full reciprocity, Chinese and EU tariffs will affect imports accounting for less than 1% and less than 2% of their GDPs respectively – chart 2.

Chart 2

By contrast, Canada and Mexico will impose a much larger effective tax rise than in the US if they reciprocate Trump’s tariff rates (which is why they won’t) – chart 3.

Chart 3

A reasonable baseline assumption is that tariff burdens will be shared equally between domestic consumers and foreign producers. Assuming full reciprocity, the US would suffer more than China / the EU (but much less than Canada / Mexico) – see table.

Advocates of tariffs claim that their imposition will boost the dollar, resulting in an improvement in the terms of trade that offsets the effective tax rise on consumers. Tariff revenues will be available to cut taxes or reduce the deficit, for a net economic gain.

This is magical thinking and begs the question of why tariff-raising has not previously been recognised as an optimal economic strategy. Equally plausible is that tariffs will undermine US economic outperformance and weaken the dollar / terms of trade, compounding the hit to domestic purchasing power.

The forecast of global manufacturing acceleration into H1 2025 is playing out but lagged money trends suggest that the pick-up will stall over the spring / summer before resuming in late 2025. A trade war could turn a stall into a more serious set-back.

The global manufacturing PMI new orders index crossed back above the 50 level in January, reaching its highest level since May. An alternative indicator combining new orders or output expectations components of national business surveys (ISM for the US, Ifo for Germany, CBI for the UK etc) mirrored the PMI increase – see chart 1.

Chart 1

The forecast of a pick-up was based on a rise in global six-month real narrow money momentum from September 2023 through April 2024. Turning points in real money momentum have led survey turning points by 11-13 months in recent years. The survey lows in September 2024 arrived on schedule – chart 2.

Chart 2

The leading relationship had been the basis for an earlier forecast of a “double dip” in the survey indicators into H2 2024.

The upswing in six-month month real narrow money momentum, however, stalled between April and October 2024, before resuming in November / December. Based on recent lead times, this suggests a local peak in PMI new orders / the alternative indicator around March 2025 and a minor fall through Q3.The latest money numbers are giving a positive signal for late 2025.

This profile, of course, takes no account of possible trade disruption from a US-led global tariff war, which could accentuate mid-year weakness and might also affect monetary prospects (to the extent that negative confidence effects cause households and firms to defer spending, reducing their demand to hold narrow money).

An alternative explanation for the recent manufacturing pick-up is that demand / production has been pulled forward as importers stockpile ahead of new or higher tariffs. Inventories components of business surveys, however, don’t currently suggest unusual behaviour – chart 3.

Chart 3

The forecast of a minor peak in global manufacturing momentum this spring could imply relief for US Treasuries.

The low / stable inflation environment of the 2010s was associated with a strong positive correlation between Treasury yields and economic momentum. This broke down in 2021-22 as surging inflation became the dominant driver of yields – chart 4.

Chart 4

With inflation normalising, the 2010s relationship may be returning. Lows in the business survey indicator in May 2023 and September 2024 were reflected in nearby lows in Treasury yields.

An approaching local peak in the survey indicator coupled with expected further favourable inflation news could open up downside for yields into H2.

The cycles framework used here suggests a window for global economic strength in H2 2025 / H1 2026 as the stockbuilding and business investment cycles move towards peaks – see previous commentary. This scenario, however, requires confirmation from a pick-up in global real money momentum into mid-2025.

December money numbers are tentatively supportive. Six-month growth rates of narrow and broad money rose across the US, Japan, Eurozone and China – charts 1 and 2.

Chart 1

Chart 2

Based on monetary data covering 84% of the aggregate, global (i.e. G7 plus E7) six-month real narrow money momentum is estimated to have reached its highest since 2021 (October). The rise in nominal growth in December was partly offset by an energy-driven increase in six-month consumer price momentum – chart 3.

Chart 3

Several qualifications are in order. The positive signal from the recent pick-up relates to economic prospects for H2 2025, based on the usual six to 12 months lag. H1 performance is expected to be weak, reflecting stalled real narrow money momentum between April and October 2024.

Real money momentum, moreover, remains low by historical standards. A rise at least to the 2010-19 average is necessary to validate a late 2025 / H1 2026 economic “boomlet” scenario – chart 4.

Chart 4

The rise in longer-term interest rates in the US and Europe since the start of December, meanwhile, could slow or reverse the money growth pick-up.

Despite rising in November / December, US six-month real narrow money momentum remains below its August peak. With China / Europe catching up, US economic and / or equity market outperformance may fade or reverse – chart 5.

Chart 5

It is much too early to worry about a money growth revival fuelling another inflation pick-up. G7 annual broad money growth is still slightly below its average over 2015-19, a rate of expansion associated with below-target headline / core inflation outcomes – chart 6. The roughly two-year lag in the relationship suggests further downward pressure on inflation in 2025 and no serious upside threat before late 2026 at the earliest.

Chart 6

Monetary trends suggest that the global economy will remain soft in H1 2025, while inflation rates will fall further, undershooting targets. Cycle analysis holds out a prospect of economic reacceleration later in the year but risk assets might have limited further upside even in this scenario, although international / EM equities might regain relative performance.

Global six-month real narrow money momentum recovered from a low in September 2023 into Q2 2024 but has since moved sideways at a weak level by historical standards – see chart 1. Based on a normal six to 12 month lead, this suggests below-trend economic growth through Q2 2025, at least.

Chart 1

Economies exhibiting monetary weakness are at greater risk from negative policy or other shocks. As an example, a fizzling-out of a recovery in UK six-month real narrow money momentum in H1 2024 signalled an approaching growth stall but the Budget tax shock appears to have tipped the economy into contraction.

With job openings / vacancy rates back in pre-pandemic ranges, below-trend global growth is likely to be associated with greater deterioration in labour markets than in 2024. In economics parlance, a movement down the Beveridge curve may be approaching a gradient shift such that a further fall in vacancies will be associated with a significant unemployment rise.

A further issue for monetary economists is the “false” US recession signal of 2022-23. Most annual contractions in US real narrow money historically were associated with recessions, and all on the scale of the 2023 decline – see chart 2. On three occasions (highlighted), however, the interval between the start of the contraction and the onset of recession was unusually long, i.e. up to 32 months.

Chart 2

On inflation, the monetarist rule of thumb that price momentum follows the direction of broad money growth roughly two years earlier suggests a further slowdown into undershoot territory in H1 2025. Chart 3 shows the relationship for the Eurozone but the message of headline / core deceleration is the same for the US, Japan and the UK.

Chart 3

Global PMI output price indices in manufacturing and services are close to 2015-19 averages, when headline / core inflation averages were below target.

Financial market prospects, on the “monetarist” view, depend on whether there is “excess” or “deficient” money relative to the economy’s needs. Two flow measures of global excess money were used here historically – the gap between six-month rates of change of real narrow money and industrial output, and the deviation of the annual change in real money from a slow moving average. A “safety first” approach of holding global equities only when both measures were positive would have outperformed buy-and-hold significantly over the long run.

The flow measures, however, remained mixed / negative in 2023-24, understating the availability of money to boost markets because they failed to capture a stock overhang from the 2020-21 monetary surge. To assess whether this stock influence remains positive, the approach here has been to use a modified version of the quantity theory in which the money stock is compared with an average of nominal GDP and gross wealth.

Chart 4 shows that an average of US nominal GDP and gross wealth remained below the level implied by the money stock through mid-2024, consistent with a positive stock influence on asset prices / the economy. Equivalent analysis for Japan and the Eurozone shows the same. In all three cases, however, the nominal GDP / wealth average moved ahead of the money stock during H2 2024, implying that stock and flow indicators are now aligned in suggesting a neutral / negative backdrop.

Chart 4

While monetary indicators suggest near-term softness, cycle analysis holds out a prospect of stronger economic performance later in 2025 and in 2026. A key consideration is that the stockbuilding and business investment cycles appear some way from reaching peaks, with the next lows unlikely before H2 2026 and 2027 respectively.

The last trough in the stockbuilding cycle is judged to have occurred in Q1 2023, with national accounts inventories data and business surveys suggesting that the upswing is around its mid-point – chart 5. The previous cycle was shorter than the 3.5 year average, so the current one could be longer, with a low as late as H1 2027. An associated downswing might not start until H1 2026.

Chart 5

The 7-11 year business investment cycle appears to have bottomed in 2020, although a case could be made that this was a false low due to the pandemic, with the last genuine trough reached following a mild downswing in 2015-16. On the more plausible former view, the next low is scheduled for 2027 or later, implying potential for a 2026 boom.

The longer-term housing cycle, which bottomed in 2009 and has averaged 18 years, is in the time window for a peak but significant weakness could be delayed until H2 2026 or later.

Monetary and cycle signals could be reconciled if near-term economic weakness / favourable inflation news triggers faster monetary policy easing and a strong pick-up in money growth into mid-year.

Would such a scenario be associated with further significant gains in risk assets? The history of the stockbuilding cycle suggests not.

Risk assets typically rally strongly in the first half of a stockbuilding cycle, partially retracing gains in the run-up to the next trough. Table 1 compares movements so far in the current cycle with averages at the same stage of the previous eight cycles, along with changes over the remainder of those cycles. US equities, cyclical sectors and precious metals have outperformed relative to history, suggesting a stronger likelihood that they will lose ground between now and the next trough.

Table 1

Areas that have lagged relative to history include EAFE / EM equities, small caps and industrial commodities, hinting at catch-up potential in the event of a delayed stockbuilding cycle peak and late (H1 2027) trough. This prospect would be enhanced by a reversal of unusual US dollar strength so far in the current cycle.

Still, any such catch-up might be a relative rather than absolute move against a backdrop of a maturing cycle upswing, a possible US market correction and neutral / negative excess money conditions.

November results confirm a September low in global manufacturing PMI new orders, with money trends suggesting a further rise through spring 2025, subject to tariff distortions.

The baseline scenario here has been that global industrial momentum – proxied by the manufacturing PMI new orders index – would bottom out in late 2024 and recover weakly into H1 2025. A manufacturing upturn was expected to be offset by loss of services momentum, with associated labour market weakness combining with favourable inflation news to support faster monetary policy easing.

The manufacturing part of the story is on track. The forecast of a late 2024 PMI new orders low was based on a recovery in global six-month real narrow money momentum from a trough in September 2023, taking into account a recent average interval of about a year between turning points in the two series. The new orders index reached a 22-month low on schedule in September, recovering solidly in October / November – see chart 1.

Chart 1

The turnaround has been mirrored by an alternative indicator based on national business surveys, although this bottomed one month earlier in August and has recovered by slightly less – chart 2.

Chart 2

Chart 3 highlights the recent relationship between swings in six-month real narrow money momentum and directional changes in the alternative indicator. Real money momentum recovered between September 2023 and April 2024 but has since stalled at a weak level by historical standards, falling back in September / October.

Chart 3

Assuming that the lead time remains at about a year, the suggestion is that a rise in the survey indicator / PMI new orders will level off in spring 2025, falling short of prior historical peaks.

Forecast uncertainty is higher than normal because tariff threats are distorting behaviour. Accelerated stockbuilding could result in a stronger near-term pick-up and earlier peak with a subsequent normalisation – or worse if threats crystallise.

The current stockbuilding cycle may be approaching its mid-point, which typically marks a shift from “risk-on” to a neutral or negative market environment.

The stockbuilding (or inventory or Kitchin) cycle is usually described as ranging between 3 and 5 years. The dating here suggests a normal band of 2.5 to 4.5 years, with an average of about 3.5.

A key indicator used to inform judgements about cycle dates is the annual change in G7 stockbuilding, expressed as a percentage of GDP. Chart 1 shows a long history of this indicator, along with suggested cycle low dates.

Chart 1

There were 16 complete cycles, measured from low to low, between Q2 1967 and Q1 2023, a period of 55.75 years. This implies an average cycle length of 3.5 years or 42 months.

The cycle described in a 1923 article by Joseph Kitchin averaged 40 months. Kitchin analysed data on bank clearings, commodity prices and interest rates and did not explicitly link his cycle with inventory fluctuations. His average was based on 9 cycles spanning 30 years, i.e. a smaller data set than shown in chart 1.

An average of about 3.5 years harmonises with the longer-term housing cycle, with an accepted average length of 18 years. Five stockbuilding cycles “nest” within each complete housing cycle, implying an average length of 3.6 years (43 months).

The most recent stockbuilding cycle trough is judged to have been reached in Q1 2023. Assuming a starting point in the middle of the quarter, November 2024 is month 21 of the current cycle.

The annual change in G7 stockbuilding was still negative in Q3 and usually becomes significantly positive at peaks, suggesting that the cycle remains an expansionary influence on economic momentum currently.

The cycle is as important for markets as the economy (as shown by Kitchin’s reliance on commodity price and interest rate data). The first half of the cycle (starting from a trough) is typically favourable for risk assets and cyclical exposure. Bear markets and crises have historically been concentrated in cycle downswings.

Table 1 compares movements in various assets since the Q1 2023 trough – third column – with average performance in the first 21 months of the prior 8 cycles (stretching back to the mid 1990s) – first column. The second column shows average performance over the remainder of those 8 cycles.

Table 1

The current cycle has so far largely conformed to the historical pattern, with strong performance of equities, cyclical sectors, precious metals and credit. The suggestion is that remaining upside potential is limited in these areas, with weakness likely over the next 1-2 years as a cycle downswing unfolds.

Could the current cycle prove to be longer than average, extending the risk-on phase? A longer cycle is plausible both because the previous one was short (2.75 years) and to align with the business investment cycle, for which the dating here implies a low in 2027 or later.

A delayed entry to the downswing phase could imply catch-up potential for areas that have lagged relative to history, including non-US / EM equities and commodities.

Cycle timings, however, could be affected by accelerated stockbuilding in anticipation of tariff wars, which could bring forward the cycle peak, although this would not necessarily imply an earlier trough.

The overall message is cautionary. A previous post argued that the “excess” money backdrop for markets is now neutral / negative in stock as well as flow terms. Cyclical considerations reinforce the monetary message.

Global “excess” liquidity has surged to a level breached only twice over the last half-century, implying a favourable backdrop for risk assets, according to a Bloomberg article. The assessment here, by contrast, is that excess money conditions are neutral / negative.

Actual growth of the money stock can exceed or fall short of the rate of increase of money demand for economic and portfolio purposes. Deviations are reflected partly in changes in demand for financial / real assets and associated price movements.

The rate of increase of (real) money demand is unobservable. Two proxies are 1) the current rate of (real) economic expansion and 2) a long-term average of real money growth, this being assumed to capture the trend rise in money demand.

Accordingly, the approach followed here historically has relied on two flow indicators of excess or deficient money:

The gap between real narrow money and industrial output momentum (six-month rates of change preferred).
The deviation of real narrow money momentum from a long-term average (12-month rate of change preferred).

Chart 1 shows a cumulative return index of global equities relative to US dollar cash together with the two indicators. The indicators have been lagged to allow for reporting delays, i.e. the readings for a particular month would have been known at the time (ignoring revisions). Shaded areas denote double-positive readings. Equities outperformed cash significantly on average during these periods (i.e. averaging performance in the month following each monthly signal). They underperformed on average under mixed or double-negative readings.

Chart 1

The first indicator is hovering around zero while the second remains negative.

The excess liquidity indicator referred to in the Bloomberg article is described as measuring how much real money growth outperforms economic growth, suggesting that it should resemble the first indicator above. Like here, narrow (M1) money is used in the calculation. Coverage, however, is restricted to the G10 developed markets and growth rates may be measured over 12 rather than six months.

Chart 2 shows a G7 version of the real narrow money / industrial output momentum gap calculated on a 12-month basis, which should be a close substitute for a G10 measure. This indicator turned positive in July but is far from historical highs.

Chart 2

What explains the much more bullish Bloomberg reading? The guess here is that the Bloomberg indicator is a deviation of the real money / economic growth gap from some measure of trend, rather than its absolute level. The current gap, for example, is significantly higher than a 24-month moving average, also shown in chart 2.

In this case, the Bloomberg indicator would be better described as a measure of excess money acceleration rather than growth. The current high reading would reflect a recovery in excess money momentum from deep negative to slightly positive.

Conceptually, it is unclear why the demand for assets should be related to the second derivative of excess money rather than its growth or level. The Bloomberg indicator correctly signalled the strength of equity markets this year, though not in 2023. Backtesting indicates that the sign of an acceleration measure would have underperformed that of the level of excess money growth in signalling whether equity market returns were above or below cash rates historically.

Why did the measures shown in chart 1 “miss” the strength of equity markets in 2023-24?

Excess or deficient money need not affect all markets similarly. Treasuries, commercial property and commodities may have borne the brunt of a money flow shortfall.

Preference for equities has been boosted by the AI boom and associated strength in a small number of large cap stocks. The MSCI World equal-weighted index has underperformed US dollar cash since the excess money indicators in chart 1 turned negative around end-2021.

The key reason for the disconnect with market performance, however, is that the flow measures were, on this occasion, an insufficient guide to the excess money backdrop, failing to take account of a still-large stock overhang left over from the 2020-21 money growth surge.

The “quantity theory of wealth”, explained in posts in 2020, is a suggested modification of the traditional quantity theory recognising that (broad) money demand depends on wealth as well as income and proposing equal elasticities. Nominal income is replaced on the right-hand side of the equation of exchange MV = PY by a geometric mean of income and wealth.

Chart 3 applies the “theory” to US data since end-2014.

Chart 3

The combined income / wealth variable closely tracked moderate growth of broad money over 2015-19. Wealth rose faster than income, so traditionally-defined velocity fell. The velocity of the combined income / wealth measure was stable.

The policy response to the covid shock resulted in possibly unprecedented monetary disequilibrium. Asset prices responded swiftly to the excess, causing wealth to overshoot broad money in 2021. Excess money flow indicators turned negative around end-2021 and wealth corrected sharply in 2022.

The combined income / wealth measure was still well below the level implied by broad money even before this correction. Deployment of the excess stock fuelled a second surge in wealth from late 2022 while sustaining economic growth despite monetary policy tightening.

Asset price gains, goods / services inflation and real economic expansion resulted in the income / wealth measure finally converging with broad money at end-Q2, with an estimated small overshoot at end-Q3. So the velocity of the combined measure has returned to its end-2019 level.

Stock as well as flow considerations, therefore, suggest that the excess money backdrop is now neutral at best.

Global (i.e. G7 plus E7) six-month real narrow money momentum is estimated to have edged lower in September, based on monetary data covering 88% of the aggregate. Momentum has been moving sideways since the spring at a weak level by historical standards, suggesting that the global economy will expand at a below-trend pace through mid-2025 – see chart 1.

Chart 1

Chart 1 showing Global Manufacturing PMI New Orders & G7 + E7 Real Narrow Money (% 6m)

Note that the global narrow money measure incorporates an adjustment for a recent negative distortion to Chinese data from regulatory changes, i.e. momentum would be weaker than shown without this correction.

A low in real money momentum in September 2023 was expected here to be reflected in a decline in global industrial momentum – as proxied by the manufacturing PMI new orders index – into a low in late 2024. October flash results could be consistent with a bottoming out: PMIs fell in Japan and the UK but recovered slightly in the US and Eurozone – chart 2.

Chart 2

Chart 2 showing Manufacturing PMIs

With money trends remaining weak, a manufacturing recovery into H1 2025 was expected to be limited and offset by a loss of momentum in services. Services business activity indices in the Eurozone and UK fell to 20- and 23-month lows respectively in October, according to flash results, with a sharper decline in Japan. US activity and new business indices, however, were strong, although the employment component remained sub-50.

Chart 3

Chart 3 showing Services PMI Business Activity

US relative strength is also evidenced by October earnings revisions ratios, with US net upgrades contrasting with weakness in Japan and Europe, particularly the UK – chart 4.

Chart 4

Chart 4 showing MSCI Earnings Revisions Ratios (IBES, sa)

US economic outperformance is consistent with a recent wide gap between US and European / Japanese six-month real narrow money momentum. The expectation here was for a US pull-back in September due to an unfavourable base effect but this proved minor, with narrow money rising solidly again on the month – chart 5.

Chart 5

Chart 5 showing Real Narrow Money (% 6m)

Eurozone / UK real narrow money momentum continues to recover but disappointingly slowly, suggesting a more urgent need for policy easing. A slump in Japan, initially due to f/x intervention but sustained by BoJ policy tightening, signals likely further negative economic news.

US narrow money acceleration started long before the September rate cut and hasn’t been mirrored by broader aggregates. One interpretation is that households / firms are accumulating “transactions” money in anticipation of increasing spending after the elections. Chart 6 suggests a tendency for narrow money momentum to pick up into presidential elections and reverse thereafter, with occasional notable exceptions (1984, 2000).

Chart 6

Chart 6 showing US Narrow Money (% 6m annualised)