Since the global COVID-19 pandemic began 17 months ago, we have seen a dizzying parade of investment themes (and memes) that have caught the imagination of investors big and small. From Electric Vehicles (EVs) to the latest canine-inspired crypto currency, and now NFTs (Non-Fungible Tokens) and the metaverse, where one can escape the harsh inflationary realities of post-pandemic life. At Global Alpha, we are not thematic investors, but we do rely on themes to offer tailwinds to companies that have been carefully vetted around our investment process.
Themes themselves can be broad-based and structural, or narrow and niche, fueled by the latest fad or trend. We tend to favour the former, which tends to last longer and influence a broad swath of the economy, cutting across sectors. Within emerging markets (EM) for example, a broad structural theme that is currently playing out is the increasing formalization of their economies. As per the International Monetary Fund (IMF), over 60% of the world’s adult labour force participates in the informal economy and accounts for around 35% of the GDP of emerging economies.
Also, informality is not evenly spread across the EM world; Latin America and Africa have higher levels of informality in comparison to East Asia. Emerging markets with large informal sectors tend to underperform and punch much below their weight. Several countries within our EM universe have been actively trying to remedy the situation in order to increase their overall economic productivity, increase the size of their tax base, and lift the living standards of their populations. One country that has really stood out in its push towards greater formalization of its economy has been India.
In the last five years, India has enacted three key measures to push its economy towards greater formalization. Firstly, demonetization of Rs 1,000 and Rs 500 notes in 2016 forced many informal workers to join the formal work force. Secondly, the implementation of Goods and Sales Tax (GST) forced unregistered firms operating in the cash economy to get registered and enter the formal economy. Finally, the first two measures acted as a tailwind for the rapid adoption of digital payments via the Unified Payments Interface (UPI) platform rolled out by the government. The net result, as per a recent report by the State Bank of India (SBI), is that the informal economy has now shrunk to 15-20% of GDP in 2020-2021, versus 52% of GDP in 2017-2018.
This recent shift towards formalization is a generational change and is impacting every sector of the economy. For the discerning investor, it offers an opportunity to identify winners and losers of this massive shakeout that is leading to consolidation and an increase in market power of a select few companies. A great example of this consolidation is the luggage industry in India, which is estimated to be worth around US$3 billion, of which only 25% is organized. The Indian luggage industry is projected to grow in the high teens, and this growth outlook is propelled by four interesting underlying trends.[3]
There is a rise in brand consciousness and luggage is now seen as a fashion statement rather than a mere utilitarian product.
There is a higher spending on Indian weddings, where luggage is now included as part of the wedding trousseau.
Replacement cycles have been reduced, with Indians replacing their luggage in four to five years (vs 10 years earlier) and their backpacks in two years (vs three to four years earlier).[5]
With the entry of Samsonite in India, VIP was forced to rebrand and reinvent itself to cater to a younger and trendier demographic. The company decided to mimic Samsonite’s own successful international turnaround by focusing on clearly segmenting their brands, expanding distribution, cutting costs, and spending heavily on branding. In addition to this, the company decided to switch from a promoter-led entity to hiring professional management.
The combination of these company-specific changes and macro tailwinds, coming from the shift to the organized sector, has led to remarkable results for VIP. If one were to look at their financial performance from 2016, which marked the acceleration of the shift towards formalization, up to the end of 2019, before the pandemic, we see that the company’s EBITDA and net income has more than doubled. With zero debt, their return on invested capital (ROIC) grew from 19.5% in 2016 to 25% in 2019, as VIP decided to rely less on imports from China, and invest in their own manufacturing units in India and low-cost Bangladesh.
While the pandemic disrupted travel and led to a sharp drop in business at VIP, our discussions with management indicate that demand has rebounded sharply with pent up demand for travel and discretionary spending, such as weddings, leading to higher volumes. VIP intends to take advantage of the dislocations in Chinese manufacturing resulting from power outages by leveraging its new manufacturing capacities while launching new SKUs to capture the market share across segments. As the market and the Indian consumer slowly moves away from the unorganized market, we see VIP further consolidating its position as a market leader.
At Global Alpha, we remain committed to separating themes from memes and identifying winners who can clearly benefit from these once-in-a-lifetime shifts in emerging economies.
Real Estate in Emerging Markets: Unlocking sustainable growth opportunities.
Emerging markets have had difficult times during COVID-19, however, we have seen that in several cases, the recovery has been faster than expected. Not only is this recovery due to higher vaccination rates, but also because of secular trends, especially in the emerging lower middle class where growth opportunities are just beginning. In our universe, one of the sectors where we see a great growth opportunity is in real estate. The main variables that drive tailwinds for the sector are:
Sustainable growth of the country, which implies that the emerging lower middle class can climb the ladder;
Low interest rates, inflation, and unemployment; and
A consolidated industry with players who have good balance sheets and are focused on profitably.
In this environment, our largest overweight in the real estate sector is in India and Indonesia. One could argue that interest rates and inflation are currently on the rise in many countries, which is true. However, the rate hike process in Asian countries has been much slower, and structural growth remains intact. For example, in the case of India, current mortgage rates are at record low levels of under 7%, compared to more than 10% a decade ago. Indonesia rates are also likely to maintain low, which continues to favour growth in the real estate sector.
India’s last real estate cycle ended in 2013 and has not been able to recover since, due to several disruptions, such as demonetization in 2016, the roll-out of the Real Estate Regulatory Act in 2017, and the Non-Banking Financial Companies (NBFC) crisis of 2018. Likewise, India hasn’t experienced real price increases since 2013. Prices have increased 3-4% on average, below inflation each year and also below growth in income levels of around 8% per capita. So, what would make this cycle effectively sustainable from 2021 onwards? Some of the reasons were explained above. Moreover, In India, the real estate sector has experienced an industry consolidation that has driven inventory reduction (around 20%). With rising demand (also boosted by additional space required driven by the work-from-home scenario) and shrinking supply, price increases are most likely to occur for the following years; a phenomenon we haven’t seen in India for the last decade. Some factors that have contributed to the real estate sector’s boom include low interest rates, rising salaries, and explosive hiring’s (i.e., Infosys has hired close to 350,000 employees this year and salary hikes have been close to 120%). With government support to housing such as stamp duty cuts by the government of Maharastra, or Gujarat government measures in December 2020 such as the possibility of agricultural land being acquired for affordable housing, this support has changed sentiment and boosted demand.
In relation to housing affordability, mortgage installments in relation to monthly income have also been improving, changing the sentiments with all the other more favourable conditions. For example, in Mumbai, this index has improved from 93% in 2010 to 61% in 2020. In cities such as Ahmedabad, the index has improved to 24% in 2020, from 46% in 2010. This means that in this city, an average household needs to spend 24% of its income to pay monthly installments for the respective loan. Mumbai remains the most expensive market, but levels are improving.[2]
Another relevant variable to monitor are launches and inventory. Companies need to increase launches overall in order to capture increasing demand in a sustainable way. In 2015 and 2016, launches were approximately between 475 and 501 million square feet, decreasing to 135 million square feet in 2021.[3] Launches decreased progressively during these years, essentially due to inventory levels being too high. Inventory months hovered around 40-45 days between fiscal year (FY) 2016 and FY2020, and lowered 40 days in FY2021. In noting this, companies reinforced their efforts to liquidate their inventory first, with prices barely increasing at a 1% compound annual growth rate (CAGR) over 2015-2021, far beyond inflation. Inventory levels have lowered to 916,195 units in FY2021, to the lowest levels in 7 years.[4] Moreover, as FY2021 was a COVID-19 impacted year, the decline in new launches was steeper than normal, as H1FY2021 was virtually a wash-out and H2FY2021 was all about monetizing existing unsold inventory.
Moving forward, we should expect launches to pick up again. We foresee that the most relevant Indian developers are well positioned to capture this window of opportunities, considering good cost of funding, low leverage (as several raised equity during 2019-2020), liquidity access, lower inventory levels, and market share gains are likely to remain consistent due to the consolidation of the industry.
The real estate sector is behaving quite well in terms of volume increases, although sustainable price increases that can also mitigate the hike in raw material prices remain as a key challenge. The real estate market in India is very important for the country’s development as it is worth USD 150-180 billion, or 6-7% of the GDP, and is expected to reach 13% of the economy by 2025. It is the second highest employment generator in the country, after agriculture.[5]
In terms of the non-residential market, in 2019, the Indian office market closed with a record high of transactions, increasing by 27% to levels of 60 million square feet during the year. In 2021, new completions surpassed transactions for the first time since 2013. During FY2021 to FY2022, in the organized market, tech-related companies accounted for around 40% of office transactions in India, with renewed massive hiring and positive business forecasts anticipate their vacancy will remain low.[6]
We still can see some work-from-home effects lowering absorption levels, nevertheless, tech and other related sectors have lowered vacancies, which we expect to maintain at reasonable levels. Their expansion plans are also likely to improve net absorption. In the first nine months of 2021, transactions increased by 13% and completions by just 6% in relation to the same period last year, showing that the levels of activity are increasing to a great extent. Likewise, projects set for completion in 2021 and 2022 are pre-leased by multinational companies. Capitalization (cap) rates in key areas such as Mumbai remain very healthy at 6-8%. Economies, such as India’s, with a young workforce and without adequate infrastructure (possess separate spaces for work from home and also lacks air conditioning) favour a hybrid model, although with less working from home than in developed markets. Considering all the aforementioned, office demands and vacancies are expected to remain at healthy levels in the medium term. Bangalore, Mumbai CBD, and Pune maintain the lower vacancy levels in the main cities, hovering around between 5 and 10%.[7]
Prestige Estates Projects (PEPL IN)
In Indian real estate, Prestige Estates Projects is one of our key holdings. Over the last decade, the Prestige Group has firmly established itself as one of the leading and most successful real estate developers in India across all asset classes. The company currently has its principal presence in South India (Bangalore) and is the main developer to boast such a widely diverse portfolio, covering the residential, commercial, retail, leisure, and hospitality segments. During 2HFY2021, Prestige signed a term sheet with Blackstone to divest its entire stake in six operational office assets (6.6 million square foot), an 85% stake in nine retail malls (3.3msf) and a 50% stake in four under-construction office assets (7.4msf), along with two hotel assets – Oakwood and Aloft. The enterprise value, as per the term sheet, was settled at Rs 92 billion, with a cap rate of 8.5%. Part of the transaction will be used to clear the debt of the company’s annuity portfolio while the remaining inflow is likely to be utilized for expanding a residential pipeline (new joint venture/joint venture development agreements) and also accelerating capex for the annuity portfolio. The yield on cost expected for the new developments is 15-20%, much higher than the cap rate of the sold portfolio. Prestige will have almost 0.2x net gearing after completing the transaction, which is much better than 1.5x before the deal, which can foster re-leveraging in new projects, giving much higher yields as recently explained.
The company is one of the few Indian real estate developers with sound geographical expansion projects, ready to capture many growth opportunities in the rising emerging low-middle class. They are characterized for their good track record in Bangalore in terms of their execution and expansion capabilities. Prestige has almost doubled its sales since 2005 and has done so every 4-6 years following, and we expect the expansion to continue with all the new projects in Mumbai. Such expansion makes the company one of the more geographically diversified developers in India and they are mainly focused in Mumbai, where opportunities are huge.
The company is setting up four office complexes in Mumbai – two in BKC: one at Mahalaxmi and one in Jijamata Nagar. They have not yet started pre-leasing any of them as they have yet to receive all approvals (construction has not yet started). All of these are prime office markets, and HDFC has been the lender in these projects prior to acquisition by Prestige, continuing to remain as the lender. These three projects are with a single local developer, DB Realty. This month, they also launched their inaugural residential project in Mumbai – Jasdan Classic, located in Byculla. Once entering the market, execution risks should be lower. Mumbai has a more “local” culture where a younger population, living in small apartments, favours a work-from-office philosophy.
Management raised FY2022 presales guidance from Rs 65 billion to Rs 70-80 billion, and targets reaching presales of Rs 100 billion in the next three years (from Rs 55 billion in FY2021) and rental income of Rs 28-30 billion per annum in the next 7-8 years (versus Rs 2.6 billion now). To achieve such growth, it is essential that the company invests in new project acquisitions and capex. In a period of five years, Prestige expects Mumbai sales to be around 25% of their consolidated revenues. Such an important figure outside its home region (Bangalore) is relevant for an Indian developer and can be the second most important diversification success case besides Godrej Properties. For the long term, their non-real estate portfolio could be transferred to a REIT.
In Indonesia, we have seen a massive rebound to robust presales and high take-up rates at launches, which implies that demand for property remains very high, whereas prices seem to have bottomed up from previous years. Launches during the year have performed well, being concentrated IDR two billion (with a tapering off of take-up rates, as prices exceed this level) and located within reasonable vicinities of large cities, fulfilling their roles as satellite suburbs serving the working population of a metropolitan area. The Government has also taken measures to boost the real estate sector. The main measure was to provide temporary rebates until December 2021, in value-added tax (VAT) for property purchases (up to 50%) if they are priced below INR 5 billion and 100% rebate if they are priced below INR 2 billion. However, developers are lobbying to extend this program into 2022.[8]
Another important issue was the relaxation on the loan-to-value (LTV) for developers. Similar to India, the last real estate cycle in Indonesia ended in 2013. Before that, leverage was not an issue for developers, as many of the properties were self-funded and banks were willing to issue mortgages for at least 80% of the value of properties. Some mortgages included some buy-back clauses from the developer, effectively protecting the bank in case of any default. After the 2013 boom cycle (which ended in 2015), one of the ways the Bank of Indonesia tightened up was by limiting LTV requirements. As a matter of fact, after 2013, for houses larger than 70 square meters, the loan-to-value was approximately 70% and 60% for first and second homes.[9] The LTV has continuously been relaxed between 2015 and in 2020, driven by a COVID-19 stimulus LTV of 100% (in practice, it is around 90%). Moreover, disbursements of funds to developers was also limited and linked to the construction progress. For example, prior to 2013, the disbursement for developers was 80% linked to the signing of the mortgage deed. In 2013, this percentage was reduced to 0%, in 2018 to 30%, and in 2021 part of the government easing measures was increasing this percentage to 100%.Such relaxations are very important for developers’ balance sheets, as construction costs hover around 50% of the selling price, helping significantly with the deleveraging of the sector.[10]
Considering the aforementioned, we are assuming growth in presales of 45% this year, 38% of which occurred in the first nine months of 2021, and was positively impacted by the VAT exemption. We also expect 10-15% for 2022-2023, which would be the first multi-year growth after the decline between 2018 and 2020. We don’t expect price increases similar to those in the 2010-2013 cycle; nevertheless, there is a probable scenario next year for prices to start rising after seven years, if the COVID-19 pandemic ends favourably and structural demand stays intact. Despite some tough years, Indonesia’s real estate prices have been extremely resilient, avoiding any declines as developers have usually preferred to sell less volumes, while not making discounts.
In summary, we think the Indonesian real estate market is ready for another positive cycle, driven by a combination of developers’ efforts, such as better presales, capex discipline, providing housing financing through hybrid mortgages and in-house installments, together with favourable policies from regulators, such as declining debt costs, lower inventory costs and lower debt rates. Rates can hike in the medium term, but should remain low in relation to previous cycles. All of the abovementioned has helped the main developers to strengthen their balance sheets.
Another phenomenon we could start to see, especially next year, is a return from investors to the real estate markets. This situation is by far not comparable to the massive boom of the 2010-2013 cycle. In those years, yields where roughly 9-10%, and currently, they are around 5-6%, similar to a government bond yield. Nevertheless, banks’ liquidity remains very high (supported by high CASA growth), with very low LDRs, and together with strong balance sheets, most developers are good enough to continue to provide hybrid mortgages and in-house installments. This in turn will make easier roads for investors who can also expect some revaluation of their properties if the positive cycle continues.
Regarding launches, those done in August and September, post the latest mobility restrictions, were all sold out, which is a good indication of demand status. The amount of launches this year has been around 5,000 units.[11] In Indonesia’s case, we have seen a greater proportion of launches in relation to inventory cleanup in India. The main reason for this is that Indonesia’s property mix is more oriented towards landed house projects. New launches are done after most of the units are sold, and therefore, inventory is not a high concern. In order to continue growing, companies have been much more dependent on new launches, and demand has responded well.
After the cycle of 2013, the Bank of Indonesia’s double-tightening measures made developers look at external ways of financing. Hybrid mortgaging was one of the most common alternatives, being a combination of installment and mortgages, where there was an option to put a 30% down payment by instalments of up to 36 months. At the end of period, the buyer has to pay the remainder of the purchase, which can be done in cash, but this is usually done by mortgage. For the developer, as the house is under construction, these instalments are booked as liabilities as customer advances. Considering down payments are usually the hardest milestone for homebuyers, hybrid mortgages have helped their affordability. Extended down payments can also improve the buyer’s approval rates for loans because they provide more time for buyers to improve their credit profile, and also lower their LTVs. Currently, this mechanism is used in a lower extent, considering required down payments are lower (10-15% as market conditions have improved).
Regarding non-residential real estate, mall and office owners have begun reducing rental discounts, as traffic and occupancies have been recovering, and are likely to continue accelerating. Majority of shopping centres started the year with an average discount to tenants of 50%, and after the reopening in the third quarter, foot traffic recovered much more quickly than expected, so the discount has been lowered to 40%. By the second half of next year, it is most likely that we should see pre-COVID-19 rental income for malls. The office market has continued under oversupply since 2014, thus rents are not expected to rise, while also considering the work-from-home environment.
Ciputra Development (CTRA IJ)
One of the primary beneficiaries of the property market recovery in Indonesia is our holding Ciputra Development. Ciputra Development is one of Indonesia’s leading property developers, and is involved in both residential townships, as well as mixed development. Landed houses account for a major portion of Ciputra’s projects. The company also develops and operates a range of investment properties (i.e., malls, hotels, hospitals, and offices). In 50% of its projects, Ciputra employs an asset light business model, with revenue/profit share agreements with various local developers, providing the company with additional development opportunities in a balance sheet efficient manner. It currently has over 75 projects in 33 cities across the country. The company has one of the most extensive land banks in Indonesia (2,300 hectares), which implies over 15 years of assured developments and high margins in the medium term. This company fits very well in this article thesis about secular trends in emerging markets due to its huge potential in mid- and low-market segments, which are heavily underserved (total addressable market (TAM) of around 120 million people (middle-to-low income bracket), including 65 million millennials). The affordable housing business (average selling price (ASP) under Rs2 billion) has a massive potential, driven by the extensive population.
Ciputra is also tapping into geographical diversification across the major markets of the country, and has established developments in Greater Jakarta and Borneo, expanding to Semarang, Surabaya, Manado, Palembang and Makassar, currently present in 33 cities.
The urbanization trend (which has increased from 49% in 2009 to 56% in 2019) and the availability of mortgage facilities, represents strong tailwinds for the mid-long term. In relation to its residential business, even though the majority of its 55 residential projects are focused on low- to mid-income segments (65% of its 1H21 presales are priced at less than Rp 2 billion), 8 of its projects target upper income segments. In the commercial business, a Possible REIT or other method exit of portfolio of properties at good cap rates and re-allocation of capital at better yields on cost is always an alternative. Ciputra is enjoying a healthy 9M21pre-sales recovery over 33% year over year and 86% of the company’s target for the full year. For 2022 and 2023, we expect low-digit growth, with 2022 being very dependent when the VAT benefit will end. Overall, Ciputra has superior margins, a good balance sheet, and low debt, and we expect the company to continue operating at strong levels.
In terms of recurring revenue (i.e., shopping centres, offices, and hotels), we expect it to contribute 18-19% 2021E and increase to 25-27% in FY2022-2023E. Recurring revenue brings stability to cash flows, and their normalization and acceleration in the following years is positive for the company and the stock. Ciputra expects normalization of tenant rates (to pre-COVID-19 levels) from FY2022 and its latest development, Surabaya mall, phase two, started reopening in the second quarter of 2021, where occupancy rates are expected to be around 90% by year end.
In emerging markets, it is important to be able to identify secular trends because it’s related to the fact that emerging lower-middle segments can gradually increase their purchasing power, well-being, and quality of life. However, in order to add value to our clients, we are constantly looking for the companies that can capture the best growth opportunities in this favourable environment. In this sense, we pay close attention to the quality of balance sheets, growth prospects, cash flow generation and management quality, among other things. Ciputra Development and Prestige Estates Projects are two good examples of quality companies enjoying favourable tailwinds.
Investing in Emerging Markets (EM) equities never gets boring. One of the main reasons why we love our job is that every day presents us with a dynamic set of challenges and opportunities. In our September 16 commentary, we discussed the crux of the ongoing regulatory changes in China from a local perspective, the impact on different sectors of the economy, and the steps we are taking to position our portfolio accordingly. However, China is not the only country in our investable universe where the government decided to step in and attempt to fix some areas where the free market’s invisible hand allegedly failed.
In August, we witnessed a regulatory crackdown on technology companies spread to South Korea. Many investors in that country reacted rapidly and rushed for the exits, likely spurred by their wounds sustained in China, where tech giants lost 30-50% of capitalization from their peak levels. As a result of the low tolerance of undergoing the same experience, they wiped tens of billions of United States dollars (USD) off the local tech titans’ market value.
Unlike the Chinese government ambitiously reshaping nearly every sector of their economy, the Korean regulators appear to be highly focused on addressing issues in the technology business. Leading internet platforms, both foreign and domestic, have been thoroughly scrutinized and repeatedly criticized by politicians from different parties for abusing their dominant market position and hurting competition in the pursuit of profits, aggressive expansionary business practices, personal data usage, and high commission rates, putting pressure on small and medium-sized enterprises (SME). For instance, Kakao is one of the leading Korean big tech companies, and until not so long ago was the third domestic company by market capitalization. Kakao started as a messaging platform and expanded into consumer finance, payments, gaming, and ride-hailing businesses, among others; with nearly 120 affiliates Kakao has been compared to an octopus by critics. While commenting on the topic, the leader of the ruling Democratic Party of Korea said, « Kakao must not follow the steps of the country’s other conglomerates that ignored fairness and coexistence in the sole pursuit of profit. »
Furthermore, some critics and lawmakers have advocated to adopt measures to prevent big tech companies from monopolizing online services, making it more difficult for larger platforms to acquire smaller peers. Senator Chung, from the People Power Party, suggested further enforcing the Telecommunications Business Act to restrict larger platforms’ M&A activities. He also pointed out that Korean internet is a winner-take-all market with quite grim consequences for the vanquished, likely reminiscent of the Netflix show Squid Game, as larger platforms have over 90% market share. Other lawmakers are pushing to allow smaller companies to gain access to user data accumulated by dominant platforms, creating an ecosystem where big tech companies and emerging operators can grow and innovate together and ultimately benefit consumers and the economy as a whole.
Let’s review the chronology of the main regulatory events:
On August 31, the National Assembly passed the so-called « Anti-Google Law », forcing tech platforms, such as Google and Apple, to open their app stores to allow alternative payment methods. South Korea is the first country in the world to enact such a law.
One can argue that the upcoming March 9, 2022 presidential election in South Korea is the main reason why politicians are bringing up issues and bills targeting big tech companies. Coincidentally or not, five years ago, it was the family-run conglomerates (also known as « Chaebol ») that came under attack, and were accused of enriching themselves by abusing their dominance and applying unfair practices. Also, lawmakers traditionally pressured telecom companies on pricing plans as an efficient way to gain publicity.
Amid growing scrutiny and accusations from lawmakers and regulators, several big tech names pre-emptively announced action plans to appease critics by abandoning some business segments, providing support to SMEs and scrapping plans to compete with small mom-and-pop businesses. For example, Kakao announced their plans to withdraw from the hair salon, flower, snack, and salad delivery businesses. The company also created a $255 million fund for suppliers’ support in addition to other steps aimed at strengthening its corporate social responsibility.
Although the new rules announced by the government so far have limited impact on business fundamentals, the concerns of further regulatory tightening affected the market sentiment and put pressure on the technology sector. By and large, small-cap companies are less prone to the current regulatory headwinds as they usually do not exercise overwhelming market dominance, nor do they employ aggressive expansionary business practices similar to Kakao and Naver, and remain out of sight from the politicians and general public. Moreover, we believe some of our holdings are in a relatively safer position or can even come out as net beneficiaries when the dust settles.
NICE Information Service (030190 KS)
NICE Information Service is the leading credit bureau (CB) in Korea, providing consumer and corporate credit information, risk management consulting, and debt collection services. It has the largest number of members in both the financial and non-financial sectors. The company is poised to benefit from structurally higher demand for retail credit checks due to the ongoing expansion of near- and sub-prime markets, increased competition among Korean lenders (leading to higher turnover of existing loans), a greater focus on unsecured lending, deregulation (enabling more product launches), and retail customers (who are becoming increasingly careful about their credit scores).
NICE Information Service is the only CB in Korea with exposure to consumer and corporate fields, with the most robust financial big data capabilities accumulated over 30 years (database of 43 million consumers and 2.2 million corporates). It has also secured non-credit and non-financial data, such as telecommunication, rental, and social info by collaborating with numerous partners. Consumer CB and big data businesses are expected to be the primary growth drivers of the company. We believe NICE Information Service should be one of the primary beneficiaries of the lawmakers’ initiatives to allow smaller companies to gain access to user data from dominant tech platforms.
NKN KCP (060250 KS)
NHN KCP (« Korea Cyber Payment ») is the leading online Payment Gateway (PG) service provider with a 24% market share. PG is a settlement service that authorizes credit card payments for online retailers. It encrypts credit card information and sends transaction data directly to credit card companies, bypassing merchants’ systems, and thus keeping credit card information confidential. PG also withholds payment until the merchant fulfils the transaction, allowing online shoppers to avoid fraudulent sellers. NHN KCP also runs online and offline Value-Added Networks (VAN) and Online-to-Offline (O2O) businesses. Online VAN service, connects online merchants with credit card companies through secure communication networks to approve credit card transactions. Offline VAN service, connects offline merchants with credit card companies through secure communication networks to approve card transactions. The O2O business empowers SMEs and facilitates payment processing in offline channels.
NHN KCP serves over 150,000 domestic and global merchants. The company is one of the key beneficiaries of the ongoing structural growth of e-commerce and digital content consumption, credit cards’ share gains from other payment methods, and growing overseas transactions. NHN KCP provides Korean merchants with frictionless payment processing capabilities by charging highly competitive take rates (e.g., in the range of 0.10-0.12% for domestic PG). In general, the current PG take rates in South Korea are among the lowest globally and do not catch the eyes of lawmakers as being predatory. For instance, in the e-commerce business, Coupang charges its merchants take rates as high as 8-10%, which has been seen as taking advantage of mom-and-pop companies with no alternative. Also, the food delivery platforms charge take rates of 8-12% of total transaction volume. One of the main market concerns in the investment case of NHN KCP is the risk of its largest clients following the suit of eBay Korea and Naver Pay, to build their in-house PG capabilities and bypass third-party PG companies. The government push against big tech’s aggressive expansion in different verticals might cool down these potential intents and lower the risk of clients’ attrition for NHN KCP. Moreover, the company can gain extra business if one of the tech giants decides to outsource PG capabilities.
AfreecaTV (067160 KS)
AfreecaTV (« anybody can freely broadcast ») is the most prominent Korean live streaming platform, where anyone can broadcast gaming, sports, and various entertainment content free of cost. Instead of paying a subscription fee, the viewers show their appreciation by donating virtual gifts (Star Balloons) to broadcasters (Broadcast Jockeys or BJs). AfreecaTV takes 35% commission from these gifts donated to its BJs. In addition, it sells advertising products (branded content, banner ads, video ads and other solutions) to various brands. The platform has over 17,000 active BJs and hosts over 20,000 live streams per day. AfreecaTV is one of the few available options in the EM universe, providing exposure to e-sports. Gaming content drives over 60% of traffic, while around 30% of its gifting revenue and 50% of advertising revenue are derived from e-sports content.
The company enjoys a substantial supply of top BJs while supporting them financially and via collaboration in creating unique content and providing facilities for professional production and e-sports events. A BJ support department is available 24/7 and top BJs are locked in through exclusive agreements with AfreecaTV. A deep bench of highly popular broadcasters and exclusive content keeps its viewer base sticky. We expect the platform monetization to improve on the back of investments in content and BJ support. Rising content quality should drive a steady user base growth, enhance engagement, and lift the proportion of paying users and average revenue per paying user. In addition, AfreecaTV ad revenue is becoming the long-awaited second source of growth. It is poised for solid expansion, from nearly 20% of the mix to 50% in five years, primarily driven by branded content. Democratization of the data accumulated by large platforms can bring new opportunities for AfreecaTV’s ad business.
Have a great day.
The Global Alpha team
The strategy’s performance in the quarter was driven by three key factors:
Reopening sensitivity in the retail and financial services portfolio in Indonesia and the Philippines as those economies emerge from their respective lockdowns as a result of a ramp up in vaccinations in the key economic centers.
A re-rating of our Moroccan portfolio following the results of the parliamentary elections, which saw the long-dominant Islamist party (Justice and Development Party) suffer a major defeat at the hands of pro-business parties led by the Independent National Rally party.
Positive reaction to a strong results season and upgraded guidance from some of the strategy’s largest portfolio companies including Integrated Diagnostics Holdings in Egypt and Jordan and Century Pacific in the Philippines.
In our last letter, we referred to an unnamed investment in the Philippines, which we can now reveal to be Wilcon Depot Inc., the largest home improvement retailer with 70 stores nationwide. Our investment in Wilcon was undeniably triggered by the reopening of the Filipino economy, which should unlock private building and construction activity, the main demand generator for Wilcon’s tiles, building materials, electrical and lighting, and paints lines. However, our thesis is built on a long term view of the company’s ability to leverage its scale, zero debt balance sheet, and management capacity to grow the overall market for home improvement and DIY retail, and consolidate shares from smaller and unorganized competitors who have been weakened by the Philippine’s dismal handling of the COVID-19 pandemic. Wilcon’s private label and exclusive lines are also a key element of its strategy to grow like-for-like sales and increase margins with the latter experiencing a step change (+200 basis points) in the last few quarters. This has been a key driver behind consensus upgrades as management affirmed this is the new level of profitability going forward. Wilcon’s management has done a solid job of managing the business in a very difficult environment through active SKU management, supply chain control, store network expansion, and investment in online channels.
In Morocco, the strategy owns two companies in retail and payments technology, sectors that should see real gains from the positive political picture that is emerging there. Morocco has generally been a very good market for the strategy as it benefits from political stability, low inflation, a stable currency, and a large domestic institutional liquidity pool that supports equity market valuations. The country has also been relatively successful in the handling of the COVID-19 pandemic. As travel resumes, Morocco’s large tourism industry should see a strong recovery (it represented approximately one fifth of the economy in 2019). The newly elected government has the technical and political capacity to execute on reforms that will likely only add to the investment case for Morocco and as such, we continue to be bullish on the strategy’s positioning there.
We are seeing earnings upgrades across a few of the strategy’s portfolio companies, which have also been supportive of the strategy’s recent performance. We highlight Integrated Diagnostics (IDH), the leading laboratory and diagnosis chain in Egypt, Jordan, and Nigeria, which posted exceptionally strong results in the first half of this year with revenue, operating profits and operating cash flows growing 1.4x, 2.9x, and 4.8x respectively versus the same period last year. This strong growth partly reflects a low base last year, but it is also a reflection of increased demand for COVID-19 related testing and the success that management has had in scaling its home testing services (i.e., collection of samples from home and sending test results digitally), which averaged out to 3.6k visits a day in the first half of the year. IDH signed a $45 million facility with the International Finance Corporation (IFC), which it can draw to fund inorganic growth on top of the approximate $80 million of cash on its balance sheet. We also expect IDH’s management to recommend an exceptional dividend once the year concludes given the strong cash generation this year.
We believe that the strategy is entering a strong earnings growth cycle underpinned by the reopening of economies, structural adoption of digital products and services that the portfolio is over-indexed to, innovation from aligned management teams in areas of product development and distribution, and operating leverage that will kick in on the back of sustainable efficiencies that portfolio companies have realised in the last 12-18 months. The strategy remains concentrated but geographically diverse, a reflection of a portfolio construction philosophy that is focused on generating returns from company rather than country/region and that favours long-term value creation over short term returns.
Vergent Asset Management LLP
DISCLOSURES
1. Unless otherwise stated, all data is at September 30, 2021 and stated in US dollars (US$). Source: Connor, Clark & Lunn Financial Group, Thomson Reuters Datastream. 2. Performance history for the Vergent Emerging Opportunities Strategy is that of the Vergent Emerging Opportunities Composite. The Composite has an inception and creation date of August 2018. 3. Net performance figures are stated after management fees, estimated performance fees, trading expenses and before operating expenses. Operating expenses include items such as custodial fees for pooled vehicles and would also include charges for valuation, audit, tax and legal expenses. Such additional operating expenses would reduce the actual returns experienced by investors. Past performance of the strategy is no guarantee of future performance; Future returns are not guaranteed and a loss of capital may occur. For illustrative purposes, performance fee of 20% on added value over the hurdle rate of 6% plus the management fee of 1.25% have been assumed. Actual management fees charged to a particular account may vary. 4. There is no benchmark for the Vergent Emerging Opportunities Strategy because it has an absolute return objective 5. Standard Deviation measures the dispersion of monthly returns since the inception of the strategy.
Benchmarks and financial indices are shown for illustrative purposes only, are not available for direct investment, are unmanaged, assume reinvestment of income, do not reflect the impact of any management or incentive fees and have limitations when used for comparison or other purposes because they may have different volatility or other material characteristics (such as number and types of instruments) than the Strategy. The Strategy’s investments are not restricted to the instruments comprising any one index and do not in all cases correspond to the investments reflected in such indices.
These materials (“Presentation”) are furnished by Vergent Asset Management (“Vergent”) on a confidential basis for informational and illustration purposes only. This Presentation is intended for the use of the recipient only and may not be reproduced or distributed to any other person, in whole or in part, without the prior written consent of Vergent. Certain information contained in this Presentation is based on information obtained from third-party sources that Vergent considers to be reliable. However, Vergent makes no representation as to, and accepts no responsibility for, the accuracy, fairness or completeness of the information contained herein. The information is as of the date indicated and reflects present intention only. This information may be subject to change at any time, and Vergent is under no obligation to provide you with any updates or amendments to this Presentation. This Presentation is not an offer to buy or sell, nor a solicitation of an offer to buy or sell any security or other financial instrument advised by Vergent. This Presentation does not contain certain material information about the strategy, including important risk disclosures. An investment in the strategy is not suitable for all investors, and before making an investment in the strategy, you should consult with your professional advisor(s) to determine whether an investment in the strategy is suitable for you in light of your investment objectives and financial situation. Vergent does not purport to be an advisor as to legal, taxation, accounting, financial or regulatory matters in any jurisdiction, and the recipient should independently evaluate and judge the matters referred to in this Presentation. Vergent Asset Management LLP is registered in England and Wales with its registered office address at 8th Floor, 1 Knightsbridge Green, London SW1X 7QA, United Kingdom (Companies House number OC418829) and is authorized and is an Exempt Reporting Adviser in the USA. It is regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority (FRN: 791909).
THIRD-PARTY DATA PROVIDERS
This report may contain information obtained from third parties including: Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Incorporated (BofAML), S&P Global Ratings, and MSCI. Source: Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Incorporated (BofAML), used with permission. BofAML permits use of the BofAML indices related data on an « As Is » basis, makes no warranties regarding same, does not guarantee the suitability, quality, accuracy, timeliness, and/or completeness of the BofAML indices or any data included in, related to, or derived therefrom, assumes no liability in connection with the use of the foregoing, and does not sponsor, endorse, or recommend CC&L Canada, or any of its products. This may contain information obtained from third parties, including ratings from credit ratings agencies such as S&P Global Ratings. Reproduction and distribution of third party content in any form is prohibited except with the prior written permission of the related third party. Third party content providers do not guarantee the accuracy, completeness, timeliness or availability of any information, including ratings, and are not responsible for any errors or omissions (negligent or otherwise), regardless of the cause, or for the results obtained from the use of such content. THIRD PARTY CONTENT PROVIDERS GIVE NO EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, ANY WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE OR USE. THIRD PARTY CONTENT PROVIDERS SHALL NOT BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, EXEMPLARY, COMPENSATORY, PUNITIVE, SPECIAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, COSTS, EXPENSES, LEGAL FEES, OR LOSSES (INCLUDING LOST INCOME OR PROFITS AND OPPORTUNITY COSTS OR LOSSES CAUSED BY NEGLIGENCE) IN CONNECTION WITH ANY USE OF THEIR CONTENT, INCLUDING RATINGS. Credit ratings are statements of opinions and are not statements of fact or recommendations to purchase, hold or sell securities. They do not address the suitability of securities or the suitability of securities for investment purposes, and should not be relied on as investment advice.
Source: MSCI. The MSCI information may only be used for your internal use, may not be reproduced or re-disseminated in any form and may not be used as a basis for or a component of any financial instruments or products or indices. MSCI makes no express or implied warranties or implied warranties or representations and shall have no liability whatsoever with respect to any MSCI data obtained herein. This report is not approved, reviewed or produced by MSCI.
We recently launched our Emerging Markets (EM) Small Cap fund. Comprised of over 11,000 companies, the EM Small Cap universe presents plenty of very sound investment ideas. One of the main challenges we have encountered since launching the fund more than a month ago has been the strong Chinese government regulations in various sectors, mainly technology and education. While we do not have investments in these sectors in China, we have seen a climate of increasing uncertainty in other economic sectors.
From a local perspective (which can differ from Western perspective), Chinese policy-makers are aiming for common prosperity, which fundamentally entitles a policy shift towards reducing wealth inequality. The concept is not new; it has been a long-term goal of the Chinese government that has become more relevant recently. The Central Party and State Council jointly announced the plan on June 10, establishing Zhejiang province as the pilot zone. The 14th five-year plan (2021-2025) called for an “action plan” to be fully implemented by 2050 to become an advanced, modern economy. Among common prosperity goals are narrowing the income gap, tackling the increasing real estate prices, promoting higher household income growth, increasing public services, such as healthcare and education, and improving living conditions of rural residents, among many others. These common prosperity initiatives will likely rebalance the economy from investments to consumption, targeting the mid-low-income population. Moreover, the state’s role in public and private sectors is likely to become more relevant.
It is worth noting that the Chinese government seems to have downplayed the importance of paying too much attention to short-term growth. They indeed have a short-term buffer, considering the 2021 GDP target is “above 6%”, and the country is likely to grow in the range of 8% this year.[1] The current outlook is more focused on solving structural problems, which may have short-term collateral consequences, but the vision is to improve the long-term perspective. Indeed, President Xi has emphasized a couple of times that the aforementioned long-term goals are not just an economic objective, they are about the Party’s “governing foundation”. The foregoing is still interesting, since, as previously mentioned, the Western vision is often different. Billions of dollars have been lost in market capitalization of Chinese assets, driven by strict regulatory policy in the after-school tutoring sector, together with anti-monopoly and cybersecurity rules in the internet sector. The government has also tightened property policies. Currently a blanket of uncertainty persists regarding « which sector will be regulated next ». For example, almost one month ago, a state media article equated the gaming industry, which has many companies that trade on the stock market, to “opium”. Although the government quickly quashed this article and there were no official statements, it caused a rapid slump of shares linked to the gaming sector, reflecting the prevailing nervousness among investors. The government recently released new regulations for the industry, including limiting the amount of time children can play video games to three hours a week, and last week state media mentioned that companies should avoid the sole focus of pursuing profit, in order to prevent minors from becoming addicted to games. This sentiment led to another round of losses in gaming-related stocks.
Again, different perspectives come into play. We believe China is trying to improve its society in the long term, but are not very concerned about the effect this may have on investors in the short term. The question then is; how can we better cope and adjust to these policies for the benefit of our clients? China accounts for around 10% of the MSCI EM Small Caps index, making it an important investment for our fund. Our approach to this new environment is to understand the domestic perspective and invest in companies/sectors that are subject to less regulation and more likely to benefit from the new trends that we see emerging in the future. Each scenario presents a new opportunity and the trends include:
greater self-reliance on government-fostered technology (semiconductors, artificial intelligence);
renewable energy;
fitness;
consumption favouring local brands/companies; and
manufacturing industry and robotics for products designed mainly to support and strengthen the Chinese economy.
In manufacturing and robotics, Estun Automation (002747 CH) is one of our key holdings. The company is the largest domestic industrial robot-maker in China and one of the best-positioned stocks in the A-share Small-Cap automation sector. Estun also produces several key components itself, which gives the company a strong competitive advantage in relation to competitors who rely on external suppliers. For example, Estun is one of the few robot-makers that can manufacture servo systems and controllers in-house. It has also managed to gain cutting-edge technologies, like robot 3D vision and micro-servos via a number of acquisitions. In short, Estun has the capabilities to manufacture almost all of the core parts it needs, with the exception of reducers, although they still procure the basic mechanical parts and semiconductor chips. They also have production plants across the globe. The two key plants are UK-based Trio, acquired in 2017, a top 10 global player in motion control systems, and Germany-based Cloos, acquired in 2019, making the brand a cutting-edge welding robot. In light of this, supply chain management has become a key issue for Estun.
The latter is definitely a big advantage. For industrial automation, all the key core technology is in upstream components, like servos, motion control systems, and reducers. Thus, without access to upstream components, a company is merely one of many system integrators, which face a significantly lower entry barrier, intense competition, and lower margins. In fact, now that the Estun brand is better known, more external system integrators are starting to integrate Estun’s robots into their product portfolio, which is why Estun shifted resources away from their system integration department. Back in 2019, the revenue contribution of industrial robot manufacturing and sales, and system integration sub-segments was 50:50, but from 2020 onward, it’s been skewing towards robot sales. As of the first half of 2021, the proportion has shifted to 80:20 for sales of robots to system integration.
Nowadays, Estun’s main end markets are lithium-ion batteries, computers, communications, and consumer electronics (known as the 3C industry in China) applications, solar, welding robots (primarily for heavy machinery), and metal forming (processing). Smaller, fast-growing contributors include woodwork, home appliances, and packaging. Meanwhile, the core markets for the Cloos robot brand are medium- and heavy–plated 6-axis welding robots. Currently, this brand is gaining market share in China’s heavy machinery segment. Cloos is also developing their medium-plated welding robots, which are commonly used in heavy-duty trucks.
Industry-wise, according to the MIR database, a Chinese based, high-end, hardware-focused research, the China automation market size grew 26.9% year over year to approximately RMB153 billion in the first half of 2021. The market is continuously experiencing robust demand from new-economy manufacturers, notably industrial robots, electric vehicle batteries, wind turbines/solar panels, as well as 3C and logistics, and some of the more niche markets (e.g., tobacco, wood engraving), which are dominated by Japanese players. However, this represents a huge upside potential for players like Estun, who are narrowing their technology gap with international peers. Moreover, machine exports drove some of the automation demand in the first half of 2021. Estun (and peers like Innovance) have experienced continuous market share gains. The company is also well positioned to maintain its domestic industrial robot leadership position, especially in 4-axis and 6-axis industrial robots, which contributed to approximately 85% of their shipment volume in the first half of 2021.
Estun’s focus on the new-economy manufacturers, coupled with their expected market share gains, should ensure a secular growth trend in the long term. Although there has been plenty of uncertainty around the Chinese economy since the start of the second half of 2021, we continue to view industrial automation (IA) demand as among the highlights of local dynamics, given the favourable demand outlook and strong policy support for an industrial upgrade. Estun is a perfect example of a company that can position Chinese automation, robotics, and industrialization on par with the leading international players. We believe the company will get ongoing government support for achieving these targets in the mid/long term, so the company is unlikely to be exposed to any material regulation risk. In light of its quarterly politburo meeting outlining the drive to “encourage enterprise to scale up technological upgrade investment”, we expect the manufacturing industry to step up investing pursuit of robotization.
Estun has experienced short-term pressure driven by COVID-19 in China (primarily in Nanjing and Jiangsu, Estun’s headquarters and production base) and lower-than-expected results in Q2 2021 are likely to remain so for the rest of the year. The difficult quarter was driven by:
price hikes of parts, base metals and chips;
Estun prioritizing market share over margins in 2021; and
hikes in raw material transportation fees.
the delayed shipping of Trio motion controllers
We feel this situation is temporary and expect margin reversal from next year (or before), driven by ongoing operating leverage, improvements in internal cost control, and more import substitution from domestic parts. In fact, in their 2Q earnings results conference call, the company maintained 2021 revenue guidance of RMB 3.5-4.0 billion, with its 2021/22/25 industrial robot sale targets of 10k/15k/50k units unchanged. Estun management also expects profit margin to rise notably as its business expands.
Despite the short-term headwinds, we hold a positive view toward Estun, as we believe in the sustainability of industrialization and automation, on the back of a solid secular growth trend in the coming years in China. As the local market leader, Estun is now already directly competing with big foreign players, like Japan-based FANUC. Their acquisition of Cloos has significantly contributed to the positioning and diversification of Estun’s robots in China. We expect Estun’s market share to increase from for 3-4% to approximately 10% by 2025, meaning Chinese factories will increasingly shift to domestic rather than foreign brands. We believe Estun has the potential to emerge as one of the leader industrial robot manufacturers globally. This could be a similar story to other emerging domestic players in China, such as excavators, where domestic market leader Sany holds an approximate 25% market share.
As bottom-up investors, fundamentals drive our stock selection. We look for companies growing faster than their industry, with good margins and cash flows. We also need to understand local dynamics and invest accordingly. China’s recent policies are a good example of a divergence in timing and perspectives between local interests and foreign investors, as detailed above. The road has been bumpy, but opportunities are also emerging, especially in small-cap companies, that will likely have more room to grow in the long run. Government-encouraged manufacturing and robotics companies also present good opportunities in this scenario, which supports our preference for our holding Estun.
[1] www.dw.com
Shot with the DJI Mavic Pro
In Canada and other developed markets, equity diversification has changed significantly in recent years. Traditional investments are now less diversified due to the increasing integration of global supply chains and global markets’ interconnectedness.
The importance of diversification, however, has not changed. If anything, it is more important than ever. With declining interest rates and record-low bond yields, investors are on a quest for income and better returns. Many investors have increased their exposure to developed or emerging-market equity investments. However, they have experienced consequences when markets have tumbled in unison, such as during the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Some investment managers now offer opportunities to invest in geographically unique markets. In particular, frontier markets are presented as a major opportunity for investors who have the flexibility to make long-term investments.
What are frontier markets?
Frontier markets are an alternative asset class focused on identifying opportunities in economies that are still in their infancy in terms of development. These « frontier » markets are less developed than emerging markets like China or Brazil.
Unlike emerging markets, there is no clear and standard definition of frontier markets. We consider frontier markets to be unclassified markets or markets that are not represented well in the emerging markets index, such as Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam, Ghana, and Kenya. These have large and growing populations and low but increasing income levels.
As incomes rise, these countries’ populations are expected to increase consumer spending on goods and services. It should increase the profitability and business maturity of local companies able to meet rising consumer demand – making such companies ripe for investment.
Understanding the risks and benefits of frontier investing
While many of these countries are high-risk due to their low level of economic maturity and potential political instability, their economies are highly localized and disconnected from global trends, making them a viable mechanism for diversifying portfolios. To mitigate risk, the companies we invest in are typically consumer-focused – with offerings that meet local consumption demand rather than global supply needs.
Investing in frontier markets can also generate social benefits, injecting much-needed capital into underinvested companies and helping drive regional economic development and the maturation of key industries. Investors can make their money do good in the world while also contributing to their long-term financial goals.
How do frontier market investments fit within an investor’s financial portfolio?
At CC&L Private Capital, we believe that adding a modest allocation to frontier markets can help improve the robustness of a portfolio under certain circumstances. However, any frontier investments need to be made based on a fulsome discussion of the risk and return trade-offs.
If you would like to find out more about our approach to frontier investing or learn how we can help you grow your investment returns, please contact us.
This post is for information only and is not intended as investment advice. The views expressed are those of the author at the time of publication and are subject to change at any time.
This strategy and any associated investments are only available to professional investors and eligible counterparties, as defined in the rules of the UK Financial Conduct Authority. This communication is not being made to, and should not be relied upon by, persons who are retail clients for FCA regulatory purposes. Vergent Asset Management LLP is not authorised by the FCA to deal with retail clients.
The strategy continues to be rewarded for the thesis we’ve built around technology, payments, and financial inclusion in our markets. The starting point for us in that process was the mobile money opportunity in East Africa which continues to be best exemplified by Kenya’s Safaricom’s M-Pesa. Over time, we built a deeper understanding of the payments value chain which helped us identify infrastructure players like Morocco’s Hightech Payment Systems which was an early investment in the life of the strategy. We also broadened the geographical scope of the thesis by expanding our core mobile money thesis towards West Africa into Ghana with MTN’s exciting Momo business which is now starting to get the attention it deserves from the market. We also benefited from the deepening opportunity set in the sector with transformational companies like Kazakhstan’s Kaspi.Kz coming to market last year. Our financial inclusion theme extended to microfinance companies like Bank BTPN Syariah in Indonesia which provides micro loans to nearly four million women entrepreneurs in rural Indonesia. BTPN Syariah has a fantastic opportunity to go from an offline centric credit disbursement and collection model into an Omni-channel offering that will help scale the business whilst improving the level of service they provide customers. Our initial thesis has evolved and strengthened since we started investing in the sector; financial inclusion and digital transformation has become a regulatory priority and the pandemic has only helped accelerate adoption and usage among consumers. Moreover, the companies we’ve invested in are constantly evolving with Kaspi.Kz continuing to add new services to its super app that counts over half of Kazakhstan’s population as active users and M-Pesa accelerating its transformation from a peer-to-peer USSD based service into a full-fledged lifestyle and financial services platform servicing ~25 million Kenyan consumers and ~300k merchants. Another factor that we must acknowledge has changed over the last two years is the valuations have re-rated for the broader sector both in the public and private markets. What reassures us on that front are four key points:
The aforementioned companies and others we own in the sector are all profitable
Their balance sheets are unlevered and in most cases net cash
They trade at reasonable multiples relative to the sector in developed markets (albeit at a premium to the rest of the portfolio) and private markets. In fact, no one company we’ve invested in currently trades on a P/E ratio that is in excess of 30x 2022 earnings. Note our emphasis on price to earnings ratio means all of our companies are bottom line profitable
The growth profile and optionality embedded in these business models means that the multiples we see on near term earnings will burn off fairly quickly in the next five years
Away from payments and technology, the strategy also experienced strong returns in the period from our retail portfolio in Morocco and the Philippines. In Morocco, the vaccination rollout program has been very successful with over 18m doses administered as of the date of writing (Morocco’s total population is ~36 million of which 27% is under the age of 15). This has bolstered the outlook for sales at Label Vie, the operator of the largest supermarket chain in the country under license from France’s Carrefour. Label Vie also operates the largest cash & carry format stores in the country under the Atacadao brand, a Brazilian concept brand also owned by Carrefour which caters to professional buyers and households. The reason for our optimism on the company’s short term prospects comes from the potential return of the hospitality channel as Morocco reopens to European tourism. Prior to the pandemic, a quarter of Atacadao’s sales came from the hospitality channel and we expect that some of that will start to show in sales over the next few quarters. Longer term, our bullish thesis on Label Vie is underpinned by the broader modern retail sector’s development and management team’s aggressive expansion strategy which is focused on scaling several formats including supermarkets (~700sqm), minimarkets (~200sqm), and Atacadao. It is worth nothing that Label Vie’s management is also investing in building an online presence in Morocco through “Bringo”, a Romanian online grocery concept that is also owned by Carrefour. Morocco is a very nascent market for online (~1% of retail sales) and according to our channel checks has not experienced the same step change in online shopping habits that other markets have experienced since the onset of the pandemic. This gives Label Vie an opportunity to build out its online channel thoughtfully by adapting its offerings and fulfillment strategy to local tastes and dynamics. We were encouraged by management’s receptiveness to our recommendations in this area and expect to continue to engage with them as they build out their online model. In the Philippines, we are seeing early signs of a recovery as vaccinations begin to pick up pace. Encouraged by that progress, we made an investment in a leading home improvement retailer that we believe will benefit tremendously from the return in construction spending and home renovation activity. It is worth nothing that unlike in other markets in the world, construction activity has been largely suppressed in the Philippines since the pandemic started in March of last year as a result of strict social distancing measures at the local and federal level.
In our last letter, we made a case for investors to think differently about how they approach emerging markets. We argued that many of the largest constituent countries of emerging market indices have reached levels of economic development, regulatory cycle, and market efficiency that makes them comparable to developed markets. We continue to advocate that the true emerging market opportunity today lies in the next generation of emerging markets like Egypt, Indonesia, Kenya, Pakistan, and Vietnam. Today, those market offer up a unique combination of a large, young and rapidly urbanizing consumer base that is increasingly connected but still not served in the same way their counterparts in more developed countries are. Our job is to find public companies that are able to fill that gap by offering services directly to those customers (B2C) or by enabling other businesses to offer those services to customers (B2B2C). That gap represents a substantial economic and social profit opportunity for well run businesses in which the strategy is generously invested.
Vergent Asset Management LLP
DISCLOSURES
1. Unless otherwise stated, all data is at June 30, 2021 and stated in US dollars (US$). Source: Connor, Clark & Lunn Financial Group, Thomson Reuters Datastream.
2. Performance history for the Vergent Emerging Opportunities Strategy is that of the Vergent Emerging Opportunities Composite. The Composite has an inception and creation date of August 2018.
3. Net performance figures are stated after management fees, estimated performance fees, trading expenses and before operating expenses. Operating expenses include items such as custodial fees for pooled vehicles and would also include charges for valuation, audit, tax and legal expenses. Such additional operating expenses would reduce the actual returns experienced by investors. Past performance of the strategy is no guarantee of future performance; Future returns are not guaranteed and a loss of capital may occur. For illustrative purposes, performance fee of 20% on added value over the hurdle rate of 6% plus the management fee of 1.25% have been assumed. Actual management fees charged to a particular account may vary.
4. There is no benchmark for the Vergent Emerging Opportunities Strategy because it has an absolute return objective
5. Standard Deviation measures the dispersion of monthly returns since the inception of the strategy.
Benchmarks and financial indices are shown for illustrative purposes only, are not available for direct investment, are unmanaged, assume reinvestment of income, do not reflect the impact of any management or incentive fees and have limitations when used for comparison or other purposes because they may have different volatility or other material characteristics (such as number and types of instruments) than the Strategy. The Strategy’s investments are not restricted to the instruments comprising any one index and do not in all cases correspond to the investments reflected in such indices.
These materials (“Presentation”) are furnished by Vergent Asset Management (“Vergent”) on a confidential basis for informational and illustration purposes only. This Presentation is intended for the use of the recipient only and may not be reproduced or distributed to any other person, in whole or in part, without the prior written consent of Vergent. Certain information contained in this Presentation is based on information obtained from third-party sources that Vergent considers to be reliable. However, Vergent makes no representation as to, and accepts no responsibility for, the accuracy, fairness or completeness of the information contained herein. The information is as of the date indicated and reflects present intention only. This information may be subject to change at any time, and Vergent is under no obligation to provide you with any updates or amendments to this Presentation. This Presentation is not an offer to buy or sell, nor a solicitation of an offer to buy or sell any security or other financial instrument advised by Vergent. This Presentation does not contain certain material information about the strategy, including important risk disclosures. An investment in the strategy is not suitable for all investors, and before making an investment in the strategy, you should consult with your professional advisor(s) to determine whether an investment in the strategy is suitable for you in light of your investment objectives and financial situation. Vergent does not purport to be an advisor as to legal, taxation, accounting, financial or regulatory matters in any jurisdiction, and the recipient should independently evaluate and judge the matters referred to in this Presentation. Vergent Asset Management LLP is registered in England and Wales with its registered office address at 8th Floor, 1 Knightsbridge Green, London SW1X 7QA, United Kingdom (Companies House number OC418829) and is authorized and is an Exempt Reporting Adviser in the USA. It is regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority (FRN: 791909).
THIRD-PARTY DATA PROVIDERS
This report may contain information obtained from third parties including: Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Incorporated (BofAML), S&P Global Ratings, and MSCI. Source: Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Incorporated (BofAML), used with permission. BofAML permits use of the BofAML indices related data on an « As Is » basis, makes no warranties regarding same, does not guarantee the suitability, quality, accuracy, timeliness, and/or completeness of the BofAML indices or any data included in, related to, or derived therefrom, assumes no liability in connection with the use of the foregoing, and does not sponsor, endorse, or recommend CC&L Canada, or any of its products. This may contain information obtained from third parties, including ratings from credit ratings agencies such as S&P Global Ratings. Reproduction and distribution of third party content in any form is prohibited except with the prior written permission of the related third party. Third party content providers do not guarantee the accuracy, completeness, timeliness or availability of any information, including ratings, and are not responsible for any errors or omissions (negligent or otherwise), regardless of the cause, or for the results obtained from the use of such content. THIRD PARTY CONTENT PROVIDERS GIVE NO EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, ANY WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE OR USE. THIRD PARTY CONTENT PROVIDERS SHALL NOT BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, EXEMPLARY, COMPENSATORY, PUNITIVE, SPECIAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, COSTS, EXPENSES, LEGAL FEES, OR LOSSES (INCLUDING LOST INCOME OR PROFITS AND OPPORTUNITY COSTS OR LOSSES CAUSED BY NEGLIGENCE) IN CONNECTION WITH ANY USE OF THEIR CONTENT, INCLUDING RATINGS. Credit ratings are statements of opinions and are not statements of fact or recommendations to purchase, hold or sell securities. They do not address the suitability of securities or the suitability of securities for investment purposes, and should not be relied on as investment advice.
Source: MSCI. The MSCI information may only be used for your internal use, may not be reproduced or re-disseminated in any form and may not be used as a basis for or a component of any financial instruments or products or indices. MSCI makes no express or implied warranties or implied warranties or representations and shall have no liability whatsoever with respect to any MSCI data obtained herein. This report is not approved, reviewed or produced by MSCI.
This strategy and any associated investments are only available to professional investors and eligible counterparties, as defined in the rules of the UK Financial Conduct Authority. This communication is not being made to, and should not be relied upon by, persons who are retail clients for FCA regulatory purposes. Vergent Asset Management LLP is not authorised by the FCA to deal with retail clients.
The strategy continues to be rewarded for the thesis we’ve built around technology, payments, and financial inclusion in our markets. The starting point for us in that process was the mobile money opportunity in East Africa which continues to be best exemplified by Kenya’s Safaricom’s M-Pesa. Over time, we built a deeper understanding of the payments value chain which helped us identify infrastructure players like Morocco’s Hightech Payment Systems which was an early investment in the life of the strategy. We also broadened the geographical scope of the thesis by expanding our core mobile money thesis towards West Africa into Ghana with MTN’s exciting Momo business which is now starting to get the attention it deserves from the market. We also benefited from the deepening opportunity set in the sector with transformational companies like Kazakhstan’s Kaspi.Kz coming to market last year. Our financial inclusion theme extended to microfinance companies like Bank BTPN Syariah in Indonesia which provides micro loans to nearly four million women entrepreneurs in rural Indonesia. BTPN Syariah has a fantastic opportunity to go from an offline centric credit disbursement and collection model into an Omni-channel offering that will help scale the business whilst improving the level of service they provide customers. Our initial thesis has evolved and strengthened since we started investing in the sector; financial inclusion and digital transformation has become a regulatory priority and the pandemic has only helped accelerate adoption and usage among consumers. Moreover, the companies we’ve invested in are constantly evolving with Kaspi.Kz continuing to add new services to its super app that counts over half of Kazakhstan’s population as active users and M-Pesa accelerating its transformation from a peer-to-peer USSD based service into a full-fledged lifestyle and financial services platform servicing ~25 million Kenyan consumers and ~300k merchants. Another factor that we must acknowledge has changed over the last two years is the valuations have re-rated for the broader sector both in the public and private markets. What reassures us on that front are four key points:
The aforementioned companies and others we own in the sector are all profitable
Their balance sheets are unlevered and in most cases net cash
They trade at reasonable multiples relative to the sector in developed markets (albeit at a premium to the rest of the portfolio) and private markets. In fact, no one company we’ve invested in currently trades on a P/E ratio that is in excess of 30x 2022 earnings. Note our emphasis on price to earnings ratio means all of our companies are bottom line profitable
The growth profile and optionality embedded in these business models means that the multiples we see on near term earnings will burn off fairly quickly in the next five years
Away from payments and technology, the strategy also experienced strong returns in the period from our retail portfolio in Morocco and the Philippines. In Morocco, the vaccination rollout program has been very successful with over 18m doses administered as of the date of writing (Morocco’s total population is ~36 million of which 27% is under the age of 15). This has bolstered the outlook for sales at Label Vie, the operator of the largest supermarket chain in the country under license from France’s Carrefour. Label Vie also operates the largest cash & carry format stores in the country under the Atacadao brand, a Brazilian concept brand also owned by Carrefour which caters to professional buyers and households. The reason for our optimism on the company’s short term prospects comes from the potential return of the hospitality channel as Morocco reopens to European tourism. Prior to the pandemic, a quarter of Atacadao’s sales came from the hospitality channel and we expect that some of that will start to show in sales over the next few quarters. Longer term, our bullish thesis on Label Vie is underpinned by the broader modern retail sector’s development and management team’s aggressive expansion strategy which is focused on scaling several formats including supermarkets (~700sqm), minimarkets (~200sqm), and Atacadao. It is worth nothing that Label Vie’s management is also investing in building an online presence in Morocco through “Bringo”, a Romanian online grocery concept that is also owned by Carrefour. Morocco is a very nascent market for online (~1% of retail sales) and according to our channel checks has not experienced the same step change in online shopping habits that other markets have experienced since the onset of the pandemic. This gives Label Vie an opportunity to build out its online channel thoughtfully by adapting its offerings and fulfillment strategy to local tastes and dynamics. We were encouraged by management’s receptiveness to our recommendations in this area and expect to continue to engage with them as they build out their online model. In the Philippines, we are seeing early signs of a recovery as vaccinations begin to pick up pace. Encouraged by that progress, we made an investment in a leading home improvement retailer that we believe will benefit tremendously from the return in construction spending and home renovation activity. It is worth nothing that unlike in other markets in the world, construction activity has been largely suppressed in the Philippines since the pandemic started in March of last year as a result of strict social distancing measures at the local and federal level.
In our last letter, we made a case for investors to think differently about how they approach emerging markets. We argued that many of the largest constituent countries of emerging market indices have reached levels of economic development, regulatory cycle, and market efficiency that makes them comparable to developed markets. We continue to advocate that the true emerging market opportunity today lies in the next generation of emerging markets like Egypt, Indonesia, Kenya, Pakistan, and Vietnam. Today, those market offer up a unique combination of a large, young and rapidly urbanizing consumer base that is increasingly connected but still not served in the same way their counterparts in more developed countries are. Our job is to find public companies that are able to fill that gap by offering services directly to those customers (B2C) or by enabling other businesses to offer those services to customers (B2B2C). That gap represents a substantial economic and social profit opportunity for well run businesses in which the strategy is generously invested.
Vergent Asset Management LLP
DISCLOSURES
1. Unless otherwise stated, all data is at June 30, 2021 and stated in US dollars (US$). Source: Connor, Clark & Lunn Financial Group, Thomson Reuters Datastream.
2. Performance history for the Vergent Emerging Opportunities Strategy is that of the Vergent Emerging Opportunities Composite. The Composite has an inception and creation date of August 2018.
3. Net performance figures are stated after management fees, estimated performance fees, trading expenses and before operating expenses. Operating expenses include items such as custodial fees for pooled vehicles and would also include charges for valuation, audit, tax and legal expenses. Such additional operating expenses would reduce the actual returns experienced by investors. Past performance of the strategy is no guarantee of future performance; Future returns are not guaranteed and a loss of capital may occur. For illustrative purposes, performance fee of 20% on added value over the hurdle rate of 6% plus the management fee of 1.25% have been assumed. Actual management fees charged to a particular account may vary.
4. There is no benchmark for the Vergent Emerging Opportunities Strategy because it has an absolute return objective
5. Standard Deviation measures the dispersion of monthly returns since the inception of the strategy.
Benchmarks and financial indices are shown for illustrative purposes only, are not available for direct investment, are unmanaged, assume reinvestment of income, do not reflect the impact of any management or incentive fees and have limitations when used for comparison or other purposes because they may have different volatility or other material characteristics (such as number and types of instruments) than the Strategy. The Strategy’s investments are not restricted to the instruments comprising any one index and do not in all cases correspond to the investments reflected in such indices.
These materials (“Presentation”) are furnished by Vergent Asset Management (“Vergent”) on a confidential basis for informational and illustration purposes only. This Presentation is intended for the use of the recipient only and may not be reproduced or distributed to any other person, in whole or in part, without the prior written consent of Vergent. Certain information contained in this Presentation is based on information obtained from third-party sources that Vergent considers to be reliable. However, Vergent makes no representation as to, and accepts no responsibility for, the accuracy, fairness or completeness of the information contained herein. The information is as of the date indicated and reflects present intention only. This information may be subject to change at any time, and Vergent is under no obligation to provide you with any updates or amendments to this Presentation. This Presentation is not an offer to buy or sell, nor a solicitation of an offer to buy or sell any security or other financial instrument advised by Vergent. This Presentation does not contain certain material information about the strategy, including important risk disclosures. An investment in the strategy is not suitable for all investors, and before making an investment in the strategy, you should consult with your professional advisor(s) to determine whether an investment in the strategy is suitable for you in light of your investment objectives and financial situation. Vergent does not purport to be an advisor as to legal, taxation, accounting, financial or regulatory matters in any jurisdiction, and the recipient should independently evaluate and judge the matters referred to in this Presentation. Vergent Asset Management LLP is registered in England and Wales with its registered office address at 8th Floor, 1 Knightsbridge Green, London SW1X 7QA, United Kingdom (Companies House number OC418829) and is authorized and is an Exempt Reporting Adviser in the USA. It is regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority (FRN: 791909).
THIRD-PARTY DATA PROVIDERS
This report may contain information obtained from third parties including: Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Incorporated (BofAML), S&P Global Ratings, and MSCI. Source: Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Incorporated (BofAML), used with permission. BofAML permits use of the BofAML indices related data on an « As Is » basis, makes no warranties regarding same, does not guarantee the suitability, quality, accuracy, timeliness, and/or completeness of the BofAML indices or any data included in, related to, or derived therefrom, assumes no liability in connection with the use of the foregoing, and does not sponsor, endorse, or recommend CC&L Canada, or any of its products. This may contain information obtained from third parties, including ratings from credit ratings agencies such as S&P Global Ratings. Reproduction and distribution of third party content in any form is prohibited except with the prior written permission of the related third party. Third party content providers do not guarantee the accuracy, completeness, timeliness or availability of any information, including ratings, and are not responsible for any errors or omissions (negligent or otherwise), regardless of the cause, or for the results obtained from the use of such content. THIRD PARTY CONTENT PROVIDERS GIVE NO EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, ANY WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE OR USE. THIRD PARTY CONTENT PROVIDERS SHALL NOT BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, EXEMPLARY, COMPENSATORY, PUNITIVE, SPECIAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, COSTS, EXPENSES, LEGAL FEES, OR LOSSES (INCLUDING LOST INCOME OR PROFITS AND OPPORTUNITY COSTS OR LOSSES CAUSED BY NEGLIGENCE) IN CONNECTION WITH ANY USE OF THEIR CONTENT, INCLUDING RATINGS. Credit ratings are statements of opinions and are not statements of fact or recommendations to purchase, hold or sell securities. They do not address the suitability of securities or the suitability of securities for investment purposes, and should not be relied on as investment advice.
Source: MSCI. The MSCI information may only be used for your internal use, may not be reproduced or re-disseminated in any form and may not be used as a basis for or a component of any financial instruments or products or indices. MSCI makes no express or implied warranties or implied warranties or representations and shall have no liability whatsoever with respect to any MSCI data obtained herein. This report is not approved, reviewed or produced by MSCI.
A Herbal Renaissance
COVID-19 has been a stark reminder of human mortality, particularly in the countries where we invest. Poor health infrastructure, strained fiscal resources, and the large informal labour market are just some of the factors magnifying its profoundly negative impact. It is easy to forget our privilege as we sit at our home offices with Amazon orders keeping the doorbell busy and fresh food only a phone tap away.
The notion of immortality has fascinated humans for millennia. Since the scientific revolution, death has become a technical challenge over a divine one[1]. Medical and societal advances have lifted global life expectancy from 46 to 72 years in the space of five decades[2]. Humans today are looking to live better for longer. In his book Homo Deus, Yuval Noah Harari talks at length on immortality, proposing enhanced-sapiens as the next evolution of our species. Once we satiate our consumption needs and wants, which have their respective ceilings, what is next? Whilst advances in genomics, artificial intelligence and prosthetics are given the most attention, what is more immediately relevant, and more accessible for the majority, are incremental life adjustments and new habit formations in day-to-day life.
“Having raised humanity above the beastly level of survival struggles, we will now aim to upgrade humans into gods, and turn Homo sapiens into Homo deus.” – Homo Deus, Yuval Noah Harari
The pandemic appears to have accelerated the pursuit for healthier and better living, evident by an uptick in demand for better-for-you products, vitamins and supplements[3]. The global supplements market is estimated to be worth over $170 billion with the herbal sub-segment contributing $7.5 billion[4],[5]. The segment has grown on the back of heightened health and wellness considerations, enhanced expression of values in purchase behaviour and greater industry commercialisation. In developed countries, having saturated the margins of society, herbal and alternative medicines are now intertwined with more conventional Western practices. The ‘herbal influence’ is certainly visible in the fast-moving-consumer-goods (FMCG) industry, yet it is geared towards the premium end of the market. We believe this speaks to the idea that ‘herbal’ has, to some extent, become a heuristic cue for premium.
Vitamin and Supplement Consumption in Asia
We see a different picture in developing countries. In Asia specifically, we have witnessed more democratised consumption of herbal products and supplements as entrepreneurs, brand owners and even spiritual leaders have taken to formalising traditional remedies[6].
Source: L Catterton Asia Consumer Survey 2021
India is home to one of the best examples of this, with the modernisation and commercialisation of Ayurveda, an alternative medicine system, in everyday FMCG products[7]. Against the backdrop of rising Hindu nationalism and a democratisation of route-to-market accessibility, both local (Dabur, Himalaya, Emami, Marico and Patanjali) and multinational corporations (Nestle, Colgate, Unilever) have capitalised upon this structural trend. India has seen a culmination of factors, which together have propelled the segment to over $5 billion, with 76% of Indian households using Ayurvedic products for personal and health care needs[8]. COVID-19 has accelerated the growth of the Ayurvedic segment, not only for edible categories but also home and personal care items. India’s Health and Welfare Ministry even issued guidelines for recovering COVID-19 patients that included the consumption of Ayurvedic products.
Ayurvedic FMCG Products
Colgate is one of the many multinational brands that have capitalized on the growth in Indian alternative medicine market
In Indonesia, a market where we are invested, we have witnessed a similar trend. Increasingly consumers are allocating their marginal dollars to modern and branded versions of traditional remedies as well as products that more closely align with their religious and cultural identities.
Much like Ayurveda in India, Jamu is an ancient and indigenous form of care. It predicates that if ailments come from nature, their cure should too. Jamu comprises of a blend of tonics, ointments, oils and pills made from ginger, turmeric, tamarind, honey and other local spices found on the 17,000 island archipelago. Indonesians believe that these concoctions strengthen the immune system and serve as both a preventative and remedial solution to common illnesses. Historically, it was sold in traditional outlets, mainly by elder women (Jamu Gendong), sometimes in unhygienic conditions. According to the Ministry of Health, the Jamu industry is worth $2.7 billion and is consumed regularly by 49% of the 260 million population[9]. In contrast to Ayurveda however, Jamu has yet to benefit from the same global exposure, without a dedicated evangelist (see Baba Ramdev of Patanjali[10]) or full integration into mass market FMCG.
Conventional wisdom stipulates that Jamu is primarily consumed by elder generations, with younger, cosmopolitan consumers generally aspiring to international lifestyle products and wellness solutions[11]. What we have seen recently however, is a renewed interest in these traditional and herbal products as part of a longer-term trend. Jamu Cafes and Bars have emerged in Jakarta and there are dozens of companies that incorporate Jamu into both their edible and inedible products. The pandemic has also supported Jamu’s revived popularity amongst Indonesians[12]. President Joko ‘Jokowi’ Widodo publicised his morning Jamu routine and Dr. Chairul Anwar Nidom, Airlangga University, suggested drinking Jamu could boost immune systems. It seems as though global trends coupled with strong inherited tradition is leading to the growth of this budding industry.
Capitalising on the opportunity
One beneficiary of this herbal renaissance is our portfolio company, Sido Muncul (SIDO), a leading producer of herbal supplements in Indonesia. SIDO has built a business in modernizing a family recipe dating back to 1941; building a brand that now captures over 70% of its market. The company’s flagship product Tolak Angin is mainly used to treat ‘Masuk Angin’, a local ailment, but it is also taken to boost immunity[13]. Masuk Angin is not a medical term, but instead a colloquial term for the collective feeling of fever, chills, muscle ache and discomfort associated with the onset of what Westerners would call a cold. Its general applicability implies Tolak Angin is not limited to solving a single symptom, therefore use cases are plentiful.
The company is run by a professional team of third generation family members (who own 60%), complemented by seasoned executives in sales, distribution and finance. Regional Private Equity (PE) firm Affinity Partners took a stake in January 2018, and now hold 21% in the listed business. Affinity have supported management, whose natural strengths are in sourcing and production, by adding expertise in finance and logistics.
Sido Muncul Flagship Product – Tolak Angin
Source: Company
What is most striking (and attractive) about SIDO is the phenomenal margins it generates on Tolak Angin (+75% gross profit margins) which leads to a company level profitability profile that is far superior to even that of Coca Cola. Just like Coke, Tolak Angin has ultimate pricing power in its category and that is reflected in an approximate 20% premium on a per unit basis compared to its competitors. Unlike Coke, Tolak Angin does not have a strong second competitor and enjoys the benefits of being in a category that multinationals have found difficult to crack.
Operating Margin Comparison
Source: Bloomberg and Vergent analysis
Return on invested capital more than doubled in the last six years as a result of SIDO scaling up manufacturing, optimising distribution, and making good capital allocation decisions. This has led to substantial free cash flow generation which management has been progressively paying out in dividends.
Return on Invested Capital (%)
Source: Vergent analysis
Despite the impressive revenue and profit margin performance to date, we see more growth for SIDO ahead. The company is now building on demand in the East of the country where per capita consumption is one quarter of that in Greater Jakarta. In addition, management have outlined an export strategy focused on the Philippines, Nigeria, Malaysia and Saudi Arabia where its products have an existing following. Building on the strength of the brand, the company is launching new higher value-added products through new formulations, formats and flavours. On the margins side, we see scope for further efficiency gains as factory utilisation improves, raw material pricing is standardised and the as innovation pipeline of high value products comes to market.
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Vergent Asset Management LLP is registered in England and Wales with its registered office address at 8th Floor, 1 Knightsbridge Green, London SW1X 7QA, United Kingdom (Companies House number OC418829) and is authorized and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority (FRN: 791909).
This financial promotion is issued by Vergent Asset Management which is authorized and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority (‘FCA’). Past performance is not indicative of future results. The value of your investment may go down as well as up and you may not receive upon redemption the full amount of your original investment.
THE PERFORMANCE PRESENTED HEREIN IS NOT INDICATIVE OF FUTURE RESULTS. The performance results contained herein are for informational purposes only, and are not meant to imply that Vergent’s trading programs will produce results similar to the performance results contained herein. There can be no assurance that Vergent or any account or product advised thereby will or is likely to achieve any results shown. There can be no assurance that such trading programs will make any profit at all or will be able to avoid incurring substantial losses. No representation is made that Vergent’s investment processes or investment objectives will or are likely to be successful or achieved.
Certain information contained in this Presentation is based on information obtained from third-party sources that Vergent considers to be reliable. However, Vergent makes no representation as to, and accepts no responsibility for, the accuracy, fairness or completeness of the information contained herein. The information is as of the date indicated and reflects present intention only. This information is subject to change at any time, and Vergent is under no obligation to provide you with any updates or amendments to this Presentation. The information contained in this Presentation is not complete and does not contain certain material information about the trading programs described herein, including important risk disclosures. Accordingly, this Presentation must be read in conjunction with, and is qualified in its entirety by, such other disclosure documentation as may be provided by Vergent from time to time in connection with a prospective investment. An investment in the strategy described herein may not be suitable for all clients, and before allocating any assets to the strategy or strategies, you should thoroughly review the terms and disclosures the strategy and consult with your professional advisor(s) to determine whether an investment in the strategy is suitable for you in light of your investment objectives and financial situation.
This Presentation may contain opinions pertaining to securities, financial products, transactions and investment strategies, and such opinions may differ from one to another. Any opinions, assumptions, assessments, statements, market commentary or the like (collectively, “Statements”) regarding past, current and/or future market conditions, themes, trends or events or which are forward-looking, including regarding portfolio characteristics and limits, constitute only subjective views, beliefs, outlooks, estimations or intentions of Vergent, should not be relied on, are subject to change due to a variety of factors, including fluctuating market conditions and economic factors, and involve inherent risks and uncertainties, both general and specific, many of which cannot be predicted or quantified and are beyond Vergent’s control. Future evidence and actual results could differ materially from those set forth in, contemplated by, or underlying these Statements, which are subject to change without notice. In light of these risks and uncertainties, there can be no assurance and no representation is given that these Statements are now, or will prove to be, accurate or complete in any way. Vergent undertakes no responsibility or obligation to revise or update such Statements. Statements expressed herein may not necessarily be shared by all personnel of Vergent. You acknowledge that you are capable of independently analyzing such Statements and the other information presented herein using your own expertise, due diligence and decision making, and you are solely responsible for any investment decisions made through your use of such Statements or other information and for any and all trading results achieved thereby, whether for your own account or on behalf of your clients.
This Presentation is not an offer to buy or sell, nor a solicitation of an offer to buy or sell any security or other financial instrument, or to invest assets in any account, advised by Vergent. An investment in any account advised by Vergent may be made only by qualified clients after receipt of formal investment management documentation and disclosures from Vergent, and only in those jurisdictions where permitted by law. Vergent’s investment strategies have management fees and operating expenses that would reduce returns to a client. Operating expenses include items such as custodial fees for segregated accounts and for pooled vehicles would also include charges for valuation, audit, tax and legal expenses. Such additional operating
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Financial indices are shown for illustrative purposes only, may not be available for direct investment, are unmanaged, assume reinvestment of income, do not reflect the impact of any management or incentive fees and have limitations when used for comparison or other purposes because they may have different volatility or other material characteristics (such as number and types of instruments) than the investment strategies described herein. Vergent’s investment strategies are not restricted to the instruments comprising any one index.
Vergent is not and does not purport to be an advisor as to legal, taxation, accounting, financial or regulatory matters in any jurisdiction. The recipient should independently evaluate and judge the matters referred to in this Presentation.
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Third-party data providers
This report may contain information obtained from third parties including: Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Incorporated (BofAML), S&P Global Ratings, and MSCI.
Source: Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Incorporated (BofAML), used with permission. BofAML permits use of the BofAML indices related data on an « As Is » basis, makes no warranties regarding same, does not guarantee the suitability, quality, accuracy, timeliness, and/or completeness of the BofAML indices or any data included in, related to, or derived therefrom, assumes no liability in connection with the use of the foregoing, and does not sponsor, endorse, or recommend Vergent, or any of its products.
This may contain information obtained from third parties, including ratings from credit ratings agencies such as S&P Global Ratings. Reproduction and distribution of third party content in any form is prohibited except with the prior written permission of the related third party. Third party content providers do not guarantee the accuracy, completeness, timeliness or availability of any information, including ratings, and are not responsible for any errors or omissions (negligent orotherwise), regardless of the cause, or for the results obtained from the use of such content. THIRD PARTY CONTENT PROVIDERS GIVE NO EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, ANY WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE OR USE. THIRD PARTY CONTENT PROVIDERS SHALL NOT BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, EXEMPLARY, COMPENSATORY, PUNITIVE, SPECIAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, COSTS, EXPENSES, LEGAL FEES, OR LOSSES (INCLUDING LOST INCOME OR PROFITS AND OPPORTUNITY COSTS OR LOSSES CAUSED BY NEGLIGENCE) IN CONNECTION WITH ANY USE OF THEIR CONTENT, INCLUDING RATINGS. Credit ratings are statements of opinions and are not statements of fact or recommendations to purchase, hold or sell securities. They do not address the suitability of securities or the suitability of securities for investment purposes, and should not be relied on as investment advice.
Source: MSCI. The MSCI information may only be used for your internal use, may not be reproduced or re-disseminated in any form and may not be used as a basis for or a component of any financial instruments or products or indices. MSCI makes no express or implied warranties or implied warranties or representations and shall have no liability whatsoever with respect to any MSCI data contained herein. This report is not approved, reviewed or produced by MSCI.
The forecast here remains that global industrial momentum, as measured by the manufacturing PMI new orders index, is at or close to a peak, with a multi-month decline in prospect.
The basis for the forecast is a fall in global six-month real narrow money growth from a peak in July 2020 – the rise into that peak is judged to correspond to the increase in PMI new orders to an 11-year high in April.
Available April monetary data indicate that real narrow money growth fell further last month, suggesting that the expected PMI decline will extend into late 2021 – see chart 1.
Chart 1
The presumption here is that PMI weakness will be modest, partly reflecting a view that the global stockbuilding cycle will remain in an upswing through H2. The cycle has averaged 3.5 years historically and bottomed in Q2 2020, suggesting a peak in Q1 2022 assuming an upswing of half-cycle length. Large declines in PMI new orders (i.e. to 50 or below) have usually occurred during cycle downswings.
Any PMI pull-back, however, could have significant market implications given consensus bullishness about global economic prospects.
Historically, a declining trend in global manufacturing PMI new orders has been associated with underperformance of cyclical equity market sectors and outperformance of quality stocks within sectors. The price relative of MSCI World cyclical sectors to defensive sectors peaked in mid-April, falling to a three-month low last week – chart 2.
Chart 2
The decline has been driven by a correction in tech – the MSCI cyclical sectors basket includes IT and communication services. The price relative of non-tech cyclical sectors to defensive sectors has moved sideways since March.
The MSCI World sector-neutral quality index, meanwhile, has recovered relative to the non-quality portion of MSCI World since March, following underperformance in late 2020 / early 2021 when cyclical sectors were outperforming strongly.
Equity market behaviour, therefore, appears to have started to discount a PMI roll-over, although confirmation is required – in particular, a breakdown in the price relative of MSCI World non-tech cyclical sectors to defensive sectors.
A sign that this could be imminent is a recent sharp fall in the non-tech cyclical to defensive sectors relative in emerging markets – chart 3. A possible interpretation is that the decline reflects worsening Chinese economic prospects, with China likely to be a key driver of a global slowdown. Early Chinese monetary policy easing may be required to mitigate this drag and lay the foundation for a resumption of cyclical outperformance.