UK – CC&L Financial Group Ltd.

A stabilisation in the stock of UK vacancies in the three months to February compared with the prior three months has been cited as evidence that labour demand is holding up despite survey indications of job cuts.

Analysis of “experimental” single-month data, however, indicates that stability of the three-month average conceals a small rise in vacancies in November / December that has more than reversed in January / February*. The February single-month number was the lowest since April 2021 and 4% below the pre-pandemic (i.e. December 2019) level – see chart 1.

Chart 1

The timely Indeed job postings series also recorded a small increase at end-2024 before falling back in January / February, with the decline continuing in the first half of March (daily information is available through 14 March).

The fall in the single-month vacancies series in January / February was more than accounted for by a decline in non-government-related postings, i.e. openings in public administration, education and health are estimated to have risen after seasonal adjustment. The single-month “private sector” series was 12% below its December 2019 level in February.

Three-month on three-month growth of private sector regular pay remained strong in January but momentum of an employment-weighted average of PAYE data on median pay levels across industries is tracking lower, suggesting better official earnings news ahead – chart 2.

Chart 2

*The single-month numbers require seasonal adjustment. A three-month average of the resulting series closely matches official numbers.

The Bank of England expects rises in regulated prices and taxes to push headline CPI inflation up to 3.5% by June but the forecast likely underestimates disinflationary pressure from monetary weakness.

The near-term inflation outlook globally is subject to cross-currents. Earlier monetary weakness is bearing down on underlying pressures but the position of the stockbuilding cycle suggests a rise in commodity prices: the cycle appears to be mid-upswing and industrial commodity prices typically climb into the peak – see chart 1.

Chart 1

Higher tariffs, meanwhile, will have a one-off direct impact on measured prices and indirect effects via increased costs and supply disruption.

The UK near-term inflation profile is being additionally boosted by the imposition of VAT on school fees and large rises in some regulated prices. The Bank of England estimates that changes in the energy price cap will lift annual CPI inflation by 0.6 pp between December 2024 and June 2025, with the VAT effect and rises in regulated prices – including an average 26% increase in water bills – adding a further 0.45 pp.

Central banks, including the MPC, worry that a near-term inflation bump due one-off influences will dislodge expectations and become embedded. Monetarists argue that ample money growth is required for such “second-round” effects to emerge. G7 annual broad money growth continues to recover but is currently still below its pre-pandemic (i.e. 2015-19) average, which was associated with below-target headline and core inflation averages – chart 2. The same is true in the UK.

Chart 2

Coming UK inflation numbers will require careful interpretation. The conventional core rate – excluding energy, food, alcohol and tobacco – will overstate underlying pressures because of the above policy effects. A “true” core measure should, at a minimum, exclude the impact of the VAT change and rises in bus fares and water bills.

The Bank of England staff forecast implies a rise in the conventional core rate from 3.2% in December 2024 to 3.6% by June 2025. Calculations here suggest that this would be consistent with the above “true” core measure slowing from 3.2% to 2.8% over the same period – chart 3.

Chart 3

The monetarist rule of thumb of a roughly two-year lag between monetary and price developments suggests strong downward pressure on underlying inflation in 2025. “True” core inflation may fall by significantly more than the Bank expects.

Charts 4 and 5 show a long-term history of annual broad money growth and an adjusted core inflation measure (based on RPI rather than CPI in earlier years). The charts respectively highlight paired peaks and troughs in the series. The mean and median lags at all the highlighted turning points were 26 and 28 months, i.e. slightly longer than posited by the rule of thumb. With broad money growth bottoming in October 2023, the suggestion is that a downtrend in underlying inflation could extend into early 2026.

Chart 4

Chart 5

The historical variability of the money growth / inflation lag in the UK mainly reflects the influence of the exchange rate. The favourable assessment of underlying inflation prospects above is conditional on avoidance of significant sterling depreciation.

UK money trends remain relatively weak, arguing that the MPC bears significant responsibility for economic underperformance.

Narrow and broad money – as measured by non-financial M1 / M4 – rose by 0.4% and 0.3% respectively in December, below gains of 0.9% and 0.6% for equivalent Eurozone measures,

UK six-month real narrow money momentum was static and barely positive in December, in contrast to higher and rising momentum in the Eurozone, Sweden and Switzerland, where policy rates fell by 100-150 bp during 2024 versus the UK’s 50 bp – see chart 1.

Chart 1

Six-month growth of (nominal) broad money is similar in the UK and Eurozone (4.1% and 4.0% annualised respectively) but the UK sectoral breakdown is unfavourable – the increase was entirely attributable to households, with corporate money holdings stagnant.

The narrow money decomposition is worse. Six-month momentum of corporate real narrow money remains negative and has weakened since July. Eurozone momentum, by contrast, turned positive in October, rising further into year-end – charts 2 and 3.

Chart 2

Chart 3

Corporate money weakness suggests that companies were under financial pressure to retrench before the Budget national insurance raid.

The contention here is that household money holdings were boosted by asset sales in anticipation of possible tax changes in the Budget – see previous post. This effect may still be inflating six-month household and aggregate broad money growth.

Households, in any case, are unlikely to be in the mood to spend “excess” money holdings against a backdrop of corporate gloom and rising job losses – unless the MPC accelerates rate cuts.

The MPC’s inappropriately restrictive stance encompasses its QT operations as well as rate policy. The Bank of England’s gilt holdings fell by the equivalent of 3.2% of the broad money stock in the 12 months to December versus comparable reductions of 1.8% and 2.0% respectively in the US and Eurozone (i.e. in Fed holdings of Treasuries and Eurosystem holdings of Eurozone government securities).

Monetary financing of the fiscal deficit (i.e. taking into account commercial banking system transactions in securities and changes in fiscal deposits as well as QE / QT) subtracted from broad money growth in the UK in the latest 12 months versus a neutral impact in the Eurozone / Japan and a significant positive contribution in the US – chart 4.

Chart 4

Monthly UK money growth was boosted by households scrambling to dispose of assets ahead of the Budget, with a reversal likely and corporate liquidity trends worryingly weak.

The narrow and broad money measures tracked here – non-financial M1 / M4 – rose by 0.9% in October, in both cases representing the largest monthly increase since 2021, when the Bank of England was still conducting QE.

Strength was focused on the household sector, with a monthly rise in M4 holdings of £20.2 billion (1.1%) versus a £7.6 billion average over the previous half-year – see chart 1.

Chart 1

Six-month momentum of household real narrow money, which had edged into positive territory in September, rose to a three-year high. Corporate real narrow money momentum, by contrast, was the most negative since March, suggesting that firms were facing a financial squeeze before the Budget national insurance grab – chart 2.

Chart 2

Corporate broad money holdings contracted at a 1.7% annualised rate in nominal terms in the six months to October, while M4 lending to the sector grew by 5.6%. The corporate liquidity ratio, therefore, fell at a 6.9% pace.

Households crystallised capital gains, accelerated property transactions and withdrew cash from pension funds to avoid mooted Budget tax hikes. Retail savers sold £5.9 billion of investment funds in October, the most since September 2022, according to the Investment Association. The number of residential property transactions rose by 10% on the month, with non-residential deals jumping 40% to a record.

An increase in asset turnover has no monetary impact where transactions are between UK residents and involve offsetting changes in the bank balances of buyers / sellers. A monetary boost occurs when UK-owned assets are sold to overseas residents and / or when transactions are associated with an increase in bank lending.

Non-financial M4 lending (i.e. to households and private non-financial corporations) rose by £7.2 billion in October versus a prior six-month average of £4.1 billion.

UK buyers of assets, moreover, may have made room for purchases by reducing demand for gilts, requiring an offsetting rise in bank lending to the public sector. Gilt sales to the UK non-bank private sector slowed to £6.1 billion in October versus a prior six-month average of £12.3 billion. The credit counterparts analysis shows a positive public sector contribution to the change in M4 of £11.0 billion (0.4%).

Sales of assets to overseas investors, meanwhile, may have been significant, judging from a £9.1 billion monthly fall in non-resident net sterling deposits.

Sellers of assets for tax reasons are unlikely to wish to retain permanently higher money balances. “Excess” funds may be used to repay bank lending, increase gilt purchases and buy assets from non-residents, resulting in a reversal of the monetary boost.

The suggestion is that the pick-up in household money momentum should be discounted, with greater weight given to deteriorating corporate trends.

The MPC’s slowness to cut rates risks aggravating a recent loss of economic momentum and prolonging an inflation undershoot.

The expected 25 bp cut in November would be insufficient to catch up with reductions to date in the Eurozone, Sweden, Switzerland and Canada – see chart 1.

Chart 1

Chart 1 showing Main Policy Rates

UK annual headline consumer price inflation is as low or lower than in all these jurisdictions except Switzerland – chart 2.

Chart 2

Chart 2 showing Headline Consumer Prices (% yoy)

The MPC’s focus on the “core services” third of the inflation basket is misplaced. Monetary conditions determine aggregate inflation, with the component breakdown partly shaped by “exogenous” factors. A fall in energy prices and slowdown in food costs have suppressed headline inflation while allowing consumers to spend more on other items, delaying price deceleration in these areas.

This suggested that services disinflation would speed up as commodity prices stabilised or recovered, a development that appears to be playing out – chart 3.

Chart 3

Chart 3 showing UK Core Services* ex Rents CPI *Ex Airfares, Package Holidays & Education

Six-month consumer price momentum continues to mirror the profile of broad money growth two years earlier, a relationship suggesting a further decline and extended undershoot of the 2% target. A recovery in six-month broad money momentum has stalled below the 4.5% pa level historically consistent with 2% inflation – chart 4.

Chart 4

Chart 4 showing UK Consumer Prices & Broad Money (% 6m annualised)

UK six-month real narrow money momentum is negative and similar to levels in the Eurozone, Sweden and Switzerland, suggesting equally poor economic prospects – chart 5.

Chart 5

Chart 5 showing Real Narrow Money (% 6m)

The double dip mooted in an earlier post could be under way. Recent signs of a loss of momentum include a faster rate of decline of job vacancies and an increase in small firm earnings downgrades – chart 6.

Chart 6

Chart 6 showing UK GDP (% 2q), Vacancies* (% 6m) & FT Small Cap Earnings Revisions Ratio *Single Month, Own Seasonal Adjustment
The previous government’s fiscal plans implied significant tightening in 2024 and 2025, according to the OBR – chart 7. Changes to the fiscal rules to be announced by Chancellor Reeves will allow for additional medium-term borrowing but are unlikely to alleviate near-term restriction.

Chart 7

Chart 7 showing UK Public Sector Cyclically Adjusted Net Borrowing (% of GDP)

It might be expected that the MPC would be especially sensitive to downside risks, following its mistake of responding too late in the opposite scenario in 2021-22 when inflation was starting to rip. Could confirmation of economic weakness and a restrictive Budget yet put a warranted 50 bp on the table for November?

Monetary trends suggest that UK economic performance will converge down to a weak Eurozone.

A post in June argued that Eurozone monetary trends were too weak to support a sustained recovery. The composite PMI output index peaked in May and fell below 50 in September (flash reading of 48.9), confirming an ongoing “double dip”.

The UK economy has outperformed year-to-date: GDP grew by 1.2% between Q4 and Q2 versus a 0.5% rise in the Eurozone, while the composite PMI has moved sideways above 50 (September flash reading of 52.9).

This outperformance, however, follows relative weakness in H2 2023, when GDP contracted in the UK but eked out a small gain in the Eurozone. Q2 year-on-year GDP growth rates are similar, at 0.7% and 0.6% respectively.

This pattern – of UK underperformance in H2 2023 followed by a catch-up in 2024 – had been signalled by monetary trends. Six-month real narrow money momentum was weaker in the UK than the Eurozone in 2022 through Q2 2023 but UK momentum recovered faster last year and had opened up a lead by Q1 2024 – see chart 1.

Chart 1

The lead, however, has been narrowing since April and almost closed in August, partly reflecting a recent stalling of the UK recovery. With momentum still negative, the suggestion is that UK and Eurozone economic performance will be similarly weak through early 2025.

As well as supposed UK relative economic strength, the expectation that rates will be slower to fall in the UK than the Eurozone incorporates a belief that inflation will prove stickier. This is also at odds with monetary trends.

Inflation rates are tracking the profile of broad money momentum two years earlier, in line with a simplistic monetarist prediction. Annual broad money growth was lower in the UK than the Eurozone in 2022 and 2023, suggesting that an undershoot of UK annual CPI inflation versus the Eurozone over May-July will resume in 2025 – chart 2.

Chart 2

A UK double dip would be blamed partly on the confidence-sapping impact of the new government’s gloomy fiscal pronouncements. The MPC’s failure to deliver timely easing would carry much greater responsibility.