Person standing on a snowy mountain cliff looking at the sunset on Mount Seymour, North Vancouver, BC, Canada.

This year’s Forecast begins with a synopsis of 2025 before delving into the secular themes shaping our outlook, and then examines the shorter-term cyclical factors affecting the economy, inflation and monetary policy. We assess market valuations and, considering these elements, establish our portfolio strategy.

Throughout the next year, updates to our forecasts will be highlighted in our quarterly newsletter Outlook.

 

Introduction

2025 was a year of shocks followed by resilience. Despite extreme policy uncertainty, equity markets delivered a third consecutive year of strong gains as investors looked through geopolitics and focused on earnings durability and AI-driven investment. Canadian equities outperformed, benefiting from relative policy stability, resilient growth and a surge in gold prices amid geopolitical and institutional uncertainty.

Entering 2026, markets face fewer immediate stresses than in prior years, but outcomes remain highly sensitive to policy, inflation and confidence. In the coming pages, we present our portfolio strategy and positioning, and discuss the long-term and cyclical shorter-term influences on markets.

Chart 1: Strong equity market gains in 2025 led by Canada
Total returns in local currency rebased at 01/01/2025 = 100
Line chart showing total equity market returns in local currency during 2025, rebased to 100 at the start of the year. The S&P/TSX Composite rises the most over the period, outperforming both the S&P 500 and the MSCI All Country World Index. All three indices end the year higher, indicating broad global equity gains, with Canadian equities leading.
Source: TMX, S&P Global, MSCI, Macrobond

 

Chart 2: Gold surged in 2025
Line chart showing the price of gold in U.S. dollars per troy ounce during 2025. Gold prices trend sharply higher over the year, reaching new highs by year-end, reflecting strong performance amid heightened geopolitical and policy uncertainty.
Source: CME group, Macrobond

2026 portfolio strategy and positioning

Equity markets begin 2026 with a favourable backdrop. Supportive monetary and fiscal policy as well as solid nominal growth underpin a positive environment for equities. Company earnings remain resilient, supported by healthy nominal growth and easing cost pressures. AI-driven investment continues to shape capital allocation across technology, industrials, energy infrastructure and utilities, while related productivity expectations remain a meaningful contributor to valuations. At the same time, high valuations in the United States temper upside potential, but represent better value in Canada and other non-US markets.

Bond markets reflect a balance between the moderating labour markets and longer-term inflation and fiscal concerns. Long-end yields remain bounded in a “higher-for-longer” range by persistent fiscal expansion, reconfiguration of global power structures and sustained investment needs. Policy easing is expected to continue early in the year, amid ongoing concerns around the central banks’ credibility in the face of stubborn underlying inflation.

Chart 3: Earnings growth to remain solid
Trailing earnings growth
Line chart showing year-over-year trailing earnings growth for the S&P 500 and the S&P/TSX Composite. Both indices display positive earnings growth, with fluctuations over time but no sustained downturn, indicating resilient corporate profitability in both U.S. and Canadian equity markets.
Source: I/B/E/S, Bloomberg, Macrobond

Asset allocation

The macroeconomic environment favours a balanced approach that recognizes both the progress made on disinflation and the persistence of structural forces keeping long-term rates elevated. While policy easing supports risk assets, we hold a neutral allocation across equities and a modest underweight in fixed income. We prefer Canadian and emerging market equities relative to global equities.

Fundamental equity positioning

Our fundamental equity portfolios have added high-quality cyclical companies that will benefit from broadening economic growth, such as financials and autos. We increased infrastructure exposure to benefit from AI-related capex as well as deglobalization and protectionist policies. We also added to mid-cap gold producers given spot prices will support strong free cash flow generation over the year. We have reduced lower-growth and interest rate-sensitive companies given expectations of interest rate volatility.

Chart 4: Limited scope for further expansion
Line chart showing trailing price-to-earnings multiples for the S&P 500 and the S&P/TSX Composite. Valuations remain elevated, particularly for the S&P 500, while the Canadian market trades at lower multiples. The chart suggests limited potential for further valuation expansion, especially in the U.S. market.
Source: I/B/E/S, Bloomberg, Macrobond

Fixed income positioning

In fixed income portfolios, we are managing duration exposure tactically within the recent range in bond yields, as interest rates fluctuate alongside downside economic surprises and upside pressures on long-end yields. Long-term rates are expected to see upside pressure, a global trend. We maintain a yield curve steepening bias. Meanwhile, short-term rates in Canada, currently pricing in central bank rate hikes, should see limited upside from here.

The backdrop of easing inflation and stable demand supports credit fundamentals, and the strong profits, income and policy backdrop are likely to persist. However, the tightest spreads in over a decade, combined with asymmetric risk-reward dynamics, lead to a neutral overall exposure. Within credit, we prefer corporate bonds over provincials.

Secular themes shaping the outlook

Inflation: A higher, more volatile floor

Disinflation over the past two years reflects the unwinding of acute shocks, not a return to pre-2020 levels. Global trade networks are adapting to shorten supply chains, prioritize resilience and elevate geopolitical considerations over cost efficiency. Aging populations and reduced immigration imply a shrinking of working-age populations and tighter labour markets. Large-scale infrastructure renewal, defence modernization and expansion, coupled with energy transition investment, all reinforce upward pressure on costs. Persistent momentum in nominal GDP will anchor growth rates higher for wages, rents, earnings and government outlays. In this environment, maintaining confidence in central bank independence remains critical, as any erosion of the US Federal Reserve’s (the Fed) credibility would raise the long-term risk that inflation expectations become less firmly anchored. Inflation is likely to trend lower, but with a higher floor, greater volatility and an increased risk of resurgence if demand firms or policy eases prematurely.

AI and the productivity wildcard

AI is reshaping capital allocation, labour demand and corporate strategy, but its macro impact remains uneven. Near-term effects are capital intensive as adoption has accelerated, boosting investment in data centres, semiconductors and power infrastructure. To fund this buildout, companies are increasingly turning to credit issuance, both public and private. This reflects the scale of ambition but also introduces financial stability risks, should funding conditions tighten or expected returns fail to materialize. While early adopters remain confident in the displacement of routine cognitive roles, AI has not yet delivered on the promised broad productivity gains. Longer-term benefits depend on diffusion into enterprise processes, organizational redesign and workforce adaptation, which historically take time. A deeper question concerns the long-term social consequences, notably how the distributional and employment impacts will be managed. AI represents both a powerful growth opportunity and a source of uncertainty around labour displacement, inequality and financial stability.

Bigger government and fiscal dominance

Fiscal policy has shifted from cyclical support to a persistent structural force. Even as central banks have cut interest rates, politically entrenched deficits, industrial policies, defence spending and climate-related investments are creating a potent blend of policy support . This encourages growth and employment, reducing the likelihood of a downturn. However, it constrains monetary policy from deploying restrictive policy as debt service costs surge. This dynamic implies asymmetric responses to inflation, leaving the risk of inflation settling above target. Elevated bond issuance and debt-servicing sensitivity imply higher term premiums, wider yield ranges and greater volatility in long-term rates.

Geopolitics and a fragmented world

Globalization is giving way to regionalization and strategic alignment. Trade, capital flows and supply chains are increasingly shaped by security concerns rather than efficiency. Countries at the intersection of the realignments, such as Mexico, parts of Southeast Asia and Canada are positioned to benefit. However, this global reordering raises costs, complicates coordination and sustains higher risk premiums . As a result, global allocators are reassessing concentrated exposure to US dollar denominated assets. While the US dollar remains dominant, diversification across currencies, jurisdictions and real assets is gradually increasing.

Hyper-financialization and fragility

Financial markets now exert outsized influence on real economic outcomes. Consumption, hiring and investment are increasingly sensitive to asset prices, particularly equities. The concentration of wealth effects at the top of the income distribution has so far supported spending growth. However, this also introduces overall consumer vulnerability to a reversal in market confidence. This is particularly true in light of higher interest rates (punitive for borrowers and more rewarding for savers) as well as high inflation that is borne disproportionately by lower income earners . Financial market risks are compounded in private markets where leverage is higher, transparency is lower and liquidity is thinner. This can lead to valuation mismatches as refinancing pressures, particularly to fund the AI buildout, rise.

Cyclical outlook over the year

The United States: A mid-cycle expansion continues, with inflation risks

The United States enters 2026 in a mid-cycle expansion supported by fiscal stimulus, easing financial conditions and sustained AI-related capex. High-income consumers remain resilient, and credit availability is improving. However, labour markets are gradually softening, services inflation remains sticky and tariffs are beginning to pass through to prices. Inflation risks are asymmetric: renewed demand or overly accommodative policy could reaccelerate inflation and force a less dovish Fed than markets expect.

Europe: Gradual stabilization amid structural headwinds

Europe shows signs of gradual stabilization as fiscal flexibility increases and rate cuts ease financial conditions. Defence and infrastructure spending support activity, notably in Germany. However, political fragmentation with coalition governments and populism imply rising fiscal strains as there is no appetite for fiscal austerity. Trade pressures and energy transition costs will constrain growth across the region. Inflation is moderating, but wage dynamics from challenging demographics, combined with rising food and energy costs, all remain upside risks.

China: Managed moderation

China continues a path of controlled slowdown, with growth driven by manufacturing, exports and state-directed investment rather than consumption. The property-sector correction remains a key drag on household confidence. Inflation is persistently below target with pressure on the downside from weak pricing power and industrial capacity. Policy support is targeted, as authorities prioritize financial stability and do not want to reflate housing aggressively. External risks persist, especially with trade, but incremental easing and stabilization efforts should help reduce deflation risks into this year.

Canada: Renewed potential output growth

Canada weathered 2025 better than expected despite significant trade shocks and housing weakness. Household leverage, mortgage resets, slower population growth and subdued business sentiment remain constraints. Looking ahead, risks are easing. Fiscal spending on infrastructure, housing and defence provides a positive thrust, while contained inflation gives the Bank of Canada room to remain accommodative. Trade frictions may resume in light of the USMCA renegotiations, but Canada enters 2026 with improving labour dynamics and renewed potential output growth.

Conclusion

After three consecutive years of strong equity returns, the investment environment entering 2026 is shifting. Equity performance is increasingly expected to be driven by earnings growth rather than valuation expansion, against a macro backdrop that remains broadly supportive. Canada’s combination of commodity exposure, improving earnings momentum and relatively attractive valuations stands in contrast to the highly valued US market, while bond yields appear range bound as inflation and interest-rate pressures offset one another.

Beyond the near-term cycle, markets are being shaped by powerful secular forces. Geopolitical fragmentation, sustained large fiscal deficits and rapid AI-driven investment are reshaping growth, inflation and policy constraints. Inflation is easing, but is likely to remain more volatile than in the pre-pandemic era.

Skyline of downtown Vancouver, BC, Canada.

This summer, markets have looked calm. Bond yields have been range-bound, interest rate and equity market volatility collapsed, credit spreads tightened and stock markets are again reaching their all-time highs. For many investors, it has felt like the tariff-induced storm had finally passed. But calm waters can be misleading. Beneath the surface, powerful undercurrents are shaping the outlook.

Bond markets are behaving as though disinflation is a sure thing and that rate cuts are guaranteed. Yet upstream pressures are bubbling again – producer prices, tariffs and unit labour costs all hint at inflation that may not go quietly. The risk lies not in what we see today, but in what the market may be ignoring.

Rates are trapped in a box

Interest rates are caught in a tug-of-war. On one side, politics, fiscal strategy and the general state of the US economy all limit how high yields can go. That is, the US Treasury’s preference for short-term bill issuance (rather than long-term bonds), the ever-present risk of financial repression tools like yield curve control (a monetary policy tool that targets interest rates at specific points of the yield curve) and the fragility of housing and consumer demand (where even modestly higher yields could tip them into deeper weakness) all act as a ceiling. On the other side, yields are also unlikely to decline significantly. Rising fiscal spending (see Chart 1) and persistent government deficits have led to a continuous supply of bonds, while elevated term premia (the extra compensation investors demand for holding a longer-term bond) keep longer maturities resistant to downward movement. Additionally, producer price indices are rising once again, and labour costs remain elevated. Together, these forces explain why yields can swing within a range but are unlikely to break out decisively in either direction.

Chart 1: US spending set to soar
A stacked bar chart showing US federal spending from 1980 through forecasts to 2035. Spending rises steadily over time, with a sharp spike in 2020 from pandemic support. Components include mandatory outlays (largest share), defense, discretionary non-defense, and net interest. Forecasts show continued growth, with net interest rising rapidly as a share of spending.
Source: US Congressional Budget Office, Macrobond

Recent statements from the US Federal Reserve (Fed) have reflected a cautiously dovish stance, supportive of easier monetary policy. During the Jackson Hole Economic Symposium in late August, Fed Chair Powell indicated a dovish position in the near term regarding employment, while reaffirming the Fed’s commitment to the 2% inflation target. Market participants interpreted these remarks as a signal for potential rate cuts. In reality, while rate reductions are indeed anticipated as soon as September, unless there is a significant deterioration in labour market data, the inflation threshold will keep the easing path confined.

Calm at the wrong time

Markets are treating today’s calm as though it was permanent. Yet, underlying pressures tell a different story. Core producer prices are up 3.7% over last year, nearing the upper end of the range since 2022. The wages and salaries component of the employment cost index at 3.6% y/y remains well above its 25-year average. Direct tariff impacts on consumers have so far been muted by businesses working off previous inventory accumulation. Most recently, the independence of the US central bank appears to be under question, which has historically been associated with higher long-term inflation. Meanwhile, the MOVE index, which tracks bond market volatility, sits near cycle lows (see Chart 2), indicating a classic sign of complacency. History shows that moments of calm often precede periods of turbulence. If inflation re-emerges, today’s quiet will prove fragile.

Chart 2: Collapsing bond market volatility since April
A line chart of the MOVE Index (US Treasury market volatility) from January 2023 to July 2025. Volatility peaked sharply in early 2023 above 190 basis points, then trended downward with fluctuations. Volatility spiked again in April 2025, but has steadily declined, reaching near 70 bps by July 2025.
Source: ICE BofAML, Macrobond

The great disconnect: payrolls vs. profits

The most striking disconnect is between the labour market and corporate earnings. Employment growth is slowing, with downward revisions a consistent theme. In the US, job growth has slowed dramatically, averaging just 35K per month over May–July, the weakest stretch since the pandemic. Meanwhile, continuing jobless claims are on the rise (see Chart 3). Firms are maintaining a “no hire, no fire” stance, meaning that they are holding onto staff but are reluctant to add new employees. Despite that, corporate America is reporting resilient results. Margins, revenues and earnings in the most recent corporate earnings season have come in stronger than expected. Productivity gains, leaner operations and early adoption of AI may be helping. However, we believe this gap is unsustainable. If the labour market weakens further, demand will eventually soften and profits will be at risk. This question of whether earnings can remain resilient while the jobs picture fades will determine the next leg of market direction.

Chart 3: Rising continuing claims suggest difficulty finding jobs
A line chart of US continuing jobless claims from January 2023 to July 2025. Claims rose from about 1.55 million in early 2023 to nearly 2 million by mid-2025. The series shows periods of stabilization but an overall upward trend, suggesting more persistent unemployment.
Source: US Department of Labor, Macrobond

Capital markets

Economic momentum softened through the summer, but equity markets weathered the weak July jobs report and tariff uncertainty well. In August, both the S&P 500 and S&P/TSX Composite reached record highs, with the VIX falling to its lowest level since March. Year to date, US equities are up in the high single-digits, while Canadian, European and emerging markets have posted stronger double-digit gains.

Other asset classes have experienced less favourable performance. WTI crude oil’s June rebound quickly reversed, and crude prices remain negative year to date. The US dollar index maintained stability through the summer but remains negative on a year-to-date basis.

Bond yields continue to stay within established boundaries due to fluctuating market narratives and consistent policies from central banks. Indeed, both the Fed (4.25–4.50%) and the Bank of Canada (2.75%) held policy rates steady during the summer. Canadian corporate spreads tightened to pre-crisis levels in June and July before widening modestly in mid-August alongside a surge in issuance. The FTSE Canada Universe Bond Index is negative thus far in the third quarter and only slightly positive for the year to date.

Portfolio strategy

For investors, the current environment requires a selective approach.

Balanced portfolios have moved back to market weight in equities, reflecting decreased recession probabilities toward the end of the second quarter. Recent data has indicated a gradual economic softening instead of a significant downturn, which has reduced the degree of downside risk. At the same time, equities are being kept afloat by strong earnings. That disconnect still warrants some caution, but the adjustment acknowledges that downside risks are not as acute as earlier in the year. In fundamental equity portfolios, the emphasis is on quality. High-quality businesses with durable earnings growth remain core holdings. As the likelihood of a deep downturn has diminished, exposure to traditional defensive areas of the market has been pared back and selective positions in quality cyclical companies have been added where valuations are attractive.

In fixed income portfolios, the strategy remains cautious. With rates expected to stay range-bound, duration is managed tactically. The shape of the yield curve matters more than the outright level. Short-term rates will be anchored by monetary policy, while longer-term rates will be pressured by fiscal supply, leading to steeper yield curves. In credit, fundamentals are still supportive but credit spreads are too tight to offer much reward, warranting a neutral position.

The Treasury Department in Washington DC, USA.

The US dollar and US Treasuries have long been seen as safe haven assets. In this edition of Outlook, we ask whether US assets are losing their special status.

Although market volatility has eased, the market shocks of April have brought to light several interesting observations that are worth exploring further.

The usual relationships between “risky” and “safe” assets started breaking down, posing challenges for asset allocators. As stock markets plunged, long-dated Treasury yields increased and the US dollar weakened (see Chart 1). Notably, the 30-year Treasury yield surged over 65 basis points from its lowest to highest in just three trading days, surpassing 5% briefly.

Chart 1: US assets shaky
This chart illustrates the movement of 10-year US Treasury yields and the US dollar index during a period of market volatility in early April 2025. Treasury yields surged during this time, while the US dollar index weakened.
Source: US Department of the Treasury, Intercontinental Exchange (ICE), Macrobond

Normally when recession fears grow or investors move to “risk-off” mode, we would expect yields to drop and the US dollar to strengthen. The fact that Treasuries and the United States Dollar weakened during recent turmoil suggests that the US’s safe haven status may be fading.

Attempts at explaining the surge in yields include concerns about rising inflation, technical flows, liquidity squeezes, worries about the US dollar as the reserve currency, foreign investors exiting US-based assets and broad US fiscal concerns. We will examine the latter two in greater detail.

Foreign investors not yielding to pressure

Investors have piled money into the US at staggering rates in recent years (see Chart 2). Not only has foreign ownership of US equities risen to a record high, but foreign ownership of US Treasuries has increased nearly twofold since 2010, rising by USD4 trillion. While the bulk of US assets are held domestically, foreign ownership represents a sizeable share. Japan and China are the top two foreign holders of US Treasuries. In the context of geopolitical tensions and an unfriendly trade environment, it is plausible that investors in other countries, including China and Japan, were selling US Treasuries to increase yields and exert pressure on President Trump to reconsider recent tariff escalations. Yet, preliminary data indicate that US assets were sold by private Japanese investors. Given the US dollar was declining in parallel with Treasury bonds during this sell-off indicates investors were price-insensitive and getting ahead of potential government intervention. Additionally, the euro, Japanese yen, and British pound experienced some of the largest rallies against the US dollar during this period, which aligns with the fact that the Eurozone, Japan and the UK are three of the four largest foreign creditors to the Treasury market. In other words: direct measures to repatriate capital in response to the tariffs.

Chart 2: Foreign ownership of US securities has surged
This chart shows the significant increase in foreign ownership of US securities since 2010.
Source: US Treasury, Macrobond
Note: Includes US Treasury, agency, and corporate bonds and US equity securities.

However, there is likely a broader theme at play, which extends beyond actions taken by global central banks or hedge funds. In recent years, investors globally have had significant over-allocation to US assets denominated in US dollars – a phenomenon that has been intensified by the theme of US exceptionalism. This exceptionalism has grown out of two areas. First, the US has a longer term economic dominance in the world order. Second, a more recent leadership role in technology combined with sizeable post-pandemic fiscal expansion has resulted in outperformance in the US markets and economy compared to its developed market counterparts. The unwinding of the US exceptionalism trade could accelerate the divestment of US assets in US dollars, as global fund managers seek to manage risk and diversify their portfolios. There are numerous estimates regarding these figures, projected to be in the trillions. The unwinding of this trade and the reallocation of assets could take a considerable amount of time.

Fiscal hawks soar

Regarding US fiscal matters, there is growing evidence indicating that the Trump administration does not intend to use the revenue generated from tariffs to reduce the deficit. Instead, the funds are being allocated towards substantial tax cuts, which have been met with disapproval from proponents of fiscal conservatism. In early April in the midst of the tariff headlines, the US Senate approved a budget resolution for up to $5.3 trillion in tax cuts over 10 years and increased the debt limit. The increased fiscal deficit will lead to a higher supply of government bonds, so it is understandable that the long-term US bond market has experienced weakness.

Concerns over the rise in interest costs are growing for fiscal hawks (Chart 3). For instance, federal interest payments will cost 18.4 cents of every dollar of revenue in 2025, equaling the previous high set in 1991. This is projected to rise to 22.2 cents by 2035. While predictions about a fiscal crisis within the next 5-10 years are warranted, it is uncertain whether this might occur sooner or later.

Chart 3: Interest Costs Becoming a Concern
This chart depicts US federal net interest expense plotted against the 10-year US Treasury yield. Since 2020, net interest expense has surged alongside a more muted increase in the 10-year yield.
Source: US Congressional Budget Office, Macrobond

It is important to note that whenever there is a significant increase in US Treasury yields, concerns about fiscal sustainability often arise. Higher bond yields typically result in tighter financial conditions, which can slow economic activity. This often leads to a bond market rally, after which fiscal concerns diminish until the next sell-off. Typically, the narrative follows the price action. However, current observations suggest that the risk of a fiscal crisis may be higher now than before.

Conclusions

Global investors appear to be reassessing their substantial holdings in US dollar-denominated assets, partly due to concerns over geopolitical tensions and fiscal policies. Recently, we observed a brief glimpse of the potential market implications resulting from the end of US exceptionalism and the subsequent asset allocation reset. There are several key points to consider:

  1. President Trump toned down his tariff rhetoric because higher yields would make the fiscal situation in the US unsustainable. This confirmed the administration’s priority to keep long-term yields capped to manage federal interest expenses.
  2. A fractured geopolitical landscape, combined with rising uncertainty and increased debt supply, implies a repricing of the term premium — the additional return required for holding a longer-term bond — from its multi-decade lows. It biases bond yields higher (acting against the desire for lower yields in the first point). This in turn prevents bonds from providing the portfolio hedge they are meant to provide in risk-off situations. In theory, Treasuries must offer a higher yield. Taking it all together, we see a secular tailwind for non-USD-denominated assets.
  3. Changes in asset allocation are typically structural and take time to implement. While a shift away from the US may be under consideration, any resultant flows will take time to materialize. This process is expected to unfold over several months or even years, rather than within a few days.

Capital markets

April started with significant turbulence in financial markets due to the announcement of US reciprocal tariffs, causing a global sell-off. Equity markets collapsed, credit spreads widened sharply, and the volatility index (VIX) reached its highest level since the pandemic. The S&P 500 experienced its fifth-worst two-day decline since WWII following the announced tariffs. However, after multiple policy changes and subsequent reversals, the US equity market began to stabilize and conditions started to improve. Despite this, the S&P 500 declined by 0.7% in April, resulting in a third consecutive monthly loss and a year-to-date return of -4.9%.

Canadian equities fared better, declining only 0.1% in April. Defensive segments of the Canadian market, such as consumer staples and gold, emerged as the best performing sectors, whereas cyclical segments on average underperformed. In contrast to the US, Canadian equities (along with European and emerging market equities) have experienced positive returns this year. For Canada, that has been partly explained by the exposure to the gold sector, as gold prices rose for the fourth consecutive month, taking the year-to-date returns to +25.3%.

Other asset classes faced challenges and did not stabilize. WTI crude oil prices declined by 18.6% in April in response to global growth and trade concerns, while the US dollar index (DXY) declined by 4.6% in April, the largest two-month decline since 2002.

Bond markets have also been volatile. Although US Treasury yields spiked in April, they moderated later in the month and have declined for the year as market expectations for monetary easing from the US Federal Reserve (Fed) increased due to rising recession probabilities. The Fed has kept rates steady this year, which has drawn criticism from President Trump.

Canadian yields rose in April but declined so far in 2025 (excluding 30-year yields and to a lesser extent compared to US yields). In April, the Bank of Canada maintained its overnight rate at 2.75% for the first time since initiating its easing cycle last June, following two interest rate reductions in the first quarter. The FTSE Canada Universe Bond Index fell 0.7% in April, though has maintained a positive return year-to-date (+1.4%).

Portfolio strategy

Although economic data has taken a backseat to trade headlines, the effects of tariffs on data have already emerged. Survey releases (considered “soft data”) suggest severe economic slowing. This has not, however, been confirmed by “hard data” releases, some of which look to be distorted by tariff front-loading. Although it is uncertain whether the “soft data” will affect the “hard data,” we assign a reasonably high probability to the likelihood of a continued economic slowdown.

Recent inflation releases have been better than feared, providing relief to markets. Nevertheless, core inflation indicators continue to be elevated, and survey-based inflation expectations have surged to multi-decade high levels, which poses challenges for central banks. This situation has resulted in an unusual combination of slowing economic growth and persistent inflation.

Within balanced portfolios, we reduced the underweight position in equities as the market fell in early April. We maintain a cautious outlook as slowing economic growth, persistent inflation, and heightened uncertainty do not present a favourable environment for risk assets. Additionally, equity market valuations remain relatively expensive.

Fixed-income portfolios hold underweight positions in both provincial and corporate bonds. We expect the yield curve to steepen reflecting an expectation for higher long-term yields relative to short-term yields. Notably, inflationary pressures and fiscal concerns should see longer-dated bond yields under some upward pressure over the near term.

Fundamental equity portfolios have increased defensive holdings by reducing exposure to cyclical sectors such as banks and oil producers, instead favouring grocers, utilities, and gold.

We will continue to monitor the evolving near-term economic developments to understand whether the existing safe haven remains, or whether policy will reignite havoc.

A person is backcountry skiing up Mount Seymour during a sunny winter day. Taken in North Vancouver, BC, Canada.

At the heart of our organization is the commitment and desire to provide superior performance and service to our clients. Our primary objective is to meet our clients’ expectations while ensuring our people are highly motivated and enthusiastic. This requires that we keep the business narrowly defined on what we do best, and endeavour to remain at the cutting edge of research and development initiatives within financial markets.

Valuing Our Client Partnerships

Each year, we take the opportunity to provide our clients with an update on our business, outlining how we are directing our efforts within CC&L Investment Management (CC&L) to fulfill our commitment to delivering investment performance and superior client service.

Despite periods of market volatility in 2024, the year will likely be remembered for a favourable macroeconomic backdrop of accommodative monetary policy in a resilient economy. The era characterized by low inflation and low interest rates – which fueled robust investment returns for many years – is behind us. The persistent threat of inflation, combined with higher interest rates over the medium to long term, presents a more challenging environment for investors. As we enter 2025, we anticipate increased market volatility in a late-cycle environment. For a comprehensive review of our investment outlook, please see our 2025 Financial Markets Forecast.

Our business structure provides stability and keeps us focused on maintaining a long-term horizon. We have successfully navigated diverse investment environments since our company’s inception in 1982. Regardless of the operating environment, we are committed to creating the internal conditions necessary to fulfill our commitments to clients. Our ability to do so begins and ends with the quality of our people and the strength of our relationships. As our teams continue to grow, we remain committed to investing in our people through career development and leadership programs. Our focus is on enhancing skillsets, strengthening the depth of our teams and investment processes, and planning for succession. We are dedicated to preserving a strong alignment of incentives which has allowed us to fulfill our commitments to clients while ensuring our people remain motivated and enthusiastic.

This year, we would like to acknowledge our client partnerships. We have the privilege of working with over 200 clients worldwide. In the past five years, we have welcomed more than 100 new clients. These new partnerships include clients from Canada, the United States, Europe, Asia and the Middle East. Notably, among them are several of the largest pension funds in the world. Equally important, we deeply value the longstanding relationships we have built with our early clients, with more than a third of them entrusting us with their assets for over a decade. These enduring partnerships reflect our commitment to understanding evolving client needs and developing tailored investment solutions. Through collaboration with clients, and in many cases their investment consultants, most of these longstanding mandates have evolved to include new or enhanced investment solutions since their inception.

The expansion of our investment and risk management capabilities and client base have meaningfully transformed our business. We firmly believe that the investments we have made and innovations driving this transformation will deliver long-term benefits for all our clients.

In closing, I extend my sincere gratitude to our clients for your trust, confidence and continued partnership.

Sincerely,

Photo of Martin Gerber
Martin Gerber
President & Chief Investment Officer

Our People

In 2024, our firm continued to grow, welcoming 18 new hires and bringing our personnel count to 135. Our business also benefits from the broader CC&L Financial Group, which employs 441 professionals supporting business management, operations, marketing and distribution.

Our firm’s stability and specialization remain key drivers of our business. Succession planning and career development are central to our approach, ensuring continuity and long-term success.

We are pleased to share that several employees were promoted to Principal, effective January 1, 2025, in recognition of their important and growing contributions to our firm.

Photos of Clement Liu, Kevin Fu, Paulan van Nes, and Uzair Noorudin.

CC&L’s Board of Directors is also pleased to announce the promotion of new business owners, effective January 1, 2025, in recognition of their leadership and impact in their roles.

Photos of Alicia Wu, Derek Poole, Graeme McCrodan, Joe Tibble and Tim Wilkinson.

Fixed Income

Throughout 2024, TJ Sutter partnered with David George as Co-Head of Fixed Income, sharing the responsibility for investment decisions, business operations, team management and strategic direction of the team. TJ has now assumed full leadership, with David transitioning to an advisory role until his retirement on December 31, 2025. TJ joined CC&L’s Board of Directors in 2025, succeeding David.

Photo of TJ Sutter  Photo of David George

Over the past three years, we have worked with Simon MacNair, Portfolio Manager, on a gradual succession plan to transition his portfolio construction responsibilities to several key individuals on the team. This process will be completed by year-end when Simon officially retires.

Photo of Simon MacNair

The portfolio construction functions have been undertaken by sub-teams, with leaders in each area who have progressively assumed greater responsibility and became business owners in 2025.

    • Derek Poole joined the fixed income team in 2015 as a trader. He became a Principal in 2018 and has had increasing responsibilities over the past seven years, which now include oversight of implementation and management of the trading team.
    • Tim Wilkinson joined the team as a trader in 2011 and became a Principal in 2015. Tim handles the investment process management of all fixed income portfolios. This includes the development and management of proprietary tools and models used in-house for trading, spread analysis and quantitative research.
    • Alicia Wu joined the team in 2017 and became a Principal in 2020. She transitioned from investment process management into a portfolio construction role in 2021. She is responsible for overseeing risk management and portfolio construction processes.

In 2024, the team launched a “core plus” strategy that complements the unique and successful CC&L Universe Bond Alpha Plus and Long Bond Alpha Plus strategies. In the new CC&L Core Plus Fixed Income Strategy, the “plus” is delivered by specialist teams within the CC&L Financial Group affiliates. The strategy offers diversified returns from high-yield bonds, commercial mortgages and emerging market corporate debt. The team is also seeing inquiries into investment solutions where it has unique capabilities, including absolute returns and alpha overlays.

Fundamental Equity

Over the past several years, the fundamental equity team has been developing the next generation of investment leaders. The team welcomed a new trader and analyst covering the technology sector in 2024. In addition, Michael McPhillips, Portfolio Manager & Research Head, was identified as the future CIO of the team. The primary functions of the CIO role are setting equity strategy, leading the portfolio management team and overall team investment leadership. Michael will transition into the role over the coming years, working closely with co-heads Gary Baker and Andrew Zimcik. Michael is a business owner and has been a fundamental equity team member since 2013.

Photo of Michael McPhillips  Photo of Gary Baker  Photo of Andrew Zimcik

Joe Tibble, Trader, became a business owner in 2025. Joe joined CC&L in 2022. His experience on both the sell-side and buy-side enabled him to step into the role seamlessly and take on greater responsibility on the trading desk.

The team continues to deliver on clients’ investment objectives across the different fundamental equity strategies. The team’s investment philosophy and process are unchanged, and we believe will continue to benefit our clients in the future. The unique features of our investment approach include always maintaining coverage of all Canadian stocks, strict target price discipline, incorporating macroeconomic research into stock and sector selection, and rigorous risk management.

Quantitative Equity

The team grew to 79 members, with 13 new hires in 2024. Investment professionals were added to all sub-teams during the year. Investment in leadership resources across sub-teams will continue at a similar pace this year. The steady growth of the team reflects the need to continually expand and reinvest in our capabilities as the size and scope of the quantitative business has grown.

Graeme McCrodan became a business owner in 2025. Graeme joined the firm in 2012 as an analyst on the Investment Process Management (IPM) team, moving to the research team a few years later. Over the course of his tenure, Graeme has led increasingly complex research projects. He introduced some of our first alpha signals leveraging new techniques to process large, complex datasets. Graeme now leads our research data onboarding effort, which plays a critical role in the research team’s ability to continue to develop unique and valuable strategies.

To support continued growth in international markets, the firm’s pooled fund structures were expanded. This includes our Europe-based UCITS Fund platform for non-US-based investors, a Collective Investment Trust (CIT) platform in the US for ERISA-regulated pension plans, and a Cayman platform for US and other eligible global investors. The investment we have made will allow us to continue to diversify the regional exposure of our client base.

Client Solutions

Over the past year, Phil Cotterill, Head of Client Solutions, has been executing on his succession plan, working closely with Calum Mackenzie on all aspects of team leadership. This transition will continue through 2025, with Phil acting in an advisory capacity. Calum joined the firm in 2023, bringing significant experience from prior leadership roles. In 2025, he was appointed to CC&L’s Board of Directors. Phil joined the firm in 1993 as an analyst on the fundamental equity team, later serving 13 years as a portfolio manager before leading the client solutions team. After more than 30 years at CC&L, Phil will retire on December 31, 2025.

Photo of Phil Cotterill  Photo of Calum Mackenzie

The team is proud to be the recipient of a Greenwich Quality Leaders award in Canadian Institutional Investment Management Service Quality for 2024.1 The award recognizes firms that deliver superior levels of client service that help institutional investors achieve their investment goals and objectives.

Responsible Investing

Last year, we developed several new tools for use in our fundamental equity and fixed income investment processes. These tools include a sector materiality matrix and ESG controversy data monitoring. The focus in 2025 will be on continued integration of these tools into each team’s research process and the monitoring of outcomes to identify areas for further improvement. In 2024, we incorporated carbon metrics for our equity portfolios in our third-quarter reports and plan to extend this reporting to our fixed income portfolios later in 2025.

Business Update

Assets Under Management

CC&L’s AUM increased by CA$12 billion in 2024 to CA$76 billion as of December 31, 2024. We are pleased to report that our business continued to grow through new client mandates across all investment teams. In 2024, CC&L gained 30 new clients and 10 additional mandates from existing clients totaling CA$8 billion. Most new mandates were for quantitative equity strategies from global institutional investors.

By Mandate Type*. Fundamental Equity: 19%. Quantitative Equity: 50%. Fixed Income: 15%. Multi-Strategy: 16%. By Client Type*. Pension: $35,898. Foundations & Endowments: $4,208. Other Institutional: $14,230. Retail: $13,689. Private Client: $8,363. *Total AUM in CA$ as at December 31, 2024.

Final Thoughts

We sincerely appreciate the trust and support of our clients and business partners. We look forward to continuing to help you achieve your investment objectives in the years ahead.

1From February through September 2024, Coalition Greenwich conducted interviews with 115 of the largest tax-exempt funds in Canada. Senior fund professionals were asked to provide quantitative and qualitative evaluations of their investment managers, assessments of those managers soliciting their business, and detailed information on important market trends. CC&L did not provide Coalition Greenwich with any compensation for this survey.

A sharp fall in the global manufacturing PMI new orders index in July confirms renewed industrial weakness. The companion services survey, however, reported an uptick in the new business component, which is close to its post-GFC average. Will services resilience sustain respectable overall growth?

The understanding here is that economic fluctuations originate in the goods sector, reflecting cycles in three components of investment – stockbuilding, business fixed capex and housing. Multiplier effects transmit these fluctuations to the services sector – there is no independent services cycle.

The manufacturing new orders and services new business indices have been strongly correlated historically, with Granger-causality tests indicating that the former leads the latter but not vice versa*.

Several considerations suggest that the recent divergence will be resolved by the services new business index moving lower:

1. The services future output index correlates with new business and fell to an eight-month low in July – see chart 1.

Chart 1

Chart 1 showing Global Services PMI New Business Future Output

2. Recent new business readings have been inflated by strength in financial services – chart 2. Financial services new business correlates with stock market movements, suggesting weakness ahead.

Chart 2

Chart 2 showing Global Services PMI New Business

3. Consumer services new business correlates with the manufacturing consumer goods new orders index, which fell below 50 in July – chart 3.

Chart 3

Chart 3 showing Global Consumer Goods/Services PMI New Orders/Business

Output price indices for consumer goods and services support the optimism here about inflation prospects through mid-2025. A weighted average has fallen back to its October 2009-December 2019 average, a period in which G7 annual CPI inflation excluding food / energy averaged 1.5% – chart 4.

Chart 4

Chart 4 showing Global Consumer Prices and Global Consumer Goods/Services PMI Output Prices

*Contemporaneous correlation coefficient since 1998 = +0.84. Granger-causality tests included six lags. Manufacturing terms were significant in the services equation but not vice versa.

post in June suggested that a recovery in the OECD’s US composite leading indicator was ending. A calculation based on the latest input data confirms a reversal lower.

The historical performance of the OECD indicator compares favourably with the Conference Board leading index. The OECD indicator recovered from early 2023, signalling that recession risk was (temporarily?) receding, while the Conference Board measure continued to weaken.

The latest published data point, for June, was released in early July. The next update is due on 5 September and will provide July / August numbers.

Chart 1 shows the published series (black), a replica series calculated here based on data available in early July (blue) and an updated replica incorporating an additional month of input data (gold). The updated series has fallen sharply from an April peak.

Chart 1

Chart 1 showing OECD US Leading Indicator Relative to Trend

The decline reflects weakness in four components: consumer sentiment, durable goods orders, the manufacturing PMI and housing starts. The two financial components – stock prices and the 10-year Treasury yield / fed funds rate spread – were still marginally positive in July but levels so far in August imply a turn lower.

The price relative of MSCI World cyclical sectors, excluding tech, versus defensive sectors has mirrored movements in the OECD US leading indicator historically – chart 2. Relative valuation is high versus history and has diverged from a weakening global manufacturing PMI – chart 3.

Chart 2

Chart 2 showing OECD US Leading Indicator and MSCI World Cyclical Sectors ex Tech Relative to Defensive Sectors

Chart 3

Chart 3 showing MSCI World Cyclical Ex Tech Price/Book Relative to Defensive Sectors and Global Manufacturing PMI New Orders

Manufacturing PMI results for July support the forecast of a global “double dip” into early 2025.

The global manufacturing PMI new orders index plunged by 1.9 points from June to 48.8, a seven-month low. The combination of a one-month fall of this magnitude or greater and a sub-50 reading occurred in only 14 months since 1998, highlighted by shading in chart 1.

Chart 1

Chart 1 showing Global Manufacturing PMI New Orders

In chronological order, those months were:

  • October 1998 (Asian / Russian / LTCM crises)
  • December 2000 / January 2001 (start of US / global recession)
  • September / October 2001 (911 terrorist attack)
  • March 2003 (Iraq invasion)
  • September through December 2008 (GFC climax)
  • November 2011 (Eurozone crisis / recession)
  • February through April 2020 (covid recession)

So the current signal suggests significant economic weakness and risk-off markets, at least until policy-makers respond.

The forecast that global economic momentum would weaken in H2 2024 was based on a fall in six-month real narrow money momentum into a low in September 2023 and an observation that the money-activity lag has recently extended to a year or more – chart 2.

Chart 2

Chart 2 showing Global Manufacturing PMI New Orders and G7 plus E7 Real Narrow Money

The September 2023 real money momentum low suggests that PMI new orders will reach a low by January 2025. With money trends still weak, however, a recovery may be lacklustre.

Could PMI new orders break below the low of 46.5 reached in December 2022? The low in six-month real narrow momentum in September 2023 was beneath the preceding low in July 2022 – chart 2. Current weakness is more likely to spill over into labour markets, creating negative feedback loops.

“Surprise” economic deterioration is forecast to be accompanied by sharply weaker inflationary pressures, reflecting broad money stagnation in H2 2022 / H1 2023. The consumer goods PMI output price index fell back below its pre-pandemic average in July, following a plunge in the consumer services index the prior month – chart 3.

Chart 3
Chart 3 showing Global Consumer Goods / Services PMI Output Prices

Global manufacturing PMI survey results for October are consistent with the base case scenario here of a progressive loss of momentum through end-Q1 2022, at least.

PMI new orders have moved sideways for two months but export orders and output expectations fell further last month, to nine- and 12-month lows respectively – see chart 1.

Chart 1

A striking feature of the survey was a further rise in the stocks of purchases index to a 15-year high – chart 2. Stockpiling of raw materials and intermediate (semi-finished) goods has been supporting new orders for producers of these inputs but the boost will fade even if stockbuilding continues at its recent pace, which is very unlikely. This is because output / orders growth is related to the rate of change of stockbuilding rather than its level.

Chart 2

Chart 3 illustrates the relationship between new orders and the rate of change of the stocks of purchases index, with the coming drag effect expected to be greater than shown because of the high probability that stockpiling will moderate.

Chart 3

Stockbuilding of inputs has been particularly intense in the intermediate goods sector – chart 4. This suggests that upstream producers – particularly suppliers of raw materials – are most at risk from relapse in orders. Commodity prices could correct sharply as orders deflate – see also previous post.

Chart 4

A similar dynamic is playing out in the US ISM manufacturing survey, where new orders fell last month despite the inventories index reaching its highest level since 1984, resulting in a sharp drop in the orders / inventories differential – chart 5. The survey commentary attributes the inventories surge to “companies stocking more raw materials in hopes of avoiding production shortages, as well as growth in work-in-process and finished goods inventories”.

Chart 5

The combination of an ISM supplier deliveries index (measuring delivery delays) of above 70 with new orders in the 50-60 range has occurred only four times in the history of the survey. New orders fell below 50 within a year in every case.

The global PMI delivery times index (which has an opposite definition to the ISM supplier deliveries index, so a fall indicates longer delays) reached a new low in October but a recent turnaround in Taiwan, which often leads, hints at imminent relief – chart 6. The view here is that current supply shortages reflect the intensity of the stockbuilding cycle upswing, with both now peaking.

Chart 6

The global manufacturing PMI new orders index – a timely indicator of industrial momentum – registered a surprise small rise in September, with weaker results for major developed economies foreshadowed in earlier flash surveys offset by recoveries in China and a number of other emerging markets.

Does this signify an end to the recent slowdown phase, evidenced by a fall in PMI new orders between May and August? The assessment here is that the rise should be discounted for several reasons.

First, it was minor relative to the August drop. The September reading was below the range over October 2020-July 2021.

Secondly, the increase appears to have been driven by inventory rebuilding. The new orders / finished goods inventories differential, which sometimes leads new orders, fell again – see chart 1.

Chart 1

Remember that orders growth is related to the second derivative of inventories (i.e. the rate of change of the rate of change). Inventories are still low and will be rebuilt further but the pace of increase – and growth impact – may already have peaked.

Thirdly, the recovery in the Chinese component of the global index was contradicted by a further fall in new orders in the official (i.e. NBS) manufacturing survey, which has a larger sample size. The latter orders series has led the global index since the GFC – chart 2.

Chart 2

Fourthly, the OECD’s composite leading indicators for China and the G7 appear to have rolled over and turning points usually mark the start of multi-month trends. The series in chart 3 have been calculated independently using the OECD’s published methodology and incorporate September estimates (the OECD is scheduled to release September data on 12 October). The falls in the indicators imply below-trend and slowing economic growth.

Chart 3

Finally, additional August monetary data confirm the earlier estimate here that G7 plus E7 six-month real narrow money growth was unchanged at July’s 22-month low – chart 4. The historical leading relationship with PMI new orders is inconsistent with the latter having reached a bottom in September. The message, instead, is that a further PMI slide is likely into early 2022, with no signal yet of a subsequent recovery.

Chart 4

While the focus of inflation is typically centered on rising raw material costs and wage increases, we are seeing transportation costs become an additional and significant part of the inflation problem, and one that is not as easily passed on to consumers.

Transportation affects every aspect of a company’s supply chain and the rising costs are unavoidable. Further, it has been a recent topic of conversation for our own holdings, as well as some of the largest companies in the world. At a recent conference, Molson Coors, the fifth largest brewer in the world, said transportation costs are the main contributing factor to inflation, while Proctor and Gamble warned that an announced price increase will not be enough to offset higher commodity and transportation costs due to not only the size, but the speed of the increases. Multinational conglomerate 3M is a good barometer, as it is seeing “a lot of pressure on logistics costs.” Dollar Tree is one of the largest retail importers in the United States (US) and at their recent quarterly earnings presentation, they spent a considerable amount of time discussing the global supply chain and higher freight costs, saying they were “not counting on material improvements in 2022, especially in the first portion of the year.”

The recovery from the pandemic has seen a huge increase in demand, but with continued quarantine controls, distancing measures at ports and labour shortages are causing severe backlogs. The Suez Canal blockage and summer typhoons off the Chinese coast did little to ease the problem. Another consideration is the consolidation of ocean shipping lines’ key shipping routes being dominated by a handful of companies, causing fewer vessels in general to be travelling between ports.

The ocean carriers have responded to the high demand by increasing container capacity by 22%, but this does not solve the problem of logjams and the waiting lines reaching record levels at some of the ports.[1] The order book for container ships has doubled in 2021, but the majority won’t be delivered until 2023.

So what does all this mean? Container rates seem to be stabilizing, yet remain extremely elevated. Freightos, a digital booking platform for international shipping, published containerized freight rates. The cost of a container from Asia to the US East Coast is over $20,000, an increase of 415% compared to last year. Shipping from Asia to the US West Coast is slightly less, but the cost is up 452% in comparison to a year ago. Shipping from Asia to North Europe has seen the largest year-over-year increase, up 714% to $13,855. Freight rates from Northern Europe to the US East Coast have been the least affected, up “only” 238% from the period last year to $5,929. In view of these rates, shipping companies are focusing on the most profitable trade routes, meaning reduced volumes crossing the Atlantic. The Baltic Dry Index is a benchmark for the price of shipping major raw materials by sea and is at its highest level since before the Great Financial Crisis.

Source: Bloomberg

The majority of companies are struggling to solve this logistical headache, but our portfolios contain two names that have been natural beneficiaries.

Clipper Logistics (CLG.LN) is a leading provider of value-added logistics solutions, e-fulfilment, and returns management services to the retail sector, primarily in the United Kingdom (UK), but with an expanding presence in Europe. Sales are comprised of the following: 60% of sales come from e-fulfilment and returns management, supporting the online activities of customers; 28% of sales come from non e-fulfilment businesses, supporting traditional brick and mortar customers; and the remaining 12% of sales comes from commercial vehicles sales. Of the logistics related revenues, 85% comes from the UK. Over 90% of Clipper’s contracts are on an open book basis (i.e. cost plus), or hybrid contract, protecting them from increasing costs. However, they are not immune to labour shortages, as they recently flagged the impact that a shortage of HGV drivers is having.

Kerry Logistics (636.HK) is a third-party logistics service provider based in Hong Kong with global exposure. The company provides many supply chain solutions, including integrated logistics, international freight forwarding (air, ocean, road, rail, and multimodal), industrial project logistics, cross-border e-commerce, last-mile fulfilment, and infrastructure investment. Revenue mainly comes from Asia-Pacific, which accounts for 74% of sales (Mainland China 32%, Hong Kong 13%, Taiwan 7%, and other Asia 21%). The Americas accounts for 16% and Europe about 10%. Their customers are mainly big multinational companies, across many industries, including fashion, electronics, food and beverages, FMCG, industrial, automotive, and pharmaceutical.

Perhaps the best advice we could give readers is that with supply chain and transportation issues showing little signs of abating, you would be wise to start your holiday shopping sooner, rather than later.


[1] https://splash247.com/more-than-40-ships-waiting-outside-la-and-long-beach-setting-new-record/