Groupe financier Connor, Clark & Lunn ltée

Global (i.e. G7 plus E7) six-month real narrow money momentum is estimated to have fallen to its lowest level since May 2025 last month, based on data for countries with a combined 88% weight in the aggregate. The decline reflected weaker nominal money expansion, with six-month CPI momentum stable – see chart 1.

Chart 1

Real money momentum peaked in February and has led global manufacturing PMI new orders by seven months at the last three turning points, suggesting a PMI peak around now – chart 2.

Chart 2

As previously discussed, global real money momentum has been supported by a pick-up in the US, in contrast to weakness in Europe and Japan. US six-month momentum pulled back in August, although this reflected an unfavourable base effect rather than a soft current-month change. The Eurozone and Japan, meanwhile, moved deeper into contraction – chart 3. (UK data will be released next week.)

Chart 3

Monetary trends support last week’s decisions to hike by the Fed and hold by the BoE but argue that ECB / BoJ tightening has been misguided and will result in unnecessary economic weakness.

Will global real money momentum fall further? Higher rates and the Fed’s suspension of securities purchases suggest slower nominal growth, while energy price strength will drive a near-term rebound in CPI momentum – chart 4.

Chart 4

August industrial output data are still patchy but global six-month momentum is likely to have remained above that of real narrow money, suggesting deficient liquidity for markets – chart 5. Bond markets have so far borne the brunt of this squeeze but a PMI reversal could transfer pressure onto equities.

Chart 5

CC&L Uni est heureuse d’accueillir Maxime Carrier à titre de chef des solutions de placement. Établi à Montréal, Maxime se joint à la société dans le cadre d’un poste nouvellement créé qui témoigne de la croissance continue de nos activités et de notre engagement à aider les investisseurs institutionnels à composer avec des enjeux de placement de plus en plus complexes. Aujourd’hui, l’actif géré de CC&L Uni a dépassé 3,2 milliards de dollars. Aujourd’hui, la société compte parmi ses clients un éventail diversifié d’investisseurs institutionnels, notamment des régimes de retraite, des compagnies d’assurance, des fondations, des régimes de santé et de bien-être ainsi que des fiducies autochtones.

La création du poste de chef des solutions de placement marque une nouvelle étape importante dans notre évolution. Alors que les investisseurs institutionnels doivent composer avec des considérations de plus en plus complexes en matière de portefeuille, de passif et de gouvernance, ce nouveau rôle vise à renforcer notre capacité à offrir des solutions de placement personnalisées qui prennent comme point de départ les objectifs des clients et qui tirent parti du vaste éventail de capacités offertes au sein du Groupe financier Connor, Clark & Lunn.

Dans le cadre de ses fonctions, Maxime dirigera l’élaboration de solutions de placement institutionnelles personnalisées, en étroite collaboration avec les clients, les consultants, notre équipe des ventes institutionnelles et les sociétés de placement affiliées du Groupe. Ses responsabilités engloberont la répartition stratégique de l’actif, la construction de portefeuille, les titres à revenu fixe et les solutions multiclasse de crédit, la gestion actif-passif, l’analyse de scénarios économiques, la gouvernance des placements et la surveillance des risques. Maxime possède une vaste expérience des placements institutionnels, des solutions de titres à revenu fixe et de la gestion actif-passif. Plus récemment, il occupait le poste de gestionnaire de portefeuille principal, Solutions de titres à revenu fixe, chez Fiera Capital. Auparavant, il a occupé des postes de direction chez Gestion de Placements TD.

L’expertise de Maxime renforcera davantage la capacité de CC&L Uni à arrimer les objectifs de ses clients aux capacités de placement offertes par le réseau de sociétés affiliées du Groupe financier CC&L. En combinant une construction de portefeuille personnalisée et une expertise spécialisée dans les marchés publics et privés, nous cherchons à offrir aux investisseurs institutionnels des solutions intégrées qui appuient l’atteinte de leurs objectifs à long terme. Nous sommes ravis d’accueillir Maxime au sein de l’équipe et nous nous réjouissons à l’idée de sa contribution à la croissance continue de CC&L Uni.

“We can’t ignore the fact that there are emerging-market-type risks in some of the actions the US has been taking.” This is former Morgan Stanley Chief Economist Ellen Zetner’s take on how policy uncertainty and fiscal trajectory in the United States are increasingly mirroring traditional EM risk factors.

Fiscal incontinence and financial repression are macro risks that investors typically associate with emerging markets. Their developed counterparts have enjoyed valuation premiums in their stock and bond markets based on a perception of stronger fiscal and monetary discipline, as well as better institutional protections.

The current flare-up in sovereign bonds yields in developed markets partly reflects their governments’ failure to curb rising debt burdens by cutting public spending back to pre-Covid levels, coupled with anaemic growth (with the exception of the United States). Investors fear that, lacking the political will to rein in spending, governments in developed countries will adopt policies of financial repression, keeping interest rates below the rate of inflation to slow or reverse the rise in debt-to-GDP ratios.

Relative to developed markets, many emerging markets have become more fiscally and monetarily disciplined over the past decade. Having learnt the consequences of fiscal and monetary incontinence the hard way, they have strengthened central bank credibility, maintained positive real interest rates and improved macroeconomic resilience.

China’s export boom risks a backlash from trading partners

We having been gradually reducing portfolio exposure to leading Chinese exporters in recent months as risk grows of an international backlash to overproduction of high-end manufactured goods.

The internal contradictions in Beijing’s model for economic growth model have fuelled an export boom that is nearing the end of the road. While the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has acknowledged that involution – or excessive levels of competition by firms producing more at low or negative margins – is unsustainable, we are yet to see any concrete measures to curb overcapacity.

“The world is not enough”

The issue is that China now accounts for 30% of global industrial production with the share set to grow to 45% by 2030 according to the UN. As noted by Council on Foreign Relations President Michael Froman in a piece for Foreign Affairs this month, this is a level of industrial dominance not seen since the United States at the end of the Second World War. He also emphasised that in 2025 China recorded the largest trade surplus in history in US dollar value terms, with exports growing at three times the rate of global goods trade.

China has outgrown its economic model and the global economy’s capacity to absorb its exports. It must take decisive steps to rebalance towards an economy driven by consumption. Unfortunately, CCP policy incentives underpinning rigid GDP growth targets and local government financing create powerful and entrenched feedback loops that fuel overcapacity, which is vented to the rest of the world through exports.

While flooding the world with cheap goods has been a disinflationary force over several decades, it has also created huge trade imbalances leading to de-industrialisation and rising debt in many of China’s trading partners. China’s economic model suppresses domestic consumption in order to maximise industrial output through an undervalued currency, subsidies and preferential financing (among other measures). Peking University economist Michael Pettis argues that this system defies David Ricardo’s principle of comparative advantage, explaining why free trade maximises global output. To quote from a Substack post by Pettis in February this year:

Competitive advantage is not the same as a comparative advantage. The former means an economy is able to produce more cheaply than its trade partners. The latter means that the relative “cheapness” with which an economy produces some goods is greater than the relative “cheapness” with which it produces other goods, so that it can only have a comparative advantage in roughly half the goods it produces.

This is because comparative advantage is about relative costs, not absolute costs, and while an economy can have lower absolute costs in most or even all things, by definition it cannot have lower relative costs in much more than half of what it produces. Ricardo’s example shows this very clearly. In his model. Portugal produces both textiles and wine more cheaply and efficiently than England, which means that Portugal has a competitive advantage in all goods, and England a competitive disadvantage in all goods.

But Ricardo did not argue that the world would benefit if Portugal produced both wine and textiles, with England producing neither and acquiring them by running trade deficits with Portugal. Instead, he showed that because the relative “cheapness” with which Portugal produces wine is greater than the relative “cheapness” with which it produces textiles, Portugal only has a comparative advantage in producing wine, and England has a comparative advantage in producing textiles. He showed that if Portugal only produces wine, and exports some of it to England to buy textiles, and if England only produces textiles, and exports some of it to Portugal to buy wine, trade would be balanced and total output would be maximized – and as counterintuitive as it may seem, this is the case even though Portugal can produce textiles more cheaply and efficiently than England.

Looking at today’s global trading system, Ricardo might argue that China’s exploitation of its competitive advantage is creating persistent global imbalances, as a result of which global production falls and unemployment rises, or “debt must rise in deficit countries to make up for weak demand in the surplus country and to prevent unemployment from rising.”

We can see both of these outcomes occurring in Europe. France relies on debt to prop up demand while Germany’s industrial giants are announcing the largest layoffs since the Global Financial Crisis.

Volkswagen flags 50,000 job cuts across group as board approves turnaround plan (Reuters, September 3, 2026)

Volkswagen’s supervisory board on Thursday approved a transformation plan that will include cutting another 50,000 jobs in its attempt to counter painful tariffs, overcapacity and aggressive Chinese rivals.

The plan, the most extensive restructuring in Volkswagen’s 89-year history, includes exploring alternatives for four German plants that will eventually run out of models during the next decade.

As Stein’s Law goes, “if something cannot go on forever, it will stop.” China’s domestic economic imbalances are provoking social and political responses among its major trading partners. In response, governments in virtually all advanced economies have taken their first steps to address the issue, enacting stronger import duties, local content requirements, and even bans on Chinese equipment in sensitive sectors such as telecoms. However, these measures will fall short without structural change in China.

Layoffs in the German auto industry virtually guarantee a more forceful and coordinated response from Europe.

Italian lobby group calls for 80% EU tariff on Chinese cars and parts (Reuters, September 10, 2026)

The head of Italian auto suppliers lobby Anfia has urged the European Union to impose 80% tariffs on Chinese-made vehicles and parts above a certain threshold to safeguard Europe’s car industry.

Anfia President Roberto Vavassori told Reuters that Chinese imports to the European Union ‌should be tariff-free up to 8% of annual European vehicle registrations, but with an 80% tariff on imports above that limit.

It should cover both vehicles and components, he said, as parts account for roughly 80% of a vehicle’s value. « We have maximum respect for what the Chinese industry has achieved, » Vavassori told Reuters. « But that respect has now turned into fear. »

« Europe cannot lose an industry which is essential for its ⁠strategic autonomy. »

His comments come days after Volkswagen approved a major restructuring in the face of slumping demand and increasing competition from China. Figures from the European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association (ACEA) showed that the share of Chinese-branded cars sold in the EU rose to top 9% in the first half of this year.

Other countries fearing the damage of a China supply shock to their leading manufacturing industries may also seek to collaborate with Europe and the United States to address the issue. There are strong incentives for both China and major trading partners to collaborate with the aim of engineering a gradual rebalancing over decades, lest more sudden measures trigger an external demand collapse for Chinese exporters, and globally inflationary supply chain disruption.

We remain admirers of the Chinese entrepreneurs that have built outstanding businesses across autos, renewable energy, batteries, heavy industries and other advanced manufacturing processes. The leaders in these industries have been innovators able to scale across a continental-sized economy amid ferocious competition and go global to challenge incumbents. In our view, their long-term prospects remain bright and they would continue to prosper in a more balanced environment for international trade, and in a domestic environment where competition is rationalised through the re-alignment of economic policy incentives that promote more sustainable growth. However, portfolio changes including reducing exposure to battery manufacturer CATL and avoiding automaker BYD altogether for the past year or more reflect lower conviction levels over the short to medium term as we move through a period of realignment in international trade.

October’s presidential election in Brazil will be a tight contest

Source: Polymarket, 10 September 2026

We wrote previously on how political uncertainty has weighed on Brazilian equities:

Brazilian Blackjack: Decoding the allure of a high-risk, high-reward market

Brazilian Blackjack revisited

Crunch time is approaching with the presidential election set to take place in less than a month. Picking up the blackjack analogy, it is safe to say there are no high cards (more moderate and economically conservative candidates stepping up to make a run) left in the deck to be dealt in this political cycle. Voters are set to choose between two deeply flawed candidates in incumbent Lula and Flavio Bolsonaro, who are both fending off corruption allegations.

Nevertheless, our view was that political risk was reflected in extremely cheap valuations for some high-quality businesses, which led us to move to a modest overweight in Brazilian equities. The market has been rallying in recent weeks, partly reflecting a betting-market lead for Flavio Bolsonaro, perceived by investors as more market friendly (debatable in our view).

We read the market move with some caution. The betting-market odds are out of line with the polls, which remain a statistical tie in second-round simulations, and much of the recent shift tracks an internal Supreme Court dispute and leaked communications weighing on Lula rather than a durable realignment of the electorate.

With a first round on 4 October and a probable runoff on the 25th, event risk is high and early, contrarian positioning has been rewarded already. Our exposure remains focused on quality names trading below intrinsic value, and sized to give us room to take advantage of volatility in the months ahead.

The long-standing view here has been that the 3- to 5-year stockbuilding cycle would enter a downswing in 2026, reaching a low by end-2027.

The key measure used to track the cycle is the annual change in G7 stockbuilding, expressed as a percentage of GDP. This is supplemented by a more timely indicator derived from business surveys, which displays a strong correlation with the GDP measure – see chart 1.

Chart 1

The GDP indicator last bottomed in Q1 2023, implying that the current upswing is mature, already matching the historical average duration of a whole cycle (of 3.5 years).

The GDP measure reached a level consistent with a peak in Q1 2025 but stockbuilding behaviour around that time was distorted by front-running of US tariffs. A correction over subsequent quarters has run its course, with the business survey indicator signalling a strong rebound in Q3 2026. This is supported by other evidence, e.g. the Atlanta Fed US GDP nowcast currently estimates that stockbuilding will contribute 2.0 pp to annualised Q3 growth.

The judgement here, therefore, is that the cycle is reaching a final peak in Q3 ahead of a multi-quarter downswing.

The cycle describes demand for production inputs – both raw materials and semi-manufactures, including electronic components – so is strongly correlated with their prices. A further rise in year-on-year growth of industrial commodity prices and global semiconductor sales in Q3 is consistent with the cycle reaching a peak – chart 2.

Chart 2

The suggestion is that the cycle about to shift from providing a tailwind to global economic momentum and pricing power to acting as a progressive headwind, with a maximum negative impact in mid-to-late 2027.

The risk of economic weakness next year is magnified by signs that a downswing in the long-term housing cycle is on track to accelerate into a 2027-28 low. The cycle has averaged 18 years historically, with the last trough reached in 2009.

The behaviour of homebuilding stocks may provide a clue to the timing of the next low. Chart 3 shows that an average of stock prices of US and UK homebuilders reached a peak 47 and 37 months respectively before lows in the last two housing cycles, in 1991 and 2009, while UK prices peaked 33 months before a previous trough in 1975.

Chart 3

The most recent peak in the average occurred in September 2024, suggesting a cycle trough between June 2027 and August 2028.

UK homebuilding stocks broke below a 2025 low in March and have yet to regain this level. US stocks currently remain above the corresponding low; an equivalent breakdown would suggest an acceleration of the cycle downswing – chart 4.

Chart 4

Joint weakness of the stockbuilding and housing cycles in 2027 would likely overpower and / or shorten the current business investment cycle upswing.

If AI hasn’t already struck fear in the minds of the general population, humanoid robots are threatening to break the confines of the lab and enter the real world. It’s been hard to ignore those funny humanoid robot videos but it’s not all about party tricks and dance moves. Deployments are expected to surge from today’s tens of thousands to millions in the next decade, driven by broadening commercial and industrial applications.

What’s stopped full-scale adoption in the past?

Robots themselves are not new. They have been performing singular mechanical tasks like painting, welding or assembling for decades. There is no shortage of demand for real-world applications, but the biggest constraint for full-scale, multipurpose adoption remains a lack of real-world training data.

Unlike LLMs where most of the training data resides on the internet, robots need data from the physical world, including watching humans performing various mundane and complex tasks in unpredictable environments (called physical AI). However, the race is on to use real-world and synthetic data to create the data flywheel that will enable rollout at scale. AI-based simulation algorithms can now replicate physical-world training data and compress the learning cycle from years to days.

Additional constraints to humanoid robot adoption are the lack of dexterity and limited battery life that prevent robots from taking up complex and mission critical tasks – for now.

What’s changed now to drive full-scale adoption?

As per CLSA, there are four key trends beneath the surface that could be changing the paradigm when it comes to full-scale commercialization of humanoids.

Actuators used to convert electrical energy into kinetic energy (movement) are being standardized across the industry with energy efficient and precise electric actuators (vs. leaky hydraulic actuators).
A move toward modularization where the motor, reducer, inverter and controller are housed in one integrated unit which is easier to mass produce.
Reducers are what give robotic joints the power to lift weights. Advances in AI software are helping decrease inaccuracies in low-cost planetary reducers, therefore enhancing performance while bringing overall costs down.
Finally, the adoption of linear actuators which use convert rotational energy into straight-line thrust, mimicking the contraction and extension of human muscles. This helps with heavy load bearing capacity and better shock absorption on ground impact.

Where will demand come from?

Manufacturing – particularly in automotive industries which have both the scale and assembly line processes to enable large-scale adoption. We also see auto component companies as fertile ground for the emergence of humanoid robot opportunities, given their scale manufacturing and quality control experience.
Retail and facilities management – from tasks like customer service, cleaning and delivery-related work.
Logistics – tasks around assembly, packaging, inspection and transportation.
Defence and hazardous tasks – from mine clearing to dangerous material handling.

We have several holdings in the emerging market small cap portfolio that could potentially benefit from the coming robotics revolution. Sinbon Electronics Co. Ltd. (3023 TT) supplies sensors and connectors for both battery charging and signal transmission, and video capture harnesses directly to humanoid robot OEMs. Reliability and quality requirements are stringent and Sinbon is a sole supplier for at least two US humanoid clients.

Similarly, pneumatic actuators and linear motion components are among the most widely used parts in humanoid robot joint and limb assemblies and Airtac International Group (1590 TT) is an important supplier in this space. We also believe holdings such as WeRide Inc. (WRD US) and Dongguan Yiheda Automation Co. Ltd. (301029 CH) could potentially benefit from increased investment in humanoid robotics.

We believe emerging markets will be at the heart of the humanoid revolution. According to Bloomberg, China accounted for almost all global humanoid shipments so far this year. Just as how Asian supply chains deliver the picks and shovels enabling the current AI buildout, we think a similar story will play out in robotics as the current supply chain leverages its scale and manufacturing excellence to mass produce everything from actuators, reducers, sensors and cables that are needed to power this revolution.

The companies discussed are provided for illustrative purposes to demonstrate the investment team’s research into the robotics theme and are not intended as investment recommendations. There is no assurance that these companies will benefit from increased adoption of humanoid robotics or that the investment thesis will develop as anticipated.

Les guerres commerciales produisent rarement des résultats gagnants. Elles augmentent les coûts, perturbent l’investissement et injectent une incertitude inutile dans les décisions d’affaires. Le regain de confrontation entre les États-Unis et le Canada ne fait pas exception et, à court terme, il devrait peser sur la croissance canadienne. Toutefois, les répercussions à plus long terme pourraient en fait être plus constructives. Depuis des années, le Canada peine à convertir tous ses avantages, notamment ses ressources abondantes, sa stabilité politique et ses énormes réserves de capital institutionnel, en un investissement et une productivité plus solides. Les obstacles réglementaires, la lenteur des approbations de projets et la forte dépendance à l’égard du marché voisin des États-Unis ont constamment freiné l’économie. Le différend commercial actuel pourrait fournir la pression nécessaire pour susciter le changement.

Choc à court terme, catalyseur à plus long terme

Les dernières négociations ont échoué après que les modalités d’un accord potentiel eurent changé tard dans le processus. Ottawa a finalement quitté la table, soutenant que l’accord proposé affaiblirait des secteurs clés et limiterait la capacité du Canada à diversifier ses relations commerciales. L’administration Trump a ensuite annoncé des droits de douane de 50 % sur environ 20 G$ US d’exportations canadiennes, ce qui a amené le Canada à répliquer par des contre-tarifs équivalents sur des biens américains à compter du 8 septembre. L’incidence économique immédiate ne doit pas être minimisée, mais elle demeure également relativement circonscrite. Pour être clair, l’incidence totale est gérable. Environ 85 % des exportations canadiennes demeurent exemptées en vertu de l’ACEUM, tandis que les nouveaux droits de douane touchent environ 5 % des exportations totales. L’incertitude commerciale retardera probablement certains investissements et pèsera sur la croissance, mais il ne s’agit pas encore d’un désastre économique. Le Canada dispose aussi d’une capacité budgétaire plus importante que celle de bon nombre d’économies développées pour amortir le choc à court terme tout en soutenant l’investissement, et il aborde cette guerre commerciale avec une inflation relativement plus modérée.

Ce qui pourrait compter davantage, c’est la façon dont le Canada réagira. Le premier ministre Carney est entré en fonction avec un programme ambitieux visant à accélérer les projets d’infrastructure et de ressources, à réduire les obstacles à l’investissement et à attirer beaucoup plus de capitaux privés. La question persistante était de savoir si le Canada pourrait surmonter les obstacles réglementaires et politiques qui ont ralenti les grands projets par le passé.

Ce différend commercial pourrait catalyser le changement. Les nouveaux pipelines, les infrastructures de GNL, les projets de minéraux critiques et le transport d’électricité peuvent de plus en plus être présentés non seulement comme du développement économique, mais aussi comme des éléments de résilience nationale. L’élimination des barrières commerciales internes devient urgente lorsque le commerce extérieur est moins fiable. En ce sens, le différend augmente le coût de l’inaction. Un contexte politique unifié pourrait donner à Ottawa la marge de manœuvre nécessaire pour faire avancer des projets dont on discute depuis des années, mais qui se concrétisent rarement.

Il en résulte des perspectives inhabituelles à deux horizons : une croissance plus faible à court terme, mais un investissement intérieur et une productivité potentiellement plus solides au fil du temps.

Le Canada paraît différent vu de l’extérieur

Le contexte mondial des placements évolue également, alors que les flux commerciaux et de capitaux sont de plus en plus influencés par la politique. Les investisseurs accordent davantage d’attention à la stabilité institutionnelle, à l’accès aux ressources et à la fiabilité des contreparties. Dans ce contexte, les forces relatives du Canada prennent de la valeur. Des signes préliminaires indiquent que les capitaux internationaux deviennent plus réceptifs à l’égard du Canada. L’investissement direct étranger a atteint tout juste moins de 26 G$ CA au T2, en hausse par rapport à la moyenne de 21 G$ CA des quatre trimestres précédents. La demande étrangère pour les actifs financiers canadiens a également été forte. La majeure partie de ces achats s’est concentrée dans les obligations, mais les flux étrangers vers les actions canadiennes sont récemment redevenus positifs après plusieurs années de ventes persistantes (voir le graphique 1).

Graphique 1 – Les flux étrangers vers les actions canadiennes redeviennent positifs

Source : Statistique Canada

Le Canada dispose d’une occasion particulièrement opportune de susciter davantage d’intérêt. À la mi-septembre, Toronto accueillera le premier Sommet de l’investissement du Canada, conçu pour attirer des capitaux vers les entreprises et les infrastructures canadiennes. Il survient maintenant au moment où les investisseurs mondiaux réévaluent activement leur concentration géographique et leur exposition aux chaînes d’approvisionnement. Le Canada n’a pas besoin de remplacer les États-Unis comme destination mondiale des placements. Il peut simplement devenir plus attrayant à la marge.

Le capital est déjà ici

Le Canada dispose également d’une énorme source de capital intérieur. Les grandes caisses de retraite du pays gèrent collectivement environ 2,5 T$ CA, mais seulement environ le quart de leurs actifs sont actuellement investis au Canada. Toutefois, l’argument en faveur de l’investissement intérieur ne peut pas simplement reposer sur un appel à « acheter canadien ». Il exige de meilleures occasions. C’est pourquoi les réformes des politiques et le développement de projets comptent. Les infrastructures, l’énergie, la production d’électricité, les minéraux critiques et le transport sont des actifs de longue durée qui peuvent bien convenir aux investisseurs en régimes de retraite. Si le Canada peut accélérer les approbations et créer des projets plus attrayants sur le plan commercial, l’investissement intérieur pourrait augmenter parce que les occasions elles-mêmes seraient convaincantes.

Tirer le meilleur parti du moment

La confrontation commerciale demeure un frein économique à court terme, mais elle pourrait aussi mettre en évidence certaines des faiblesses structurelles dont le Canada discute depuis des années sans les corriger. C’est là que réside l’occasion. Rien ne garantit que le Canada transformera ce moment en changement durable. Les annonces de projets doivent encore se traduire par de véritables projets, et les réformes réglementaires doivent encore produire des résultats durables. Mais l’argument en faveur des placements est assurément devenu plus intéressant.

Stratégie de portefeuille

Les marchés canadiens ont fait preuve d’une résilience notable malgré l’escalade des tensions commerciales. Les actions canadiennes ont continué de bien se comporter, l’indice composé S&P/TSX surpassant l’indice S&P 500 tant depuis le début du trimestre (voir le graphique 2) que depuis le début de l’année (en monnaie locale). Parallèlement, le dollar canadien a mieux résisté que prévu depuis la reprise de la guerre commerciale, compte tenu de ce qui constituerait normalement un choc négatif important pour les perspectives intérieures. Cette résilience laisse croire que les investisseurs pourraient regarder au-delà de l’incidence immédiate sur la croissance. En même temps, les rendements obligataires ont augmenté à l’échelle mondiale, reflétant les pressions persistantes attribuables à une croissance solide du PIB nominal, aux dépenses budgétaires et, peut-être surtout, à la combinaison croissante des besoins de financement des secteurs public et privé. Aux États-Unis, la hausse des rendements est devenue suffisamment importante (voir le graphique 3) pour que le secrétaire au Trésor Bessent augmente les achats de titres du Trésor à long terme dans le cadre du programme de rachat. Les flux directs étaient faibles par rapport à la taille du marché, mais le signal était notable : les responsables du Trésor sont de plus en plus mal à l’aise devant des hausses désordonnées des rendements à long terme. Les obligations à long terme ont d’abord progressé, mais le mouvement s’est rapidement estompé, ce qui donne à penser que l’intervention des autorités pourrait ne pas éliminer la pression sous-jacente sur les taux à plus long terme. Parallèlement, les communications de plus en plus restrictives de la Fed, plus récemment de la part du président Warsh au symposium de politique économique de Jackson Hole, laissent entendre qu’une inflation persistante aux États-Unis pourrait encore forcer un resserrement de la politique monétaire.

Graphique 2 – Les actions canadiennes surpassent les autres marchés malgré la guerre commerciale

Sources : Bourse de Toronto, S&P Global, MSCI, Nasdaq, Macrobond

Graphique 3 – Les rendements des obligations du Trésor américain à 30 ans ont atteint leur plus haut niveau en près de 20 ans

Sources : Département du Trésor des États-Unis, Macrobond

Dans ce contexte, les portefeuilles équilibrés conservent une orientation globalement défensive, avec une exposition neutre aux actions. Au sein des actions, nous privilégions les actions canadiennes par rapport aux actions mondiales.

Au sein des titres à revenu fixe, la croissance canadienne plus faible et l’incertitude commerciale apportent un certain soutien tactique à la durée, mais les pressions persistantes à l’extrémité longue de la courbe commandent la prudence. Nous observons actuellement des occasions relativement attrayantes liées à l’accentuation pentification de la courbe des taux canadienne.

La stratégie des portefeuilles d’actions fondamentales demeure constructive, soutenue par des révisions positives des bénéfices et une activité économique résiliente. Nous continuons de favoriser des thèmes comme les infrastructures d’IA, les terres rares et la défense, tout en surveillant les principaux risques, notamment les pressions inflationnistes potentielles et tout ralentissement des dépenses d’investissement liées à l’IA.

Money trends suggest that global economic momentum is peaking in Q3, with downside risk focused on Europe and Japan.

The global manufacturing PMI new orders index rose in August, though remains below an April high – see chart 1.

Chart 1

The solid August result is consistent with a rise in global six-month real narrow money momentum into early 2026. Growth, however, has eased since February, suggesting a moderation in new orders over the remainder of the year.

A July fall in real money momentum reflected deepening contractions in Europe and Japan, which offset a further pick-up in the US – chart 2.

Chart 2

The suggestion is that the US economy is running hot with the Fed behind the curve, while ECB and BoJ policy tightening is misguided, risking a sharp economic slowdown, or worse.

Meanwhile, six-month growth of global real narrow money is estimated to have fallen below that of industrial output in July, implying a less favourable liquidity backdrop for markets – chart 3.

Chart 3

A previous undershoot in April preceded a sharp correction in momentum stocks but real money growth recovered to close the gap in May / June, following which equity indices reached new highs.

The global services PMI survey for August was stronger than for manufacturing, with new business reaching a 20-month high. Services buoyancy, however, has little implication for manufacturing prospects. Granger-causality tests show that manufacturing new orders predict services new business but not vice versa. Manufacturing deceleration is likely to be reflected in services cooling.

Dans une récente entrevue accordée à Soundbites d’Investment Executive, Lisa Conroy, CFA, spécialiste des produits au sein de notre équipe des actions fondamentales, présente ses perspectives pour les actions canadiennes et explique pourquoi plusieurs tendances structurelles créent des occasions intéressantes pour les entreprises canadiennes. Du rapatriement des activités de production à l’électrification, en passant par les investissements dans les infrastructures liées à l’intelligence artificielle, Lisa explique pourquoi le Canada est bien placé pour tirer parti des forces qui transforment l’économie mondiale et où notre équipe trouve des occasions sur le marché canadien.

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Japan: Oasis of (political) stability

In February 2026, Japan’s first female prime minister Sanae Takaichi announced a snap election in the National Diet’s Lower House. She proceeded to win a commanding majority of roughly two-thirds of seats for her ruling conservative party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). With conservative Osaka-based coalition partner, the Japan Innovation Party (JIP), the ruling coalition control about three-quarters of seats, providing a strong mandate to advance policy plans. After cycling through four prime ministers (including Sanae Takaichi) since the pandemic, Japan finally has political stability. In contrast, G7 peers like France, Germany, the UK and Italy are beset by fragile ruling coalitions or political infighting.

Figure 1: National Diet Lower House seats split by party before and after the snap February 2026 election

Source: Nikkei Asia

Fiscal investment, not consumption

The Takaichi administration is taking advantage of this electoral supermajority to pursue a more growth-oriented fiscal strategy with a ¥370+ trillion fiscal investment package into 17 strategic sectors through FY 2040E. Previous fiscal stimulus programs focused on consumer support and public works projects to prevent economic stagnation or to alleviate downturns and associated unemployment. However, Prime Minister Takaichi’s plan is aimed at boosting Japan’s long-term productive capacity.

Figure 2: Estimates of Japan’s real GDP potential growth rate from Bank of Japan and the Cabinet Office

Source: Bank of Japan, Cabinet Office via Bloomberg Economics

Figure 3: Annualized potential real GDP growth estimates across major economies

Country	Estimated potential real GDP growth rate YoY
Japan	0.7%
China	3.8%
United States	2.1%
Korea	<2.0%
Canada	1.4%

Sources: International Monetary Fund, Bank of Japan, Bank of Canada, Bank of Korea, USA Congressional Budget Office

Automation to offset a shrinking labour force

Against other advanced economies, Japan’s economic growth potential is low. This is partly due to its aging and falling population, but also because of low productivity relative to peers. The government and private firms both see automation, rather than mass immigration, as the solution to low productivity and structural labour shortages caused by an aging and declining population as well as insufficient technological adoption. By directing capital toward sectors such as automation, semiconductors, data centres, batteries and advanced healthcare, Prime Minister Takaichi’s fiscal plans seek to lift productivity, which will drive Japan’s long-term economic growth. Specifically, Prime Minister Takaichi’s fiscal roadmap includes allocations toward themes such as physical AI, advanced health care and soft power.

Figure 4: The Japanese economy’s capital intensity stagnated for two decades despite labour shortages

Sources: Bank of Japan, Cabinet Office, Ministry of Internal Affairs & Communications via Bloomberg

Figure 5: Prime Minister Takaichi’s fiscal stimulus plan through public-private partnerships into FY 2040E

Source: Cabinet Secretariat via Bank of America Global Research

Physical AI

Prime Minister Takaichi’s fiscal roadmap allocates ¥10.5 trillion to “physical AI.” This refers to the manifestation of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in the physical realm through robotics and automation. In Japan, labour shortages are concentrated in sectors where robots struggle to displace workers. For example, manufacturers have advanced machining tools, but too few operators to handle them. Logistics firms have sufficient trucks but too few drivers. Humanoid robotics and autonomous vehicles should eventually enable Japan to expand productivity via a capital-for-labour substitution.

In total, physical AI, semiconductors, data centre and battery investments comprise ¥101.6 trillion of the government’s 15-year ¥370 trillion fiscal investment plan. Our portfolios’ exposure to these core themes is concentrated in semiconductor production equipment makers and semiconductor material producers.

Tokyo Seimitsu Co. Ltd. (7729 JP)

Founded in 1949, Tokyo Seimitsu manufactures and sells metrology instruments and semiconductor production equipment for automotive, machine tools, semiconductors and aerospace, as well as charge and discharge testing systems for BEVs.

Micronics Japan Co. Ltd. (6871 JP)
Micronics Japan designs, produces and sells probe cards, which are used to inspect integrated circuits (ICs). The firm also manufactures wafer probers, probe card testers, IC handlers and inspection and testing devices used for liquid crystal display (LCD) manufacturing.

Horiba Ltd. (6856 JP)
Horiba manufactures and markets metrology instruments and analyzers. Key product lines include scientific/medical/emissions analyzers, environmental monitors for air/water and semiconductor testing equipment. Horiba has a local presence across China, Japan, Korea, India, Singapore, Thailand, Austria, France, Germany, the UK, the United States, Canada and Brazil.

Sumitomo Bakelite Co. Ltd. (4203 JP)
Sumitomo Bakelite Limited is an integrated processor of synthetic resins and a member of the Sumitomo Chemical Group, which retains a 10.5% equity stake. The firm’s materials are used during the production of electronic components such as chips and PCBs as well as in automotive where BEVs use more encapsulants. With an industry-leading 50% market share after acquiring Kyocera’s encapsulant business, the company is well-positioned to expand further, supported by the growth in automotive applications.

Kurita Water Industries Ltd. (6370 JP)
Kurita Water manufactures, sells and maintains water treatment equipment and facilities. It produces chemical consumables for precision cleaning and water purification. The company also manufactures equipment for wastewater treatment, purification, sanitation, soil remediation, sanitation and HVAC applications. Kurita Water remains Japan’s largest water treatment engineering firm.

Advanced health care

As Japan is a pioneer leading the world in aging, its government recognizes their firms’ “first-mover advantage” in tackling ailments. “Advanced health care” refers to pharmaceutical solutions and medical devices that improve human health. Prime Minister Takaichi’s fiscal plan allocates ¥64.1 trillion to pharmaceutical therapeutics such as antibody drug conjugates, bispecific antibodies, infectious disease vaccine R&D and AI-enabled medical device diagnostics. We have portfolio holdings that are positioned to benefit from the investments in this theme.

Asahi Intecc Co. Ltd. (7747 JP)
Asahi Intecc is a Japanese medical device manufacturer. Asahi operates through two segments. The medical segment develops, manufactures and sells private-label and OEM SKUs. The industrial devices segment develops, manufactures and sells components related to both medical and industrial products. It is the leading producer of interventional guidewires and microcatheters, perfected over 40 years with a longstanding presence in niche steel wire tech.

Sysmex Corporation (6869 JP)
Founded in 1968, Sysmex is the leader in hematology, hemostasis, invitro diagnostics, immunochemistry, urinalysis and the challenger in surgical robotics. The company designs, produces and supplies reagents, instruments, services and other products used in diagnostic tests.

Soft power

The government also understands the importance of “soft power.” This is the phenomenon of exerting geopolitical influence through cultural content such as manga, anime, music, and games. The fiscal plan outlines content investments worth ¥33.7 trillion to enable intellectual property (IP) monetization and new IP development, as well as the localization of Japanese cultural IP overseas, IP exports and tourism.

Sega Sammy Holdings Inc. (6460 JP)
Sega Sammy is the second largest gaming software and hardware producer by revenue, after Nintendo. Their entertainment content segment develops and sells games on third-party platforms (mobile, PC, consoles), licenses IP to film producers and goods manufacturers and sells equipment to arcade operators. Sega’s pachislot and pachinko machine segment manufactures and sells its products to game parlours. The resort segment operates hotels and golf courses at integrated resorts. The firm owns IP of major gaming franchises like Sonic the Hedgehog, Virtua Fighter, Yakuza and Angry Birds since 2023.

Kotobuki Spirits Co. Ltd. (2222 JP)
Kotobuki Spirits is a Japanese firm engaged in the manufacture and sale of confectioneries. It operates six segments: Sucrey, KCC, Seika Tajima, Sales Subsidiary, Kujuku Island and others. The firm is entering into retail after successfully operating via wholesalers.

Recent Eurozone economic news has surprised positively. Monetary trends suggest disappointment ahead.

The manufacturing PMI reached a 51-month high in August, according to flash data released last week. Recent strength was signalled by an upswing in six-month real narrow money momentum into July 2025 followed by a consolidation into early 2026 – see chart 1.

Chart 1

Real money momentum, however, has fallen sharply since February, turning negative in April and weakening further in July. Allowing for the usual six to 12 months lead, this suggests that the PMI is entering a time window to begin another sustained decline.

The fall in real narrow money momentum reflects a combination of a slowdown in nominal growth, probably explicable by misguided ECB policy tightening, and an energy-driven pick-up in six-month consumer price inflation – chart 2.

Chart 2

A country breakdown is available for the deposit component of narrow money but not currency in circulation. Six-month real deposit momentum is negative across the big four, with the largest contractions in France and Italy.

Chart 3

French monetary weakness suggests rising economic / fiscal risks, appreciation of which may explain a fall in demand for French government debt. Bond purchases by Eurozone banks in the 12 months to July were smaller than in the other big four markets, a reversal of the position a year ago – chart 4.

Chart 4

Further details show that purchases of French bonds by both French banks and other Eurozone institutions have slowed. French banks bought only €7.0 bn in the year to July, down from €48.9 bn in the prior 12 months.

The fall in demand for French bonds by French banks follows a reduction in the ownership percentage of French insurers and other domestic investors in recent years. Accordingly, the share of debt owned by non-residents rose to 57.5% in Q1 2026, a nine-year high – chart 5.

Chart 5