Raw salmon on a wooden board.

In a world increasingly focused on wellness and sustainability, fish sits at the intersection of health and investment opportunity. From the cardiologist’s clinic to the equity analyst’s desk, the case for seafood has never been stronger. Whether you’re measuring omega-3 levels or return on equity, the numbers tell a similar story: balance, resilience and long-term growth.

In recent years, a quiet revolution has taken hold in nutrition circles: protein is back in the spotlight. Supermarkets and social media alike now highlight “high-protein” products, from snack bars and shakes to reformulated staples. What was once the domain of bodybuilders is fast becoming mainstream wellness. Major food industry reports confirm that the appetite for protein is real and broadening with 61% of US consumers increasing their protein intake in 2024, up from 48% in 2019. We all know the reasons: protein builds muscle, keeps you satisfied and supports overall health. What’s new is how it’s gone mainstream; it’s not just for athletes anymore.

This trend ties in perfectly with the growing focus on fish as a cornerstone of a healthy diet. As consumers shift toward protein-forward diets, seafood – long praised for its rich omega-3s – now gains even more appeal for its dual role: premium protein plus cardiovascular benefit.

Salmon isn’t just known for its omega-3s; it is a robust, high-quality protein source, and that amplifies its value in a protein-conscious world.

  • Rich protein density: An 85 g portion of raw wild salmon contains about 17 g of protein, nearly all essential amino acids, making it a “complete” protein.
  • Lean, but nutrient-dense: Compared to many red meats or processed protein sources, salmon provides its protein alongside healthy fats (primarily EPA/DHA), vitamin D, selenium and minimal saturated fat.
  • High bioavailability and recovery support: The amino acid profile (especially leucine) in fish proteins supports muscle protein synthesis and recovery which is a benefit that complements the anti-inflammatory effects of omega-3s.
  • Lower contaminant risk (relative to larger predators): While mercury and PCBs remain valid concerns for some species, salmon – particularly well-managed farmed or wild-caught types – tends to lie at the safer end of the spectrum, making it a smart choice within a diversified seafood diet.

This health-driven demand story is not only reshaping dietary habits, it’s also powering an investment opportunity. As one of the world’s largest salmon farmers, SalMar ASA (SALM NO) sits at the forefront of this global protein transition. The company’s scale, cost control and sustainability credentials make it a standout in the seafood sector.

SalMar is one of Norway’s leading salmon producers, and one of the highest-quality names in the global aquaculture industry. Based along Norway’s pristine coastline, SalMar combines decades of experience with innovative farming technology to produce salmon that’s both sustainable and consistently high in quality. The company’s strengths lie in its efficient operations, prime farming locations and focus on biological control, which keep production costs low while maintaining excellent fish health and environmental standards. With operations stretching from central to northern Norway and growing exposure in Iceland and Asia, SalMar is well-positioned to meet rising global demand for healthy protein.

Norwegian farmed salmon, more broadly, has become a gold standard for sustainable seafood. The cold, clean waters of Norway provide the perfect environment for salmon to grow naturally, while strict national regulations ensure traceability, low antibiotic use and responsible feed sourcing. Compared to other animal proteins, salmon has a smaller carbon footprint, delivers high-quality omega-3 fats and provides a complete source of lean protein making it a smart choice for both consumers and investors focused on health, sustainability and long-term value.

If consumers continue reprioritizing protein, salmon producers like SalMar, that manage costs, traceability and scale will enjoy structural growth beyond the broader seafood category. For our portfolio, the protein trend adds an extra degree of optionality of not just health credibility, but a narrative anchored in a “protein-first” consumer future.

The global money growth surge of 2020-21 resulted in a monetary overhang, which limited economic damage when money trends subsequently slumped in 2022-23, as well as providing fuel for a prolonged bull market in risk assets.

So how much is left in the monetary tank?

One approach is to compare the ratio of the money stock to nominal GDP with its longer-term trend. This has two major drawbacks – it ignores the dependence of money demand on wealth as well as income, while the trend is left unexplained.

An alternative approach is based on the “quantity theory of wealth”. This posits that a given percentage change in the (broad) money stock is reflected in an equal percentage change in the geometric mean of nominal GDP and gross wealth.

The conventional quantity theory states that monetary expansion will lead to some combination of increased output and higher prices of goods and services to restore equilibrium.

The modified theory allows for asset prices (and stocks of assets) to bear part of the burden of adjustment. The modified approach fits US long-term historical data without requiring the assumption of an unexplained trend.

Charts 1-3 below apply this idea to US, Japanese and Eurozone data since the end of 2018, implicitly assuming that money stocks were in equilibrium with nominal income and wealth at that date. The gap (shaded) between the paths of the money stock and the combined income / wealth variable is an estimate of the monetary overhang. The individual paths of nominal GDP and wealth are also shown for comparison.

The rise in the money stock has been reflected in a larger increase in wealth than income in all three cases.

In the US, the suggestion is that the monetary overhang was eliminated in Q1 2024. Broad money and nominal GDP have grown at the same pace since then (a cumulative 6% through Q2 2025), with wealth rising faster (12%), driven by the equities component (19%) – chart 1.

Chart 1

NSP-WeeklyBulletin-20251020-Chart13-1024×897-1.png

The Japanese overhang is estimated to have been removed one quarter later, in Q2 2024. Broad money has barely grown since then, while nominal GDP has outpaced wealth (5% versus 2% increase through Q2 2025) – chart 2.

Chart 2

NSP-WeeklyBulletin-20251020-Chart12-1024×897-1.png

In contrast to the US and Japan, a small monetary overhang is estimated to have persisted in the Eurozone. Nominal GDP and wealth grew similarly in the year to Q2 2025 (4%), slightly outpacing money (3%) – chart 3.

Chart 3

NSP-WeeklyBulletin-20251020-Chart12-1024×897-1.png

The suggestion is that there is no major misalignment between current money stocks and levels of nominal income and asset prices in the three economies. A stock overhang is no longer acting as a tailwind for economic activity and markets but nor is there a significant monetary deficiency.

The monetary environment, in other words, has normalised, suggesting a re-anchoring of economic / market prospects to money growth and underlying cycles.

Seoul cityscape at twilight in South Korea.

We called for a brighter outlook for EM equities over a year ago on the prospect of a USD bear market. This is now starting to play out, led by a liquidity-driven bull market in China.

Over the last three years to the end of the quarter, EM equities have compounded at an annualised rate of 19%.

Our markets remain under-owned and boast cheap valuations relative to US stocks. Easing financial conditions should support a recovery in earnings growth.

We are also believers that you can have too much of a good thing, and that emerging markets are a host to a number of attractive structural thematics outside of the AI fervour that are unique to our investment universe.

The rally this year has been focused on the large cap names. To illustrate, the MSCI EM Small Cap Index has returned 16.67% against 28.16% for the large cap index for the year to date.

This is also reflected in the underperformance of smaller and less liquid markets such as ASEAN. As the bull market matures, we expect liquidity to creep out to markets such as Malaysia, which have been abandoned by foreign investors despite having exciting structural investment opportunities. We know from past experience that when investor flows do return, the upside can be dramatic.

Returns across emerging markets have so far been driven by local allocators, with foreign investors largely sitting on the sidelines – although interactions with attendees on our usual conference circuit suggest that this could be about to change.

Korea Value-Up deep dive: SK Square

Corporate Value-Up catalyst alongside tailwind from SK Hynix’s dominance in high bandwidth memory

South Korean equities have surged by over 57% this year to the end of September. The fuel is a combination of exposure to AI infrastructure mania through the country’s tech giants such as SK Hynix and Samsung rallying, ultra cheap valuations and the prospect of a broader market re-rating courtesy of the Value-Up corporate reform drive that is now underway.

Below we provide a deep dive into recent portfolio addition SK Square, which we think is emblematic of the broader upside potential in Korean equities if the government sticks to its reform ambitions.

South Korean equities have surged by over 57% this year to the end of September. The fuel is a combination of exposure to AI infrastructure mania through the country’s tech giants such as SK Hynix and Samsung rallying, ultra cheap valuations and the prospect of a broader market re-rating courtesy of the Value-Up corporate reform drive that is now underway. Below we provide a deep dive into recent portfolio addition SK Square, which we think is emblematic of the broader upside potential in Korean equities if the government sticks to its reform ambitions.

Overview

South Korea is home to some of the world’s most innovative companies, and yet it is also arguably one of the cheapest equity markets. The dichotomy is down to a poor history of corporate governance in the country, with the economy dominated by vast family-controlled chaebol conglomerates.

These families have historically been more focused on preserving their business empires than looking out for the interests of minority shareholders. However, following in the footsteps of Japan’s stock exchange reforms, South Korea has launched Value-Up to narrow the “Korea discount” and attract foreign capital.

We think SK Square epitomises the sort of opportunity where Value-Up could be a significant catalyst for re-rating. Spun off from SK Telecom in 2021, the holding company’s investment portfolio includes business across semiconductors (SK Hynix), ICT ventures and digital platforms.

A compilation of the logos of 19 companies within the investment portfolio of SK Square.
Source: SK Square 2025

Focus on the discount to NAV for this holding company – the discount has widened to 55% following a recent correction. This was an opportunity to buy. Management has levers to pull to narrow the NAV discount via more share buybacks, NAV enhancement and dividend payouts.

SK Square is the best in class among the holding companies and is leading peers in efforts to enhance shareholder value. Management quality is high and the board has a majority of independent directors. They were the first holdco to unveil their Value-Up program and appear to be executing the plan well.

The company is already practising cumulative voting rights – this favours minority shareholders who can pool votes to secure board seats (only 6% of companies in South Korea practice cumulative voting).

The disposal of non-core assets will enable SK Square to focus its energy on its best assets in the IT and Communications sectors.

A brief history of the chaebols

Born out of the interplay of historical, economic and governmental forces following WWI and the Korean War, these family-owned conglomerates filled a significant institutional void post Korea’s liberation from Japanese occupation in 1945.

Chaebols were formed out of the sale of assets previously owned by Japan’s government and firms, which accounted for 30% of the Korean economy. These assets were often sold to families and high-ranking officials at a deep discount, with prices based on outdated book values amidst high inflation. Early chaebols like Hanwha, Doosan, Samsung, SK and Hyundai used these assets as the foundation for growth.

The Korean government played a decisive role in shaping the economy since 1961. Under President Chung Hee Park, economic development became a top priority for legitimacy. The government launched a series of five-year development plans which were based on nationalising banks and channelling foreign loans in capital-intensive heavy industries and chemical industries. It allowed chaebols to acquire or establish non-bank financials to provide capital to their affiliates.

Korea experienced chronic capital shortages throughout its development period, particularly after the Korean war. The chaebols could create value by internalizing resource allocation and replacing poorly performing institutions. The absence of supporting industries meant that chaebols often had to vertically integrate to secure necessary parts and raw materials.

While the chaebols were effective vehicles for kickstarting growth, a host of structural issues emerged.

Vertically integrated suppliers, with captive customers, meant the chaebols lacked incentives to be efficient.

Cross-subsidisation across affiliate businesses led to yet more inefficiencies and wasteful allocation of capital.

Internal subsidies via nonbank financial subsidiaries funded unprofitable ventures bypassing traditional banks. This was identified as one of the causes for the Asian Financial Crisis.

Centralised family control over numerous group affiliates even though their direct equity ownership is often a small percentage. This control allows for decisions that serve personal interests at the expense of minority shareholders.

Cross-shareholding – affiliates within a chaebol group own shares in each other, which inflates the apparent ownership stakes and provides a mechanism for the founding family to control the entire group with minimal actual capital investment.

High debt-equity ratios. Chaebols have historically preferred debt over equity financing to avoid diluting the controlling stakes of their founding families.

Unchecked power of chairmen. Chairmen held absolute power over strategic decisions, leading missteps such as ill-conceived diversification strategies e.g., Samsung’s entry into the auto industry.

Ineffective boards. Typically dominated by executive officers and outside directors with close ties to dominant shareholders. They often serve to provide ex-post factor approval rather than independent oversight.

Value-Up aims to tackle these issues, and it is more than just political rhetoric.

The program is supported by both of South Korea’s major political parties in the DPK and PPP. Real reform is underway, including revisions to the Commercial Act mandating director loyalty to shareholders (instead of to “the company”), electronic shareholder meetings for large firms and cumulative voting rights to empower minority investors.

Corporate governance reform – Japan vs. Korea

South Korea Japan
Mandatory vs. voluntary Voluntary Mandatory
Incentives Carrots and sticks Named and shamed
Targeting companies with price to book ratio <1 Financial Services Commission believes PBR helps assess whether or not the issue arises from a low ROE due to a high cost production structure and decrease in market demand. The company has not achieved profitability that exceeds its cost of capital, or investors are not seeing its growth potential.
Framework A Value-Up ETF Index has been created. Value-Up adherents to be rewarded with inclusion.

Potentially, a special tax regime will be set up for companies increasing dividends.

Companies complying with the new corporate governance rules were publicly named by TSE in early 2024.

 

History of SK Square

Founded in November 2021 via a spin-off of SK Telecom, SK Square intended to focus on ICT investments and become a more growth-and-tech-focussed holding company.

The downturn in portfolio company and DRAM giant SK Hynix in 2023 forced SK Square management to sharpen its focus on the underlying portfolio, much of which was loss making.

SK Group chairman Chey does not have a direct stake in SK Square and the independent board of directors makes it more exposed to shareholder activism. It was the subject of shareholder activism in 2023–2024, led by a London hedge fund (1% shareholding), pushing for the business to release an industry-leading value-up plan which was eventually announced in November 2024.

Company overview

  • Operating income (Q2 2025) of 1.4tn won, of which SK Hynix contributed to 1.84tn (20% stake). The ICT portfolio is generating negative operating income of 28.9tn won.

Two bar graphs of SK Square's financial performance. The first graph illustrates the operating income growing to 1.4 trillion won as at Q2 2025. The second graph illustrates the ICT operating income generating a negative operating income of 28.9 trillion won.
Source: SK Square company presentation Q2 2025

  • SK Hynix is 88% of SK Square NAV.

A line graph illustrating that SK Hynix makes up 88% of SK Square's net asset value.

  • Other than SK Hynix, SK Shieldus (2% NAV) and TMAP Mobility (1%) are the only ventures making meaningful profits.
  • Management said that they will divest 20 or more ventures this year, and the rest in the next couple of years.

Four bar graphs. Graph one shows SK Hynix revenue and operating income for the last 5 quarters. Graph two shoes TMAP Mobility year-over-year growth in operating income and monthly active users. Graph three shows Eleven Street year-over-year growth in operating income and EBITDA. Graph four shows SK shieldus year-over-year growth in revenue and EBITDA.
Source: SK Square company presentation Q2 2025

SK Square’s NAV discount is beginning to narrow. A recent market correction has given us an opportunity to buy the stock.

  • NAV to market cap discount has narrowed significantly from 74% in 2022 to 66% at Q3 2024 since the announcement of its value-up program.
  • The discount narrowed to a low of 47% in June, before the KOSPI and SK Square correction.
  • While SK Hynix corrected by c.15% from its July peak, SK Square’s share price fell by c.37% from its June peak, with the NAV discount widening to c.55% at the time we initiated our position.
NAV Discount 28/08/25
NAV 44,198
Market cap 19,828
-55%

 

Catalysts

There are strong KPI incentives in place for management if the NAV discount gets to 50%, ROE> Cost of equity at 13-14% and over 1x PB by 2027.

The Price to Book Ratio analysis side from the SK Square company presentation with comments on data presented.
Source: SK Square company presentation Q2 2025

The NAV discount has been narrowed by:

1) Aggressive share buybacks (c.9% of total outstanding). Critically, all shares bought back are to be cancelled. At the March AGM, another batch of buyback of 100bn won was announced on top of the 300bn and 200bn buybacks in 2023 and 2024.

Slide on shareholder return illustrating the completed cancellation of previously acquired shares and new share buyback program underway.
Source: SK Square company presentation Q2 2025

2) Non-core divestments by reducing the number of entities from 43 to 20 this year. They are hoping to de-risk the portfolio, boost cash flows and shareholder returns.

Slide illustrating the plan to boost the profitability of the ICT portfolio of SK Square following the significant reduction of operating losses.
Source: SK Square company presentation Q2 2025

3) Payout of at least 50% of recurring portfolio dividend income to investors.

Slide illustrating the discussion and implementation of value-up measures.
Source: SK Square company presentation Q2 2025

Our base case is for NAV discount to narrow to 40% over medium term, the historic average of holdco discounts in South Korea.

A bar graph illustrating a comparison of NAV discounts from different times and regions in Korea.
Source: CLSA, DART

Narrowing the discount to this level implies significant upside in the stock.

In addition, dividends from SK Hynix will amount to 3tn won by 2027, which can be deployed.

They have sold an SK Shieldus (Cybersecurity) stake to a PE fund and the cash received in Q3 2025 (510bn won) could be deployed to further boost shareholder returns.

For the remaining unlisted companies, management is yet to outline plans for further asset sales. More clarity here would boost the stock.

Additional tailwinds may come from the next batch of share buybacks to be announced in Q4. The pace and magnitude will be key. SK Hynix coming back in focus as an AI play is an added tailwind.

Risks

  • The board of directors may not go as far as investors expect to sustainably narrow the NAV discount from 75% in 2022 to 50%.
  • Disappointment over the cadence and magnitude of share buybacks.
  • Chairman Myung is trying to turn some portfolio companies around to be EBITDA positive, but the labour union is in the way. (We are still seeing some progress i.e., portfolio company TMAP turned an operating profit in Q2 2025).
  • The pace of divestments could be slower than anticipated, as assets require proper packaging to sell them at a good valuation.
  • Volatility in the stock adding to beta to the portfolio.
  • An SK Hynix downcycle and share price downturn will trigger a bigger correction in SK Square.

Summary

Overall, SK Square is just one example of how South Korea’s Value-Up program can act as a catalyst for managers to sharpen up capital allocation and sweat their assets harder. Much will depend on the government’s willingness to pressure corporates to continue value-enhancing efforts through further legislative and regulatory reform. The momentum is positive, and if sustained could lead to a full market re-rating.

Chinese money trends suggest a continuation of sluggish economic growth, negligible inflation and a supportive liquidity environment for markets.

Six-month growth of narrow money – as measured by the new M1 definition incorporating household demand deposits – rose slightly in September, extending a recovery from a May low. Broad money momentum also edged higher. Both series are around their average levels in recent years – see chart 1.

Chart 1

171025c1.png

Credit trends remain weak, with six-month growth of bank lending reaching another record low, although numbers have been suppressed by bond swaps. Monetary expansion, however, continues to be boosted by China’s version of QE, conducted via the state banks. Monetary financing of the government, including bond swaps, accounted for 3.8 pp of M2 growth of 8.4% in the year to September – chart 2.

Chart 2

20251017_NSP_MMM_Image_WP-Thumbnail.jpg

Money growth remains above nominal GDP expansion, arguing against a debt deflation scenario and suggesting “excess” money support for asset prices. With the housing market still weak and longer-term bond yields recently moving up from record lows, equities could remain the default beneficiary.

Two scientists looking through microscopes.

The foundation of traditional Chinese medicine is Qi – the life force or energy that flows through a body. If, for any reason, the Qi in your body was to go out of balance or get blocked, one would end up falling ill. A wide range of plant- and animal-based medicines would then be used to unblock those pathways and to restore the balance of Yin and Yang in the body.

While traditional Chinese medicine techniques like cupping and acupuncture gain popularity both at home and abroad, China has been quietly making giant strides in the traditional pharmaceutical and biotechnology sectors. In the past, it applied the principles of scale and an integrated supply chain to manufacture inexpensive generics faster and cheaper than its competitors.

Cut to present day, China’s pharmaceutical industry is on the cusp of becoming a global leader in both drug discovery and development. According to Morgan Stanley, annual revenues from drugs originating in China could reach USD$34 billion by 2030 and USD$220 billion by 2040. Currently, drugs from China account for only 5% of all USFDA approvals, but that is estimated to rise to 35% by 2040. So how did China go from a middling pharma player to the hot house of innovation and manufacturing that we see today?

Broadly, we can trace three key factors that are fueling this boom:

  1. Reforms – The comprehensive series of reforms needed to move the needle in this space did not happen overnight. Over the last decade, China has made a deliberate push to move from a large-scale generics manufacturer to an innovation powerhouse by pushing through the following reforms.
    • Increasing innovative drug approvals – In 2017, measures were introduced to reduce the review timeline of innovative drugs to 60 days, increasing the efficiency of the drug development process. The result has been a record 93 drugs receiving first approval from the National Medical Products Administration (NMPA) in China in 2024 with China surpassing Europe and Japan as the second largest country to receive first approvals.
    • Investment inflows – Funding is crucial for innovation and reforms such as 18A listing rules in Hong Kong and the launch of STAR Market (touted as Shanghai’s equivalent to NASDAQ) allowed pre-revenue biotech companies to list and raise money.
    • Globalization – In response to intense competition at home, Chinese pharmaceutical companies have started to spread their wings abroad through strategic partnerships. This is being executed by applying for global approvals for drugs developed in China and through so called out-licensing agreements, where Chinese companies further the development of their unique IP by leveraging the R&D and commercialization network of western pharma giants.
  1. Speed – To accelerate development of novel drugs, China’s regulator is proposing to further cut the clinical trial review period from 60 to 30 working days, matching the time line of USFDA. The presence of large pools of patients in Chinese cities further expedites the go-to-market process.
  2. Talent – China graduates around five million science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) graduates every year. The recent crackdown in immigration in the United States has led many talented Chinese scientists and professionals (nicknamed “sea turtles”) to return home. The recent announcement by the Chinese government of the K visa program could further accelerate this trend.

This combination of speed, abundance of talent and structural reforms could throw up multiple opportunities in the Chinese pharma space. It is next to impossible to predict which company could win the next out-licensing deal. Similarly, picking the next big biopharma product requires a high degree of technical expertise. Hence our investment in Sunresin New Materials Co. Ltd. (300487 CH) takes a picks and shovel approach to this space.

Sunresin is a specialty resin manufacturer, making more than 200 different types of resin for a variety of applications from purifying water, extracting lithium to serving as an enzyme carrier for drug development including GLP-1 drugs. While its life sciences business makes up about a fourth of its revenue, given the trends discussed above, the growth opportunities and potential runway could be enormous.

The consumables that Sunresin manufactures have high barriers to entry, more stable risk profiles vs. betting on winning drugs and underlying high growth in total addressable market. Its products are used both for upstream synthesis of various active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs) and for downstream separation and purification that determines the final quality of the drug.

Key trends that underpin Sunresin’s growth include:

  1. Growth of the biologics (large molecules) market that is growing faster than the chemical drug (small molecules) market. Biologics production has an upstream API synthesis phase that requires carriers and a downstream purification phase that requires chromatographic media (CM) to capture target molecules.
  2. Sunresin produces both upstream carriers (for both large and small molecules) and downstream chromatographic media. Entry barriers are high as both products can make up 15–40% of production cost and are crucial to the final quality of the drug. Switching suppliers by commercial drug makers can be costly and time consuming.
  3. Rise of import substitution in China and rise of overseas opportunities from out-licensing deals could further underpin growth.
  4. Build out of new high-end life sciences capacity that could support 10x of current sales.

Between its proven products, new capacities and tailwinds from the growth of biologics and the larger China bio pharma sector, we see Sunresin as a key winner in the race to find the new blockbuster drugs on the back of China’s booming pharmaceutical sector.

Credit tightening in private markets may mark the end of a boom in US bank lending to shadow banks, with negative monetary implications.

Equity prices of major players in private credit have fallen sharply in the wake of the Tricolor / First Brands bankruptcies, with an average down by 31% from a January peak – see chart 1.

Chart 1

NSP-WeeklyBulletin-20251013-Chart1-1024×897-1.png

Increased risk aversion is also evident in lower prices / higher yields of traded private credit instruments, such as the VanEck Business Development Companies ETF (BIZD), which usually mirrors moves in high yield spreads but has opened up a wide gap – chart 2.

Chart 2

NSP-WeeklyBulletin-20251013-Chart1-1024×897-1.png

Commercial bank lending to shadow banks / private credit has been booming, with the “all other” category containing loans to non-bank financial institutions up by 14.5% in the year to September, accounting for 2.9 pp of overall bank loan growth of 4.9% – chart 3*.

Chart 3

NSP-WeeklyBulletin-20251013-Chart2-1024×857-1.png

Traditional loan categories – C&I, real estate and consumer – grew by only 2.5% over the same period.

Lending to shadow banks is likely to slow as private credit players rein in activity and loan officers tighten standards. A normalisation could cut 2 pp or more from annual loan growth, implying weaker broad money expansion unless offset by other “credit counterparts”**.

Credit tightening could extend to other loan categories unless private markets recover – chart 4. (Note that the reporting window for the October Fed senior loan officer survey, to be released in early November, may already have closed, so the results may not fully reflect recent developments.)

Chart 4

NSP-WeeklyBulletin-20251013-Chart2-1024×857-1.png

*Growth numbers are break-adjusted – levels series have been distorted by recent reporting changes.

**Some combination of increased monetary deficit financing, a stronger basic balance of payments or reduced non-deposit funding.

Des hommes d'affaires travaillant au bureau.

Depuis des décennies, le processus de répartition stratégique de l’actif fournit aux investisseurs institutionnels un cadre de gestion de portefeuille structuré et axé sur les indices de référence. Cette approche, fondée sur la recherche universitaire et la théorie moderne des portefeuilles, a aidé d’innombrables conseils d’administration et comités de placement à aller au-delà de la répartition classique 60 % actions/40 % titres à revenu fixe en faveur d’une composition plus diversifiée.

À l’heure où le monde des placements change, certains des plus grands investisseurs du monde en sont à transformer leurs processus, au profit d’une approche de portefeuille global novatrice qui considère le portefeuille comme une entité unique et dynamique plutôt que comme un ensemble de catégories d’actifs distinctes. Le présent article explore l’évolution des stratégies de composition de l’actif, les avantages et les limites de la répartition stratégique de l’actif, ainsi que les promesses et les défis de l’approche de portefeuille global.

L’évolution des stratégies de répartition de l’actif

La répartition de l’actif des investisseurs institutionnels a connu d’importants changements au fil des ans. Le modèle classique 60/40 a dominé pendant des décennies, jusqu’à ce que David Swensen et Dean Takahashi de l’université Yale opèrent une réorientation vers les placements non traditionnels à la fin des années 1980 et au début des années 1990. En ouvrant la porte au capital-investissement, aux fonds de couverture, à l’immobilier et aux ressources naturelles, ils ont révolutionné la répartition de l’actif et diversifié les portefeuilles au-delà des frontières traditionnelles.

Alors que d’autres institutions sont passées au-delà de la répartition 60/40, le cadre de la répartition stratégique de l’actif est devenu un outil essentiel pour orienter les cibles de répartition de l’actif à long terme, en fonction des objectifs de placement, de la tolérance au risque, des besoins de liquidité et de l’horizon de placement.

Les avancées technologiques et le plus grand accès aux données sont en train de modifier le fonctionnement des marchés financiers et la gestion de portefeuille. Les investisseurs peuvent maintenant mieux comprendre l’incidence de leurs décisions, ce qui permet de gérer les portefeuilles de façon plus dynamique et éclairée – et l’approche de portefeuille global en est le plus récent développement. Elle présente de précieux concepts à tous les investisseurs, même si elle demeure la spécialité des plus grandes institutions mondiales.

L’attrait durable de la répartition stratégique de l’actif

Le processus de répartition stratégique de l’actif est intuitif et constitue une méthode quantitative rigoureuse pour établir la composition de l’actif. Son attrait durable réside dans son accessibilité, où tout investisseur, quelle que soit sa taille, peut l’utiliser. Essentiellement, le processus de répartition stratégique de l’actif vise à accroître la diversification, ce qui peut réduire le risque sans sacrifier les rendements cibles, ou à générer des rendements plus élevés tout en maintenant le risque sous contrôle.

Les premières étapes du processus sont la définition des objectifs de placement, l’horizon de placement, la tolérance au risque et les besoins de liquidités. À partir de ces mesures, les investisseurs analysent le rendement et la volatilité attendus pour déterminer les répartitions potentielles, mais en accordant une priorité générale aux rendements relatifs. La décision finale en matière de répartition de l’actif dépend souvent des catégories d’actif avec lesquelles un conseil d’administration ou un comité de placement est le plus à l’aise.

Une fois les catégories d’actif sélectionnées, la répartition est raffinée. À cette étape, de nouvelles catégories d’actif ou d’autres gestionnaires de placement peuvent être ajoutés au portefeuille. La répartition des catégories d’actif et des gestionnaires peut également être modifiée. Le portefeuille est surveillé en regard de ses objectifs et de ses indices de référence. Il fait donc l’objet d’une vigilance soutenue et est ajusté à mesure qu’évoluent les conditions du marché.

Limites et décalages de la répartition stratégique de l’actif

Même si le cadre de la répartition stratégique de l’actif a résisté à l’épreuve du temps, il n’est pas sans failles. L’une des critiques les plus fréquentes à l’égard de cette approche est le décalage entre la conception de la répartition de l’actif et la sélection des titres par les gestionnaires. Des inefficiences peuvent survenir lorsque ces étapes sont gérées séparément, ce qui réduit les avantages de la diversification. Cette séparation peut également faire en sorte que le profil risque-rendement du portefeuille s’écarte du profil prévu, surtout lorsque l’accent est mis sur le rendement passé lors de la sélection des gestionnaires et l’on fait abstraction du risque.

L’ajout de nouvelles catégories d’actif et de gestionnaires de placement exige habituellement un examen officiel, ce qui ralentit la capacité de réagir à l’évolution des conditions du marché. Les hypothèses relatives aux marchés financiers à long terme guident les décisions de répartition stratégique de l’actif, mais leur fiabilité n’est pas garantie. Selon certaines études, les prévisions de rendement sont souvent inexactes, alors que les prévisions de risque ont tendance à être plus conformes aux résultats réels. Cela donne à penser qu’il peut être plus sage de mettre l’accent sur la gestion du risque plutôt que sur la quête de rendements.

Qu’est-ce qu’une approche de portefeuille global?

Contrairement au modèle de répartition stratégique de l’actif traditionnel, dans le cadre duquel les catégories d’actif sont gérées en vase clos, l’approche de portefeuille global considère le portefeuille comme un ensemble unifié. Chaque décision de placement est évaluée en fonction de son incidence sur le risque et le rendement du portefeuille dans leur ensemble, et une attention particulière est prêtée au risque. Cette approche globale et souple tire parti de l’expertise en matière d’actifs de différentes équipes et permet à ces dernières de réagir rapidement à l’évolution de la dynamique des marchés.

Toutefois, l’adoption d’une approche de portefeuille global n’est pas simplement un changement de processus de placement; il s’agit d’une transformation culturelle. Les organisations doivent aller au-delà de la gestion cloisonnée des catégories d’actif pour adopter un modèle de portefeuille unifié. Cette transformation nécessite des changements audacieux sur le plan de la culture et de la gouvernance. Les conseils d’administration et les comités de placement doivent déléguer une plus grande part de leur pouvoir décisionnel et donner davantage de libertés aux chefs des placements et aux équipes de placement internes. Dans le cadre de l’approche de portefeuille global, la collaboration entre les spécialistes et l’harmonisation des incitatifs sont essentielles au succès du portefeuille dans son ensemble.

Qui mène le bal?

L’approche de portefeuille global a d’abord été adoptée par les plus grands investisseurs du monde, comme l’Australian Future Fund, Investissements RPC au Canada, le New Zealand Superannuation Fund et GIC, le fonds d’investissement souverain de Singapour. Ces institutions ont l’envergure nécessaire pour intégrer des équipes de placement et créer les environnements de collaboration nécessaires à la mise en œuvre d’une approche de portefeuille global. La philosophie de l’approche de portefeuille global a commencé à prendre forme officiellement vers 2006. Ses origines remontent toutefois plus loin, notamment au début des années 1990 lorsque Bob Hamje, chef des placements de TRW, a délaissé les mandats individuels au profit du rendement total des portefeuilles, récompensant ainsi les gestionnaires pour leur collaboration et leur succès global.

Répartition stratégique de l’actif et approche de portefeuille global : perspective comparative

Le tableau ci-dessous présente les principales différences entre la répartition stratégique de l’actif et l’approche de portefeuille global :

Caractéristique Répartition stratégique de l’actif (RSA) Approche axée sur le « portefeuille total » (APT)
Rendement évalué par rapport à : Indices de référence des catégories d’actif Objectifs du fonds et portefeuille de référence
Le succès est mesuré comme suit : Valeur ajoutée relative Rendement total du fonds
Les occasions de placement sont définies comme suit : Catégories d’actif Contribution au rendement total du portefeuille
Diversification obtenue grâce à : Catégories d’actif Facteurs de risque
Répartition de l’actif déterminée par : Processus axé sur le conseil d’administration Processus axé sur le chef des placements
Portefeuille mis en œuvre par : Plusieurs équipes, qui se disputent des capitaux Une équipe qui collabore entre les différentes stratégies

Source : Thinking Ahead Institute

Le passage de la répartition stratégique de l’actif à l’approche de portefeuille global représente une transformation importante. Dans le cadre de la répartition stratégique de l’actif, le succès est déterminé en fonction du rendement obtenu par rapport à un indice de référence global, qui correspond à la moyenne pondérée des indices de référence de chaque catégorie d’actif. En revanche, l’approche de portefeuille global mesure le succès par rapport aux objectifs du fonds, habituellement en fonction d’un portefeuille de référence.

Pour ce qui est de la répartition stratégique de l’actif, chaque catégorie d’actif est choisie en fonction de son rôle dans l’atteinte des objectifs en matière de rendement, de risque, de diversification et de liquidité. En ce qui concerne l’approche de portefeuille global, on tente avant tout de saisir la façon dont chaque occasion de placement contribue au résultat global du portefeuille. De plus, les facteurs et les primes de risque guident à la fois la manière dont est élaborée la stratégie et sont déterminés les résultats. Cette approche permet d’effectuer des simulations de crise plus robustes dans différents régimes macroéconomiques, ce qui permet de mieux cerner la résilience d’un portefeuille.

Le changement le plus important lié à l’approche de portefeuille global est probablement celui apporté à la culture et à la gouvernance. Le processus décisionnel n’est plus principalement du ressort du conseil d’administration, mais plutôt du chef des placements et de l’équipe de placement, ce qui favorise la collaboration et la responsabilité à l’égard des résultats globaux du portefeuille.

Les défis de l’approche de portefeuille global

Bien que l’attrait de l’approche de portefeuille global soit évident, la mise en œuvre de cette stratégie peut être difficile. Les défis ne sont pas seulement de nature technique, mais ils ont aussi trait à la culture et à la gouvernance. L’approche de portefeuille global confère au chef des placements un plus grand pouvoir discrétionnaire en matière de placement, ce qui ouvre la voie à une gestion de portefeuille plus dynamique. De nombreux fonds qui adoptent l’approche de portefeuille global utilisent, en guise de référence supplémentaire, un portefeuille généralement composé d’actions et de titres à revenu fixe. Cette méthode peut toutefois donner lieu à un raisonnement erroné et à des préoccupations mal fondées si le portefeuille plus diversifié qui se fonde sur l’approche de portefeuille global est devancé par le portefeuille de référence à court terme.
L’approche de portefeuille global exige également d’importants investissements dans les données et les infrastructures aux fins de l’analyse du risque, ce qui complique la tâche des petits fonds. De plus, l’évaluation de l’apport des gestionnaires individuels devient plus nuancée. Dans le cadre de l’approche de portefeuille global, le succès est mesuré en fonction de l’incidence sur les résultats globaux du portefeuille plutôt que par rapport aux indices de référence des catégories d’actif. Il est donc plus difficile d’évaluer l’apport de chaque personne ou de chaque équipe.

Leçons pratiques pour tous les investisseurs

L’approche de portefeuille global complète est hors de la portée de la plupart des investisseurs, mais certains de ses aspects peuvent renforcer la prise de décisions et améliorer les résultats, notamment :

  • La reformulation des objectifs pour mettre l’accent sur les résultats globaux du portefeuille et accorder moins d’importance aux rendements relatifs;
  • Une plus grande souplesse en matière de placement grâce à la formation sur la gouvernance, en vue de faire appel au conseil au début du processus d’examen afin qu’il soit à l’aise avec un plus vaste éventail de placements;
  • L’accent mis sur les prévisions relatives au risque plutôt qu’au rendement, car les données donnent à penser que les prévisions de risque ont tendance à être plus fiables que les prévisions de rendement;
  • L’amélioration du processus de mise en œuvre au moyen de portefeuilles complémentaires afin que le portefeuille global garde le cap sur ses objectifs à long terme.

Conclusion

Même si l’approche de portefeuille global a été adoptée par les fonds de plus grande envergure jusqu’à maintenant, les leçons qu’on peut en tirer sont pertinentes pour tous les investisseurs. L’accent mis sur le risque, l’arrimage aux objectifs à long terme et une gouvernance plus souple ouvrent la voie à une façon plus durable et réactive de gérer les portefeuilles.

Même si les petits investisseurs ne peuvent trouver leur compte dans une approche de portefeuille global complète aujourd’hui, il s’avère très utile d’adopter certains éléments d’une telle stratégie et d’intégrer sa philosophie dans les discussions du conseil d’administration ainsi que les processus de répartition de l’actif au fil du temps.

Vue plongeante d'une réunion avec 6 personnes assises à une table.

Peter Muldowney, premier vice-président et chef, Stratégie institutionnelle et multiactifs, s’entretient avec Plans & Trusts sur le rôle de l’intelligence émotionnelle (IE) dans le façonnement de la culture des conseils d’administration et améliorer la performance.

 

Veuillez noter que cet article est écrit en anglais.

Rendement des indices boursiers (monnaie locale) T3 (%) Cumul annuel (%)
MSCI Monde tous pays 7,4 17,8
MSCI Monde tous pays hors É.-U. 6,2 15,2
S&P/TSX composé 12,5 23,9
S&P 500 8,1 14,8
MSCI monde tous pays 12,5 25,0
Obligataire universel FTSE Canada 1,5 3,0

Actions étrangères

Stratégies d’actions étrangères T3 (%) Cumul annuel (%)
Stratégie d’actions mondiales Q CC&L 10,2 18,9
Stratégie d’actions mondiales Q à extension CC&L1 9,6 18,8
Indice MSCI Monde tous pays ($ CA) (net) 9,7 14,6
Stratégie d’actions mondiales à petite capitalisation Q CC&L 11,4 17,3
Indice MSCI Monde tous pays à petite capitalisation ($ CA) (net) 10,2 12,8
Stratégie d’actions internationales Q CC&L 9,1 26,7
Indice MSCI Monde tous pays ex ÉU ($ CA) (net) 9,0 21,9
Stratégie d’actions internationales à petite capitalisation Q CC&L 10,9 27,7
Indice MSCI Monde tous pays hors É,-U, à petite capitalisation ($ CA) (net) 8,8 21,5
Stratégie d’actions marchés émergents Q CC&L 13,1 25,8
Indice MSCI Marchés émergents ($ CA) (net) 12,8 23,4
Stratégie d’actions américaines Q à extension CC&L1 8,8 13,8
Indice S&P 500 (net 15%) 10,2 10,9

Rendements sectoriels (en devise locale) de l’indice MSCI Monde tous pays au 3ème trim.
3 MEILLEURS

13,3 %

Technologies de l’information

12,0 %

Services de communicationcommuni-cation

11,8 %

Matériaux

3 MOINS BONS

3,6 %

Santé

3,0 %

Immobilier

-1,3 %

Biens de consommation de base

Rendements des pays (en devise locale) de l’indice MSCI Monde tous pays au 3ème trim.
3 MEILLEURS

23,1 %

Pérou

20,5 %

Egypte

19,8 %

Chine

3 MOINS BONS

-3,3 %

Inde

-4,6 %

Philippines

-13,0 %

Danemark

Actions canadiennes

Stratégies d’actions canadiennes T3 (%) Cumul annuel (%)
Stratégie fondamentale d’actions canadiennes CC&L 11,0 21,2
Stratégie d’actions canadiennes de revenu et de croissance CC&L 7,8 17,6
Actions de revenu et de croissance plus CC&L 9,0 18,6
Stratégie d’actions canadiennes Q de base CC&L 11,7 24,9
Stratégie d’actions canadiennes Q croissance CC&L 12,1 26,1
Stratégie d’actions canadiennes Q CC&L (stratégie d’extension)1 13,0 28,2
Stratégie d’actions canadiennes combinées CC&L (Q de base & fondamentale) 11,4 23,0
S&P/TSX composé 12,5 23,9
Stratégie fondamentale d’actions canadiennes à petite/moyenne capitalisation CC&L 15,1 29,9
60 % indice des titres à petite capitalisation S&P/TSX + 40 % indice complémentaire S&P/TSX 19,0 34,4

Rendements sectoriels de l’indice composé S&P/TSX au 3ème trim.
3 MEILLEURS

37,8 %

Matériaux

13,2 %

Technologies de l’information

12,6 %

Énergie

3 MOINS BONS

3,7 %

Consommation discrétionnaire

1,6 %

Biens de consommation de base

-1,4 %

Industrie

Titres à revenu fixe canadiens

Stratégies de titres à revenu fixe T3 (%) Cumul annuel (%)
Stratégie d’obligations de base CC&L 1,9 3,4
Stratégie d’obligations universelle alpha plus CC&L1 1,6 4,4
Stratégie de titres à revenu fixe de base plus CC&L 2,0 3,4
Stratégie d’obligations à haut rendement CC&L2 2,9 5,2
Indice obligataire universel FTSE Canada 1,5 3,0
Stratégie d’obligations à long terme CC&L 1,6 1,2
Stratégie d’obligations à long terme alpha plus CC&L1 1,3 2,1
Indice obligataire global à long terme FTSE Canada 1,2 0,6
Stratégie d’obligations à court terme CC&L 1,4 3,5
Indice obligataire global à court terme FTSE Canada 1,3 3,5
Stratégie marché monétaire CC&L 0,7 2,3
Indice des Bons du Trésor à 91 jours FTSE Canada 0,7 2,2
Évolution des marchés obligataires
FixedIncome_Chart1-Q2-2025_FR_NEW
FixedIncome_Chart2-Q2-2025_FR_NEW

Stratégies équilibrées

Stratégies équilibrées T3 (%) Cumul annuel (%)
Stratégie équilibrée CC&L 7,2 13,3
25 % Indice composé S&P/TSX & 35 % MSCI ACWI Net ($ CA)
& 40 % Indice obligataire universel FTSE Canada
7,1 12,2
Équilibré bonifié CC&L 7,1 13,4
20 % Indice composé S&P/TSX & 40 % Indice MSCI Monde tous pays
($ CA) (net) & 40 % Indice obligataire universel FTSE Canada
6,9 11,8
Stratégie revenu et croissance de base CC&L 7,5 15,2
Indice composé S&P/TSX à 50 % / Indice plafonné des FPI S&P/TSX à 25 % /
Indice obligataire toutes les sociétés FTSE Canada à 25 %
7,7 16,2

Stratégies de rendement absolu

Stratégies de rendement absolu1 T3 (%) Cumul annuel (%)
Stratégies multiples CC&L 0,0 5,9
Toutes stratégies CC&L -0,3 4,9
Stratégies fondamentales d’actions neutres par rapport au marché CC&L -6,1 -3,9
Stratégie d’actions mondiales Q neutre au marché CC&L (Canada) 1,9 9,1
Stratégie de revenu fixe à rendement absolu CC&L 2,6 3,4
Fonds d’obligations à rendement absolu CC&L 2,4 3,6
Indice des Bons du Trésor à 91 jours FTSE Canada 0,7 2,2

Gestion de placements Connor, Clark & Lunn Ltée

Fondée en 1982, Gestion de placements Connor, Clark & Lunn est une société fermée de gestion de placements qui a à cœur d’offrir un service exceptionnel et une vaste gamme de solutions de placement intéressantes à sa clientèle diversifiée, qui comprend des particuliers, des régimes de retraite, des sociétés, des fondations, des membres des Premières Nations et d’autres organisations. Nous nous employons à répondre aux besoins de nos clients en matière de placement en leur offrant des stratégies de placement complètes qui comprennent des catégories d’actif traditionnelles ou non, de même qu’une diversité de styles axés sur des facteurs quantitatifs et fondamentaux.


Toutes les données, à l’exception des indices MSCI sont en date du 30 septembre 2025 et sont exprimées en dollars canadiens ($ CA). Sources : Groupe financier Connor, Clark & Lunn Ltée, FTSE Global Debt Capital Markets Inc., MSCI Inc., Thomson Reuters Datastream et S&P. Les rendements des portefeuilles sont des données préliminaires, fondées sur un compte représentatif de la stratégie applicable et peuvent changer. Sauf indication contraire, les rendements sont présentés avant déduction des frais. Le rendement brut est présenté après déduction des frais de négociation et d’exploitation, mais avant déduction des frais de gestion et des commissions de rendement, selon le cas. Les frais d’exploitation comprennent des éléments comme les frais de garde pour les comptes distincts et, dans le cas des fonds en gestion commune, ils comprennent aussi des frais d’évaluation et d’audit ainsi que des frais fiscaux et juridiques. Les frais de gestion et les frais d’exploitation additionnels réduiront les rendements réels des investisseurs. 1. Ces stratégies sont assujetties à des frais de rendement, lesquels réduiront davantage les rendements réels obtenus par les investisseurs. 2. La Stratégie d’obligations à haut rendement CC&L s’appuie sur un indice de référence personnalisé. Pour en savoir plus, veuillez communiquer avec nous.

Pour de plus amples renseignements sur le rendement, veuillez communiquer avec nous à [email protected].

Sources : MSCI Inc. Les données de MSCI sont destinées uniquement à l’usage interne. Elles ne peuvent être reproduites ni rediffusées sous quelque forme que ce soit et ne peuvent être utilisées pour créer des instruments, des produits ou des indices financiers. MSCI ne donne aucune garantie et ne fait aucune déclaration, explicite ou implicite, et ne peut être tenue responsable quant aux données présentées ici. MSCI n’a pas approuvé, revu ou produit le présent document.

Brazil and Mexico flags.

During a research trip to São Paulo this summer, our team met with the management teams of some of our holdings, with prospective investments and with local investors. We observed that consumer demand in Brazil is stronger than expected, particularly in higher-end categories. Companies we like such as Vivara Participações S.A. (VIVA3 SA) and Track & Field Co S.A. (TFCO4 SA) benefit from this consumer strength and offer a compelling risk reward given where these stocks traded during beginning of the year.

Local market behaviour remains distinctly short term, with high turnover and a focus on the next-quarter results. This is largely driven by the elevated Selic policy rate, currently at 15%, which leads investors to assess opportunities on an absolute-return basis rather than seeking alpha. With inflation near 5%, real yields approach 10%, creating a persuasive risk-free alternative that diverts capital from equities. In turn, local equity managers are adjusting their styles to retain AUM.

Banco Central do Brasil Target for Federal Funds rate (Selic)
A bar graph illustrating Central Bank of Brazil target for federal funds rate (Selic) over the last decade.
Source: Banco central do Brasil

These dynamics reinforce our long-term approach: concentrating on high-quality businesses with durable earnings power and consistent EPS expansion. Looking ahead, with elections approaching and potential rate cuts on the horizon, we expect a reallocation of flows from fixed income back into equities, benefiting companies with strong fundamentals and clear earnings visibility.

Key players in Brazil’s political landscape

Brazil’s political landscape is already taking shape as the country heads toward the 2026 elections. One of the most significant developments is the exclusion of Jair Bolsonaro from contention. His ineligibility through 2030, reinforced by a conviction earlier this month, effectively removes the most polarizing figure on the right. In his absence, the centre-right governor of São Paulo, Tarcísio de Freitas, is emerging as the most likely challenger to President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (also known as “Lula”) in a potential second-round runoff. This dynamic sets up a more conventional contest between a centre-left incumbent and a pragmatic, reform-minded conservative.

For Lula, the current year has been a test of political resilience. His approval ratings hit a low point of around 24% in February 2025, but have since rebounded modestly, reaching roughly 33% by September according to Datafolha surveys. The recovery suggests some stability, though his support remains fragile, reflecting persistent dissatisfaction with the pace of economic recovery and concerns about fiscal policy. Nevertheless, the directional improvement offers the president some breathing room as he navigates the second half of his term.

From the perspective of markets, the electoral outlook carries important implications. A Lula re-election would imply continuity in the Workers’ Party approach: a more active state role in economic management, coupled with efforts to demonstrate adherence to Brazil’s new fiscal framework. Investor reaction would likely hinge on whether the government can maintain a credible path to primary balance and on its stance toward state-controlled enterprises such as Petrobras, where governance remains a focal concern. By contrast, a victory for a centre-right figure like Freitas would be interpreted as a more reformist and privatization-friendly outcome. Such a scenario could lower perceived political risk, reduce risk premia and prove supportive for equities and local rates markets.

Mexico rates, USMCA and tariffs

Headline inflation in Mexico remained relatively stable, with the Consumer Price Index (CPI) registering a 3.57% year-over-year increase in August. Preliminary mid-September data suggests a slight acceleration to approximately 3.7%. Inflation expectations continue to trend downward. The Bank of Mexico’s (Banxico) August private-sector survey shows a further decline in median inflation forecasts for both 2025 and 2026, signaling growing confidence in price stability.

On September 25, Banxico lowered its policy rate to 7.50%, executing a 25 basis point cut. The decision was not unanimous, reflecting differing views within the board. Forward guidance remains cautious, as core inflation is decelerating only gradually. Reuters notes that while the easing cycle supports domestic demand and longer-term fixed income instruments, external factors – particularly the pace of US Federal Reserve rate cuts or potential tariff shocks – will ultimately drive risk premiums in Mexican assets.

In 2026, the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA) is scheduled for its first mandatory joint review. At that point, the three countries must decide whether to extend the agreement for another 16 years, renegotiate its terms or allow it to transition into annual reviews. The outcome will directly affect trade certainty and tariff exposure in North America. Currently, approximately half of Mexico’s exports to the United States do not qualify under USMCA’s origin requirements and are therefore vulnerable to a 25% US tariff. Goods meeting the agreement’s rules of origin continue to benefit from duty-free treatment, but non-compliant products face higher costs and stricter enforcement.

In parallel, Mexico has recently imposed tariffs of between 10–50% on a wide range of imports from China, including auto parts, textiles, steel and consumer goods. This move underscores Mexico’s effort to shield domestic industries from low-cost Chinese competition, but also adds a layer of complexity to supply-chain strategies for companies operating across the region.

The 2026 review will thus be a critical inflection point: it could either reaffirm the stability of North American trade or introduce uncertainty through renegotiation and tariff escalation.