An LNG tanker at a gas terminal.

AI infrastructure investment has moved upstream. The advent of ChatGPT, Claude and other AI applications fueled demand for semiconductor chips that enable the software to “think.” The demand concurrently brought about record capital expenditures to build out hyperscale data centres housing those chips. Now the bottleneck is even more basic: power. For AI, electricity is no longer a utility input; it is strategic infrastructure.

Data centre growth needs energy – a lot of it

That shift is colliding with a US grid whose expansion is constrained at multiple points: new generators are stuck in interconnection queues; interstate transmission still requires approvals across multiple jurisdictions; transformer shortages are delaying grid upgrades; and local opposition is increasingly slowing or cancelling data centre projects. North American Electric Reliability Corporation’s 2025 long-term reliability assessment warned that 13 of 23 North American assessment areas face resource-adequacy challenges over the next decade, underscoring that the issue is not only energy volume, but deliverability and reliability.

Electric Power Research Institute’s Powering Intelligence 2026 report makes the same point from the data centre side. Its “Generation and Capacity Impacts of Data Center Load” analysis finds that data centre growth could require large additions of generation and transmission capacity, but that supply-chain, siting and permitting constraints may limit how fast those additions arrive. In least-cost scenarios, incremental data centre load is met primarily by new and existing gas generation rather than carbon-free resources.

Getting power to where it’s hard to get

That naturally explains the recent order flow into large reciprocating engines. In April, the Finnish vessel engine manufacturer Wärtsilä Oyj Abp announced a 790 MW off-grid power solution for a new Texas data centre facility, using its 50SG natural gas engines. Wärtsilä explicitly framed the order around fast access to reliable power in a region where the grid cannot adequately meet urgent AI-infrastructure demand. Around the same time, the Korean shipbuilder HD Hyundai Heavy Industries Co. Ltd. disclosed that it had signed a US data centre power generation equipment contract based on its 20 MW-class HiMSEN engines, citing total capacity of 684 MW.

The appeal is straightforward. Large reciprocating engines are modular, dispatchable, fast-starting, scalable in increments and deployable closer to load than central-station plants. Compared with combined-cycle gas turbines, nuclear projects or major transmission upgrades, they can often be installed in shorter phases and avoid waiting years for grid interconnection. For a data centre developer, speed-to-power can be as important as cost-of-power.

Maintaining engine power at sea and on land

HD Hyundai Marine Solution Co. Ltd. (443060 KS) in our Emerging Markets Small Cap Strategy is the sole authorized provider of maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) aftermarket services to HiMSEN engines worldwide. As a HD Hyundai-affiliate, the company benefits from having HD Hyundai Heavy Industries – the world’s second largest shipbuilder and the largest manufacturer of medium-speed 4-stroke vessel engines – as a captive market. Of approximately 17,000 HiMSEN units in operation globally (most of them generating power for over 4,000 ships at sea), roughly 2,000 units are generating power on the ground.

Could data centres move offshore?

Mitsui O.S.K. Lines and Karpowership’s Kinetics have already signed a memorandum of understanding to develop what they describe as the world’s first integrated floating data centre platform, hosted on a retrofitted vessel and supplied by a powership capable of using LNG. In that scenario, vessel-engine makers are also powering the physical layer of AI.

Photo of the Crestpoint team in front of the King + Park construction site.  

Crestpoint Real Estate Investments is pleased to continue its partnership with Vestcor and Anthem Properties on King + Park, a landmark mixed-use masterplan at the gateway to Burnaby. Joined by the Mayor of Burnaby and other guests, Crestpoint, Vestcor and Anthem celebrated the project’s ceremonial groundbreaking on June 1, 2026.

Situated in a transit-oriented setting, the full King + Park masterplan includes:

  • 724 rental homes in two towers over a shared podium (Phase 1 now under construction)
  • Restoration of the iconic Boot Office Tower
  • 512,350 sq ft of retained and restored office space (the Boot)
  • 43,402 sq ft of commercial space delivered across all phases
  • 1,559 strata homes (future phase)

As Max Rosenfeld, Executive Vice President and Head of Asset Management at Crestpoint, noted, King + Park is “a distinct opportunity to honour heritage and reimagine a site simultaneously,” and Crestpoint is thrilled to be partnering on a vision that will have a positive, lasting impact.

Eurozone and UK April money numbers signal rising recession risk and suggest that policy-makers should be considering easing not tightening.

Three-month annualised growth of Eurozone narrow money – as measured by non-financial M1 – slumped from 5.3% to 1.5% between January and April. UK growth fell from 3.8% to 0.7% over the same period, with a large contraction in April alone.

The nominal slowdowns compound a squeeze on real money from consumer price acceleration due to the Gulf War III supply shock. Six-month momentum of real narrow money fell to zero in the UK in April while turning negative in the Eurozone – see chart 1.

Chart 1

Chart 1 showing Real Narrow Money (% 6m)

Real money contractions have been a recession warning signal historically. An obvious push-back is that much greater weakness in 2022-23 was not reflected in a subsequent economic slump. Negative momentum was a misleading indicator of monetary conditions then because of a large overhang from the 2020-21 money growth surge. There is no such overhang now, so dismissing current weakness on the basis of that experience is dangerous.

Broad money trends are also worrying, with nominal growth of only 3.5% and 3.6% annualised respectively in Eurozone non-financial M3 and UK non-financial M4 in the three months to April. US broad money, by contrast, expanded at a 7.6% pace over the same period (M2+ measure).

Globally, six-month real narrow money momentum fell for a second month in April, supporting the forecast of a fall in manufacturing PMI new orders during H2 – chart 2.

Chart 2

Chart 2 showing Global Manufacturing PMI New Orders & G7 + E7 Real Narrow Money (% 6m)

Scenic downtown Vancouver financial district building near Robson square.

Equity markets have continued to reach new highs despite a backdrop that, on the surface, should be far less supportive. War in the Middle East, elevated oil prices, tighter financial conditions and policy uncertainty have done little to derail risk appetite. There have been periods of volatility along the way, but none have meaningfully disrupted the broader trend higher. Instead, equities have rallied, credit markets have remained firm, and investors have repeatedly looked through shocks that, in prior cycles, may have triggered a more meaningful repricing.

The engines behind the rally

The strength in equity markets is being driven by an alignment of two forces that are both unusually powerful and highly concentrated.

At the centre is the AI-led investment cycle, which stands out not simply due to the scale of the capex cycle (Chart 1), but its structure. Investment is being driven by a small group of hyperscalers committing unprecedented sums to data centres and supporting infrastructure that by some estimates could reach USD$5 trillion over the next five years; increasingly, companies are tapping global credit markets to fund it. Credit markets, notably, are not acting as a constraint. Heavy issuance has been readily absorbed, with strong demand keeping spreads tight even as supply increases. In Canada, Alphabet’s inaugural maple bond issue amounted to a record CAD$8.5 billion and was very well absorbed. In effect, funding conditions are enabling, not limiting, the economic expansion.

Chart 1: US tech investment has surged
A line graph showing US tech investment against its trendline illustrated as percentage of GDP from 1980 to present.Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis, Macrobond

At the same time, corporate earnings have been unequivocally strong. The S&P 500 is on track to deliver approximately 28% year-over-year earnings growth in Q1, the fastest pace since 2021. More importantly, this strength has been broad-based. Ten sectors are reporting earnings growth, with seven sectors posting double-digit gains, spanning technology, financials, industrials and materials (Chart 2).

Chart 2: US earnings growth strong and broad-based
Bar graph illustrating the S&P 500 earnings growth year over year for the first quarter of 2026 with broad-based growth across sectors.Source: FactSet. Note: As of May 21, 2026

While earnings are broad, what is driving revisions, sentiment and capital allocation is a relatively small group of AI and AI-adjacent companies. Yet despite the scale of investment, its direct contribution to GDP growth is still limited. What makes the current environment unusual is that the rally is not purely speculative, as earnings are delivering. So long as the combination of broad earnings resilience holds alongside a concentrated growth engine, the path higher can remain intact.

Disappearing downside risks

If the engine explains the direction of markets, the persistence of the rally reflects the repeated failure of risks to materialize. Geopolitics is the clearest example, with the disruption in the Strait of Hormuz raising oil prices significantly, but not to levels consistent with the scale of the shock. Meanwhile, other macro risks are also being largely looked through. Labour markets continue to soften, though this appears to be bottoming, leaving employment and income growth still sufficient to sustain consumption.

Importantly, inflation has proven persistent. April US producer prices rose sharply, with headline PPI increasing 1.4% month over month, reflecting a surge in energy-related components. Beneath the surface, however, the picture appears benign. Core consumer goods prices in the April CPI report were flat on the month, and core services, while sticky, have not accelerated meaningfully (Chart 3). Additionally, the transmission mechanism appears weaker than in prior cycles – including the post-pandemic period – when rapid wage gains and highly stimulative fiscal and monetary policy reinforced inflation across the economy.

Chart 3: Core services prices relatively contained
Line graph illustrating core (ex energy and rent of shelter) services CPI inflation over time from 2015 to present.Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics, Macrobond

Markets are not ignoring risks – they are observing that those risks are not translating into negative earnings or growth outcomes and are adjusting accordingly. With each risk that passes without consequence, markets grow more conditioned to look through shocks. Concern fades faster, and positioning rebuilds more quickly.

What could break this positive risk sentiment?

Bond yields have been moving higher, with front-end rates rising sharply and yield curves flattening, a combination typically associated with tightening financial conditions. Since the start of the conflict, US 10-year yields have risen materially, and 30-year yields have breached the psychologically important 5% threshold. Front-end rates have risen even more aggressively, reflecting both inflation pressure and resilient growth. At the same time, risk assets have continued to rally alongside this move, an unusual late-cycle dynamic that is resulting in a system drifting toward ever higher interest rates. Interestingly, the same forces supporting risk assets are also contributing to this tightening. The AI-driven investment cycle is sustaining demand, reinforcing inflation pressures (Chart 4), and keeping policy more restrictive than markets might otherwise expect. In that sense, the optimism driving the rally is also what prevents policy from easing.

Chart 4: Near-term inflation pressures building
Line graph illustrating the producer price index for electronic components and accessories on a year-over-year basis, showing a sharp increase since Q2 2025.Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics, Macrobond

This creates a growing tension. Historically, higher discount rates and tighter financial conditions have weighed on equity valuations. Policy adds another layer of uncertainty. Central banks are moving away from an easing bias, with growing inflation risks. They are concerned about allowing inflation expectations to become unhinged from their target levels, should the narrow commodity price shock pass through into a reacceleration of core inflation (although the current assumption is that energy disruptions are temporary and manageable). Additionally, in the US, the transition to a new Federal Reserve Chair introduces another unknown that could reverse the previous regime’s flexibility.

Portfolio strategy

In balanced portfolios, positioning remains modestly underweight equities and fixed income. This stance was implemented at the end of the first quarter as markets entered an “inflation shock first, growth risk later” phase. Recession risks have since moderated, leading equities to now trade near all-time highs, embedding relatively optimistic growth assumptions. As a result, patience and flexibility remain important. We look to add risk opportunistically during periods of market weakness or positioning-driven selloffs. We favour Canadian equities over US equities, with a secular positive view on Canada.

Within fixed income portfolios, the environment remains challenging as strong growth, sticky inflation and higher energy prices continue to put upward pressure on bond yields. Markets have steadily reduced expectations for interest rate cuts and begun to price the possibility of rate hikes in both Canada and the US. This has resulted in yield curve flattening and higher rates. We expect this trend to continue, though not in a linear fashion. Duration exposure will continue to be managed tactically with a bias to be shorter-than-benchmark, with an emphasis on flexibility rather than large directional positions.

Fundamental equity portfolios remain positioned around businesses with resilient earnings. While the broader recovery remains intact, we have paused further increases in cyclical exposure to help mitigate downside risk. We have also reduced exposure to business models most vulnerable to AI-driven disruption, while selectively increasing exposure to sectors positioned to benefit from the broader AI-related capex and infrastructure cycle, including commodity-linked industries.

The current environment continues to favour an opportunistic approach, and we look to add to risk cautiously.

An expected fall in global manufacturing PMI new orders suggests a moderation, at least, in current earnings strength.

New orders reached a four-plus-year high in April but DM flash results imply a pull-back in May. The forecast here is for a further decline in H2, reflecting an inflation-driven slowdown in global six-month real narrow money momentum from a February peak – see chart 1.

Chart 1

Chart 1 showing Global Manufacturing PMI New Orders & G7 + E7 Real Narrow Money (% 6m)

A further consideration is that orders have been boosted recently by demand front-loading and stockbuilding motivated by supply concerns, implying future payback.

PMI new orders are contemporaneously correlated with MSCI World earnings revisions, whether expressed in terms of the revisions ratio (net proportion of analyst estimates upgraded each month) or the one-month percentage change in aggregate forecast earnings per share – chart 2.

Chart 2

Chart 2 showing Global Manufacturing PMI New Orders & MSCI ACWI Earnings Revisions (IBES, sa)

Both revisions measures remained strong in May but the expected new orders decline suggests a moderation, at least, ahead.

Current earnings strength is focused on the US and AI-spend beneficiaries, with downgrades in Europe, China and EM ex. Korea / Taiwan – chart 3. The suggestion of European relative weakness was echoed in the flash PMIs.

Chart 3

Chart 3 showing Earnings Revisions Ratios (MSCI Indices, IBES, sa)

Sector wise, IT extended its lead, with consumer sectors continuing to suffer earnings downgrades – chart 4. The revisions ratio gaps between IT and consumer discretionary / staples reached new records in data extending back to 1995 – another manifestation of economic disparities.

Chart 4

Chart 4 showing MSCI World Sector Earnings Revisions Ratios (IBES, sa)

A hand holding a computer microchip with a motherboard in the background.

China’s semiconductor ambitions returned to the spotlight following the recent meeting between President Trump and President Xi. While the US administration reportedly signaled willingness to permit exports of certain downgraded or older-generation AI GPUs into China, the more notable takeaway may have been China’s relatively muted reaction. Rather than relying on controlled access to foreign technology, China appears increasingly focused on accelerating the development of its own semiconductor ecosystem.

While the AI cycle continues to demonstrate remarkable strength, China’s push toward semiconductor self-reliance increasingly appears to represent an additional structural driver for the industry – one that could persist largely independent of the pace or duration of the current AI infrastructure cycle.

A focus on a domestic opportunity for self-reliance

The scale of the opportunity remains significant. China is already the world’s largest semiconductor consumption market, representing well over USD200 billion of annual chip demand and likely continuing to grow meaningfully over the coming decade. Yet domestic self-sufficiency across many semiconductor categories remains relatively low, leaving substantial room for domestic substitution over time. Even within analog and power semiconductors – categories generally viewed as more achievable for domestic suppliers – the opportunity remains large. Industry estimates suggest China’s power management semiconductor demand alone already represents a multi-billion-dollar market, while domestic suppliers still account for a relatively modest share. If China materially increases domestic semiconductor content over the coming years, tens of billions of dollars of annual value could gradually shift toward Chinese suppliers.

China still faces important technological bottlenecks. Advanced EUV lithography remains effectively inaccessible, while gaps persist across certain leading-edge manufacturing equipment, inspection and metrology tools and advanced materials. However, recent developments suggest China continues to make incremental progress across multiple parts of the semiconductor stack despite these restrictions. Domestic memory players have advanced meaningfully in NAND and DRAM, while progress in high-bandwidth memory (HBM), advanced packaging and other areas continues to evolve. More broadly, as the saying goes, necessity is often the mother of invention, and technological constraints themselves can become catalysts for accelerated domestic innovation.

Lessons from solar, batteries and EVs

Importantly, China has already demonstrated an ability to achieve global scale and competitiveness in industries once dominated by foreign incumbents. The country now holds leading positions across solar panels, batteries and electric vehicles, while also becoming increasingly competitive in industrial automation and advanced manufacturing more broadly. Regardless of one’s geopolitical perspective, China’s long-term willingness to commit capital, engineering talent and policy support toward strategic industries should not be underestimated.

As the AI infrastructure cycle evolves, bottlenecks have gradually expanded beyond AI accelerators and memory into broader areas of the semiconductor supply chain. More recently, power management integrated circuits (PMICs) have emerged as an area experiencing tighter supply-demand dynamics, driven by rising demand from data centres and AI infrastructure. AI servers require increasingly sophisticated power architectures, translating into higher semiconductor content and more advanced PMIC requirements. These products typically command higher pricing and more attractive margins, while stronger AI-related demand may also help stabilize pricing conditions across broader analog semiconductor markets.

Against this backdrop, we believe companies positioned within China’s domestic semiconductor ecosystem could benefit from these longer-term trends. One example within our Emerging Markets portfolio is Silergy Corp. (6415 TT), a China-based analog semiconductor company and one of China’s leading domestic suppliers of PMICs.

Why PMICs are important

PMICs are semiconductors responsible for regulating and distributing electrical power within electronic systems, helping ensure that processors, servers, vehicles and industrial equipment receive power efficiently, reliably and safely. Unlike leading-edge AI accelerators, analog and power management semiconductors are embedded across a broad range of everyday electronic applications.

Headquartered in Hangzhou, Silergy designs analog and mixed-signal semiconductors serving industrial, automotive, consumer electronics, computing and communications applications. While the company is gaining increasing exposure to AI servers and data-centre-related applications, its business remains diversified across multiple end markets, which in our view provides a more balanced way to participate in both semiconductor self-reliance and broader electronics content growth.

Silergy is already one of China’s leading domestic PMIC suppliers, yet its market share within China’s broader analog and power semiconductor market likely remains relatively small, suggesting a potentially long runway for continued share gains over time.

While market attention remains concentrated on the most visible AI beneficiaries, some of the more durable investment opportunities may emerge deeper within the semiconductor supply chain and away from the headlines. China’s semiconductor ambitions could ultimately prove to be one of the more important long-term trends still unfolding beneath the surface of today’s AI cycle.

Night view of Taichung, Taiwan.

Emerging market equities have outperformed the rest of the world year to date.

Line graph illustrating the MSCI Price indices over the first 5 months of 2026, for the markets of US, Japan, Eurozone, UK and EM.
Source: NS Partners and LSEG Datastream

The asset class is decisively breaking out of a long-run trend of underperforming developed markets.

Line graph illustrating MSCI Emerging markets performance relative to the MSCI World since 2018.
Source: Bank of America, May 2026.

What is driving the turnaround? Looking at contributions to returns since 2023, earnings have been the clear driver for emerging market equities, with multiple expansion only a minor contributor.

Bar graph illustrating the total returns breakdown of different MSCI regions since 2023, highlighting EM.
Source: Jefferies quant research, April 2026.

Earnings growth has been the key driver
A line graph comparing IBES MSCI The World weighted average EPS 12 months forward to IBES MSCI Emerging markets since 2020.
Source: NS Partners and LSEG Datastream.

In fact, for the year to date as at the end of April, valuation compression has been a headwind for the asset class.

A bar graph illustrating the total returns breakdown of MSCI regions, highlighting EM with the highest forward EPS contribution.
Source: Jefferies quant research, April 2026.

EM equities are now cheaper than they were in beginning of 2025 despite strong returns.

A line graph comparing the price to forward earnings ratios of US, EAFE and emerging markets MSCI Indices since 1990.
Source: NS Partners and LSEG Datastream.

We flagged in previous pieces that the signals we track suggested emerging market equities were positioned to outperform their developed market counterparts. Based on the headline numbers it appears this call has been vindicated (albeit over a short period) with the welcome combination of cheaper valuations and a strengthening earnings outlook.

What got us particularly excited was the potential for a US dollar bear market driving a new virtuous circle, as illustrated below.

A image illustrating the stages of the virtuous circle: weaker USD, EM currency appreciates, easing inflationary pressure, central bank easing, Improving liquidity, capital flows improve; debt service costs fall, stronger corporate earnings, strong EM equities; risk-on environment, flows to risk assets.

We have had positive spurts in a number of markets which enjoyed easing currency pressure courtesy of a falling dollar and better liquidity. However, this has been overwhelmed by the US AI boom which is bleeding out into emerging markets with North Asia the clear winner.

It has been a narrow rally driven by US capex and the AI supply chain

This dramatic improvement in earnings and performance largely reflects a boom in South Korean and Taiwan tech companies. If you strip these markets out of EM, the return picture for the wider asset class is subdued.

YTD outperformance of EM equities has been entirely due to Korea/Taiwan, with the rest of the asset class lagging DM
Line graph comparing the MSCI Price Indices of US, Japan, Eurozone, UK, EM, EM ex Korea & Taiwan, and China since December 31, 2025.
Source: NS Partners and LSEG Datastream

The demand boom for key technologies that underpin the infrastructure needed to meet a massive build out of AI technologies and the flow through to earnings growth is swamping interest in other positive stories across the asset class.

We are modestly overweight AI supply chain leaders in South Korea and Taiwan, who control key supply bottlenecks across memory and logic chips, thermal cooling, signals and switching, electrification and data centre assembly. Earnings growth and margins for these companies are downstream of rising investment from US hyperscalers seeking vast amounts of compute power to develop cutting-edge large language models.

A bar graph showing that quarterly capital spending indicators are increasing, considering the spending by Amazon, Google, Microsoft, Meta, Oracle and data centre construction.
Source: Koyfin, April 2026.

Portfolio names in these areas have posted outstanding gains over the last 12 months. While we have been quick to trim positions when stock valuations exceed what we think is reasonable, we have not run away from the rally and have maintained the overweight as we can see the fundamentals accelerating. For example, the supply-demand mismatch for high bandwidth memory is so great that memory giants SK Hynix and Samsung Electronics are now among the most profitable companies in the world.

A table showing the estimated 2026 top global companies by operating profit, highlighting Samsung Electronics at number 2, and SK hynix at number 4.
Source: Jefferies March 2026.

Earnings growth in South Korea has been so strong that valuations still look modest despite the market doubling

Samsung Electronics, Hynix and Micron are the only three companies in the world capable of producing HBM chips that are crucial components in Nvidia GPU clusters. And yet, Samsung and Hynix trade at a price to earnings multiples of less than 5x.

Two bar graphs. The first showing Next twelve months price-to-earnings ratio of KOSPI, MSCI AC Asia ex Japan, STOXX 600, S&P 500. The second graph shows next twelve months price-to-book ratio of those same indices.
Source: Deutsche Bank 2026.

Optically, cheap valuations reflect a market view that these remain deeply cyclical businesses in an industry with a history of violent booms and busts and thus lack the durability in the earnings growth to award a higher multiple.

Looking at the table above, there may be a good argument that the DRAM giants are over-earning and will attract competitors. On the other hand, we are mindful that AI innovation represents a major technological shift and the possibility that this could structurally alter demand dynamics in an oligopolistic industry controlling essential and hard to replicate technologies.

Maintaining conviction with tight risk management

While the pace of capex spending by the US hyperscalers and the cash flows going to hardware suppliers is extraordinary, the parabolic stock moves in a number of the names that we hold naturally make us twitchy. Major uncertainty remains over how LLM technologies will evolve and be monetised, whether competitor frameworks will gain dominance, and if real-world bottlenecks in memory and energy may ultimately slow the pace of development.

We have been careful to trim winners and recycle profits elsewhere in emerging markets where we are seeing other opportunities that excite us. Equally, relatively modest valuations and earnings visibility on our time horizon represent a significant upside risk which leaves us happy to maintain our overweight to the AI supply chain.

A silhouette of high voltage power lines against a colorful sky at sunrise.

Earnings remain resilient, but growth is concentrated, macro risks are building and selectivity is becoming critical.

Resilience in a tense environment

The Q1 reporting season underscores a growing divergence in global earnings. While US earnings growth remains robust, it is increasingly concentrated in AI-related industries. In contrast, Europe remains in a low-growth, late-cycle environment, while Japan continues to benefit from structural tailwinds. At the same time, a gap is emerging between the AI narrative and broader earnings. While AI-related sectors are seeing strong growth, the benefits have yet to spread across the wider economy.

The conflict in Iran has driven a sharp rise in oil prices and renewed volatility across equities and bonds, reflecting concerns around inflation and energy supply disruptions. It has also led markets to reassess the path of interest rates, with higher energy costs reducing the likelihood of near-term policy easing. This could test the resilience of corporate earnings through 2026.

So far, corporate earnings in developed markets have been more resilient than expected, despite successive macro shocks. Part of this resilience reflects lessons learned over the past five years. The pandemic period, in particular, has led to improved inventory management, stronger cost discipline and a greater willingness to implement cost optimization programs. More broadly, companies appear better equipped to manage their cost base, and in some cases, have demonstrated persistent pricing power. This has been particularly evident in industrials and technology, where contract structures and product differentiation have enabled effective price pass-through. These factors have helped preserve margins even as demand has plateaued or softened.

However, without a swift resolution to the conflict in Iran, global growth could decelerate further, exposing more vulnerable areas of the market. Discretionary spending, manufacturing and energy-intensive sectors such as transportation and logistics are likely to be most at risk. Rate-sensitive sectors, including residential real estate and REITs, could also face valuation pressure.

Looking at the broad small-cap market, balance sheets are structurally more fragile today than they were a decade ago when companies were deleveraging following the Global Financial Crisis. In the current environment, smaller companies are more exposed to rising interest costs and refinancing risk, particularly at the lower end of the quality spectrum.

Positioning for resilience

In this environment, a quality-focused approach centred on sustainable EPS growth remains critical. Our strategy continues to prioritize companies with strong balance sheets and high returns on equity.

As illustrated by our portfolio characteristics, our Global and International Small Cap strategies exhibit the following attributes:

End of March 2026 Global Small Cap vs. Index International Small Cap vs. Index
Leverage (Net debt/EBITDA) Leverage is ~74% lower than the benchmark Leverage is ~83% lower than the benchmark
Operating margin +558 bps above the benchmark +937 bps above the benchmark
Return on equity + 451bps above the benchmark +407 bps above the benchmark
Forward EPS growth +793 bps above the benchmark +750bps above the benchmark

Source: IDA, Bloomberg, MSCI

The lower leverage of these strategies points to less balance-sheet risk and better ability to navigate higher-for-longer rates. At the same time, the higher operating margins and stronger ROE, alongside faster forward EPS growth, are indicative of higher-quality businesses with more durable profitability and earnings power than the benchmark.

In addition, we continue to focus on companies exposed to structural growth drivers. Themes such as electrification, automation, health-care innovation, defence and reshoring offer improved visibility over the medium term. These areas can provide both defensive characteristics in a slowdown and operating leverage in a recovery.

The ECB and Bank of England have signalled an expectation of policy tightening, while the latest Fed statement maintained an easing bias. Economic / monetary conditions argue for the opposite relative positions.

Eurozone core inflation is lower than in the US, labour market indicators softer, money growth slower and credit conditions weaker. The UK resembles the Eurozone in most of these respects.

Last week’s ECB bank lending survey signalled tighter credit standards and notably weaker loan demand – see previous post and chart 1. The corresponding Fed survey this week, by contrast, shows little change from last quarter – chart 2. (Note that the Fed survey asks about current conditions, while the ECB survey additionally canvasses expectations.)

Chart 1

Chart 1 showing Eurozone ECB Bank Lending Survey Credit Demand & Supply Indicators* *Average of Balances across Loan Categories

Chart 2

Chart 2 showing US Fed Senior Loan Officer Survey Credit Demand & Supply Indicators* *Average of Balances across Loan Categories

The last Bank of England credit conditions survey, released on 9 April, was benign but partly pre-dated Gulf hostilities.

US annual broad money growth – as measured by “M2+”* – was 5.9% in March versus an increase of 3.3% in both Eurozone non-financial M3 and UK non-financial M4 – chart 3.

Chart 3

Chart 3 showing Broad Money (% yoy)

US annual core PCE inflation rose to 3.2% in March versus a Eurozone core CPI increase of 2.2% in both March and April. UK core CPI inflation was 3.1% in March but the number still incorporates a boost from large rises in water bills and vehicle excise duty last April – the policy-adjusted measure calculated here was 2.7%.

The US trimmed mean PCE inflation measure preferred by incoming Fed Chair Warsh was 2.4% in March but there are no Eurozone / UK numbers for comparison. The calculation excludes 31% and 24% respectively of the top and bottom “tails” of the distribution, i.e. included items have a combined weight of only 45%.

Labour demand is weaker in the Eurozone / UK than the US, with Indeed job postings making new lows versus US stability – chart 4.

Chart 4

Chart 4 showing Indeed Job Postings (1 February 2020 = 100)

Unemployment expectations have picked up in the EU Commission consumer survey, suggesting a rise in the official jobless rate – chart 5.

Chart 5

Chart 5 showing Eurozone Unemployment Rate (6m change) & Consumer Survey Unemployment Expectations

The Fed model used here predicts policy direction based on current and lagged values of annual core PCE inflation, the unemployment rate and the ISM manufacturing delivery delays index. A rise in the latter has pushed the model estimate further into the tightening zone – chart 6.

Chart 6

Chart 6 showing US Fed Funds Rate & Fed Policy Direction Probability Indicator

*M2+ adds large time deposits at commercial banks and institutional money funds to the official M2 measure.

Global six-month real narrow money growth fell in March and is on course to decline further in April-May, suggesting a loss of economic momentum during H2.

The March fall from a four-plus-year high in January / February was due to a pick-up in six-month consumer price momentum, with nominal money expansion unchanged – see chart 1.

Chart 1

Chart 1 showing G7 + E7 Real Narrow Money (% 6m)

Commodity price strength implies a further increase in CPI momentum through May, at least – chart 2. So the slowdown in real money growth will extend unless nominal expansion accelerates – unlikely given recent upward pressure on rates.

Chart 2

Chart 2 showing G7 + E7 Consumer Prices & Commodity Prices (% 6m)

The earlier rise in real money growth has been reflected in a pick-up in global industrial momentum, with April manufacturing PMI new orders also the highest for four-plus years – chart 3. Orders have received an additional boost from precautionary stockpiling triggered by Gulf War III.

Chart 3

Chart 3 showing Global Manufacturing PMI New Orders & G7 + E7 Real Narrow Money (% 6m)

The lead time between turning points in real money momentum and PMI new orders has recently been running at seven months, suggesting a PMI reversal from September. The stockbuilding boost may have accelerated strength, however, implying an earlier peak.

The March fall in global six-month real narrow money growth was driven by the G7 component, with E7 expansion tracking sideways – chart 4.

Chart 4

Chart 4 showing G7 & E7 Real Narrow Money (% 6m)

US growth fell in March but remains higher than in the rest of the G7 – chart 5.

Chart 5

Chart 5 showing Real Narrow Money (% 6m)

The March fall in global six-month real narrow money growth is estimated to have been accompanied by a similar slowdown in industrial output expansion, implying a continued small lead for the former – chart 6. The suggestion of “excess” money support for markets is consistent with recent equity market resilience.

Chart 6

Chart 6 showing G7 + E7 Industrial Output & Real Narrow Money (% 6m)

The expected further fall in real money growth, however, and near-term support for output from full order books, could result in the series converging or crossing soon.