Category: Global

The current stockbuilding cycle may be approaching its mid-point, which typically marks a shift from “risk-on” to a neutral or negative market environment.

The stockbuilding (or inventory or Kitchin) cycle is usually described as ranging between 3 and 5 years. The dating here suggests a normal band of 2.5 to 4.5 years, with an average of about 3.5.

A key indicator used to inform judgements about cycle dates is the annual change in G7 stockbuilding, expressed as a percentage of GDP. Chart 1 shows a long history of this indicator, along with suggested cycle low dates.

Chart 1

Chart 1 showing G7 Stockbuilding Cycle G7 Stockbuilding as % of GDP (yoy change)

There were 16 complete cycles, measured from low to low, between Q2 1967 and Q1 2023, a period of 55.75 years. This implies an average cycle length of 3.5 years or 42 months.

The cycle described in a 1923 article by Joseph Kitchin averaged 40 months. Kitchin analysed data on bank clearings, commodity prices and interest rates and did not explicitly link his cycle with inventory fluctuations. His average was based on 9 cycles spanning 30 years, i.e. a smaller data set than shown in chart 1.

An average of about 3.5 years harmonises with the longer-term housing cycle, with an accepted average length of 18 years. Five stockbuilding cycles “nest” within each complete housing cycle, implying an average length of 3.6 years (43 months).

The most recent stockbuilding cycle trough is judged to have been reached in Q1 2023. Assuming a starting point in the middle of the quarter, November 2024 is month 21 of the current cycle.

The annual change in G7 stockbuilding was still negative in Q3 and usually becomes significantly positive at peaks, suggesting that the cycle remains an expansionary influence on economic momentum currently.

The cycle is as important for markets as the economy (as shown by Kitchin’s reliance on commodity price and interest rate data). The first half of the cycle (starting from a trough) is typically favourable for risk assets and cyclical exposure. Bear markets and crises have historically been concentrated in cycle downswings.

Table 1 compares movements in various assets since the Q1 2023 trough – third column – with average performance in the first 21 months of the prior 8 cycles (stretching back to the mid 1990s) – first column. The second column shows average performance over the remainder of those 8 cycles.

Table 1

Table 1 showing Stockbuilding Cycle & Markets Table 1 compares movements in various assets since the Q1 2023 trough – third column – with average performance in the first 21 months of the prior 8 cycles (stretching back to the mid 1990s) – first column. The second column shows average performance over the remainder of those 8 cycles.

The current cycle has so far largely conformed to the historical pattern, with strong performance of equities, cyclical sectors, precious metals and credit. The suggestion is that remaining upside potential is limited in these areas, with weakness likely over the next 1-2 years as a cycle downswing unfolds.

Could the current cycle prove to be longer than average, extending the risk-on phase? A longer cycle is plausible both because the previous one was short (2.75 years) and to align with the business investment cycle, for which the dating here implies a low in 2027 or later.

A delayed entry to the downswing phase could imply catch-up potential for areas that have lagged relative to history, including non-US / EM equities and commodities.

Cycle timings, however, could be affected by accelerated stockbuilding in anticipation of tariff wars, which could bring forward the cycle peak, although this would not necessarily imply an earlier trough.

The overall message is cautionary. A previous post argued that the “excess” money backdrop for markets is now neutral / negative in stock as well as flow terms. Cyclical considerations reinforce the monetary message.

Global “excess” liquidity has surged to a level breached only twice over the last half-century, implying a favourable backdrop for risk assets, according to a Bloomberg article. The assessment here, by contrast, is that excess money conditions are neutral / negative.

Actual growth of the money stock can exceed or fall short of the rate of increase of money demand for economic and portfolio purposes. Deviations are reflected partly in changes in demand for financial / real assets and associated price movements.

The rate of increase of (real) money demand is unobservable. Two proxies are 1) the current rate of (real) economic expansion and 2) a long-term average of real money growth, this being assumed to capture the trend rise in money demand.

Accordingly, the approach followed here historically has relied on two flow indicators of excess or deficient money:

  • The gap between real narrow money and industrial output momentum (six-month rates of change preferred).
  • The deviation of real narrow money momentum from a long-term average (12-month rate of change preferred).

Chart 1 shows a cumulative return index of global equities relative to US dollar cash together with the two indicators. The indicators have been lagged to allow for reporting delays, i.e. the readings for a particular month would have been known at the time (ignoring revisions). Shaded areas denote double-positive readings. Equities outperformed cash significantly on average during these periods (i.e. averaging performance in the month following each monthly signal). They underperformed on average under mixed or double-negative readings.

Chart 1

Chart 1 showing MSCI World Cumulative Return vs USD Cash & Global “Excess” Money Measures

The first indicator is hovering around zero while the second remains negative.

The excess liquidity indicator referred to in the Bloomberg article is described as measuring how much real money growth outperforms economic growth, suggesting that it should resemble the first indicator above. Like here, narrow (M1) money is used in the calculation. Coverage, however, is restricted to the G10 developed markets and growth rates may be measured over 12 rather than six months.

Chart 2 shows a G7 version of the real narrow money / industrial output momentum gap calculated on a 12-month basis, which should be a close substitute for a G10 measure. This indicator turned positive in July but is far from historical highs.

Chart 2

Chart 2 showing G7 Real Narrow Money % yoy minus Industrial Output % yoy

What explains the much more bullish Bloomberg reading? The guess here is that the Bloomberg indicator is a deviation of the real money / economic growth gap from some measure of trend, rather than its absolute level. The current gap, for example, is significantly higher than a 24-month moving average, also shown in chart 2.

In this case, the Bloomberg indicator would be better described as a measure of excess money acceleration rather than growth. The current high reading would reflect a recovery in excess money momentum from deep negative to slightly positive.

Conceptually, it is unclear why the demand for assets should be related to the second derivative of excess money rather than its growth or level. The Bloomberg indicator correctly signalled the strength of equity markets this year, though not in 2023. Backtesting indicates that the sign of an acceleration measure would have underperformed that of the level of excess money growth in signalling whether equity market returns were above or below cash rates historically.

Why did the measures shown in chart 1 “miss” the strength of equity markets in 2023-24?

Excess or deficient money need not affect all markets similarly. Treasuries, commercial property and commodities may have borne the brunt of a money flow shortfall.

Preference for equities has been boosted by the AI boom and associated strength in a small number of large cap stocks. The MSCI World equal-weighted index has underperformed US dollar cash since the excess money indicators in chart 1 turned negative around end-2021.

The key reason for the disconnect with market performance, however, is that the flow measures were, on this occasion, an insufficient guide to the excess money backdrop, failing to take account of a still-large stock overhang left over from the 2020-21 money growth surge.

The “quantity theory of wealth”, explained in posts in 2020, is a suggested modification of the traditional quantity theory recognising that (broad) money demand depends on wealth as well as income and proposing equal elasticities. Nominal income is replaced on the right-hand side of the equation of exchange MV = PY by a geometric mean of income and wealth.

Chart 3 applies the “theory” to US data since end-2014.

Chart 3

Chart 3 showing US Broad Money M2+, Nominal GDP & Gross Wealth* Q4 2014 = 100 *Gross Wealth = Public Equities + Debt Securities ex Fed + Residential Real Estate

The combined income / wealth variable closely tracked moderate growth of broad money over 2015-19. Wealth rose faster than income, so traditionally-defined velocity fell. The velocity of the combined income / wealth measure was stable.

The policy response to the covid shock resulted in possibly unprecedented monetary disequilibrium. Asset prices responded swiftly to the excess, causing wealth to overshoot broad money in 2021. Excess money flow indicators turned negative around end-2021 and wealth corrected sharply in 2022.

The combined income / wealth measure was still well below the level implied by broad money even before this correction. Deployment of the excess stock fuelled a second surge in wealth from late 2022 while sustaining economic growth despite monetary policy tightening.

Asset price gains, goods / services inflation and real economic expansion resulted in the income / wealth measure finally converging with broad money at end-Q2, with an estimated small overshoot at end-Q3. So the velocity of the combined measure has returned to its end-2019 level.

Stock as well as flow considerations, therefore, suggest that the excess money backdrop is now neutral at best.

Global (i.e. G7 plus E7) six-month real narrow money momentum is estimated to have edged lower in September, based on monetary data covering 88% of the aggregate. Momentum has been moving sideways since the spring at a weak level by historical standards, suggesting that the global economy will expand at a below-trend pace through mid-2025 – see chart 1.

Chart 1

Chart 1 showing Global Manufacturing PMI New Orders & G7 + E7 Real Narrow Money (% 6m)

Note that the global narrow money measure incorporates an adjustment for a recent negative distortion to Chinese data from regulatory changes, i.e. momentum would be weaker than shown without this correction.

A low in real money momentum in September 2023 was expected here to be reflected in a decline in global industrial momentum – as proxied by the manufacturing PMI new orders index – into a low in late 2024. October flash results could be consistent with a bottoming out: PMIs fell in Japan and the UK but recovered slightly in the US and Eurozone – chart 2.

Chart 2

Chart 2 showing Manufacturing PMIs

With money trends remaining weak, a manufacturing recovery into H1 2025 was expected to be limited and offset by a loss of momentum in services. Services business activity indices in the Eurozone and UK fell to 20- and 23-month lows respectively in October, according to flash results, with a sharper decline in Japan. US activity and new business indices, however, were strong, although the employment component remained sub-50.

Chart 3

Chart 3 showing Services PMI Business Activity

US relative strength is also evidenced by October earnings revisions ratios, with US net upgrades contrasting with weakness in Japan and Europe, particularly the UK – chart 4.

Chart 4

Chart 4 showing MSCI Earnings Revisions Ratios (IBES, sa)

US economic outperformance is consistent with a recent wide gap between US and European / Japanese six-month real narrow money momentum. The expectation here was for a US pull-back in September due to an unfavourable base effect but this proved minor, with narrow money rising solidly again on the month – chart 5.

Chart 5

Chart 5 showing Real Narrow Money (% 6m)

Eurozone / UK real narrow money momentum continues to recover but disappointingly slowly, suggesting a more urgent need for policy easing. A slump in Japan, initially due to f/x intervention but sustained by BoJ policy tightening, signals likely further negative economic news.

US narrow money acceleration started long before the September rate cut and hasn’t been mirrored by broader aggregates. One interpretation is that households / firms are accumulating “transactions” money in anticipation of increasing spending after the elections. Chart 6 suggests a tendency for narrow money momentum to pick up into presidential elections and reverse thereafter, with occasional notable exceptions (1984, 2000).

Chart 6

Chart 6 showing US Narrow Money (% 6m annualised)

Monetary prospects and cycle considerations suggest global economic strength in H2 2025 / 2026 but a “hard landing” – or at least a scare of one – may be necessary first.

Commentary here at mid-year proposed the following baseline scenario:

  • A “double dip” in global industrial momentum in H2 2024 with limited recovery in early 2025, reflecting the profile of real narrow money momentum with a roughly one-year lag.
  • Pass-through of industrial weakness to the services sector and – crucially – employment, the latter contrasting with experience during the first “dip” in 2022 when labour markets were in excess demand and unaffected.
  • A further decline in consumer price inflation rates to below target in H1 2025, echoing a fall in broad money growth to very low levels in H1 2023, assuming a typical two-year lag.
  • A rapid response of monetary policy-makers to downside labour market and inflation surprises, resulting in official rates falling by more by spring 2025 than markets expected in mid-2024.
  • A consequent strong pick-up in real narrow money momentum by spring 2025, laying the foundation for an economic boom starting in late 2025, consistent with the cyclical framework suggesting joint strength in the stockbuilding, business investment and housing cycles.

The near-term hard – or hard-ish – landing in this scenario is necessary to elicit policy easing sufficient to drive the later boom. Without it, the global economy could remain stuck in a slow-growth equilibrium into 2026, with policy rates kept above a neutral level despite low inflation.

Incoming news has been consistent with several elements of the baseline scenario but others require confirmation:

  • The global manufacturing PMI new orders index fell to a 21-month low in September. Global six-month real narrow money momentum bottomed in September 2023, signalling a likely PMI trough by end-2024 – see chart 1.

Chart 1

Chart 1 showing Global Manufacturing PMI New Orders & G7 + E7 Real Narrow Money (% 6m)

  • Real narrow money momentum has been moving sideways since the spring at a low level by historical standards, consistent with industrial momentum remaining weak in early 2025.
  • Manufacturing weakness appears to be transferring to services. The global services PMI new business index remained at an expansion-consistent level in September but output expectations fell sharply to a 23-month low – chart 2.

Chart 2

Chart 2 showing Global Services PMI New Business & Future Output

  • Employment weakness has yet to crystallise. The global composite PMI employment index is below a low reached during the first dip in 2022 but not yet in contraction territory (50.0 in September). The US economy has continued to add jobs, although payrolls numbers are probably still overstating growth and average weekly hours have fallen.
  • Inflation news has been favourable. Six-month headline / core consumer price momentum in the US and Eurozone has moved lower since mid-2024, while global PMI output price indices for consumer goods and services have stabilised close to their 2015-19 averages, when G7 annual core CPI inflation averaged 1.6% – chart 3.

Chart 3

Chart 3 showing Global Consumer Goods / Services PMI Output Prices

  • Monetary authorities have in most cases shifted dovishly since mid-year. A major Chinese policy pivot at quarter-end could lead to a strong rebound in narrow money growth, supporting the expectation of global acceleration.

To summarise, the baseline scenario is still on track but requires confirmation from early further deterioration in labour market news as well as continued inflation progress.

The stabilisation of global six-month real narrow money momentum at a weak level conceals significant geographical dispersion. A strong pick-up in the US has been offset by falls in China and Japan, while a slow recovery in the Eurozone has caught up with a stalling UK – chart 4.

Chart 4

Chart 4 showing Real Narrow Money (% 6m)

The rise in US momentum is puzzling and challenges the expected scenario of economic weakness and labour market deterioration into H1 2025. A near-term stall or reversal would reduce this tension and is plausible, with large monthly rises in March / April about to drop out of the six-month comparison.

Momentum remains negative across Europe but – except in the UK – has continued to recover, with a further acceleration expected as a pattern of rate cuts at successive policy meetings is established. UK-Eurozone monetary convergence is at odds with market themes of UK relative economic resilience and inflation stickiness, and incoming data could force the MPC to shift dovishly soon.

Interpretation of Chinese monetary trends has been clouded recent regulatory changes that have reduced the attractiveness of demand deposits, resulting in a switch into time deposits and money substitutes. The narrow money measure shown in chart 4 incorporates an adjustment but the “true” picture could be stronger or weaker. Previous large stimulus packages have fed rapidly through to monetary acceleration but – even if this occurs – economic momentum is likely to remain weak through Q2 2025, at least.

The cyclical framework used here judges current global economic weakness to reflect mid-cycle corrections in stockbuilding and business investment upswings, rather than new downswings in either cycle. The stockbuilding cycle (3-5 years) bottomed in Q1 2023 but an initial recovery due to an ending of destocking has fizzled as final demand has remained weak. The assumption is that policy easing will generate a second leg up in 2025, with a cycle peak possibly delayed until 2026.

The primary trend in the business investment cycle (7-11 years, last low 2020) is also still up, with the current correction probably attributable to a combination of restrictive interest rates, a profits slowdown and heightened uncertainty. Corporate financial balances (retained earnings minus capex) are in surplus in the US, Japan and Eurozone and a recovery in global economic momentum in 2025 could generate a strong “accelerator” effect on investment as animal spirits revive.

A key assumption is that the long-term housing cycle (average 18 years), which bottomed in 2009, will enjoy a final burst of strength in response to lower rates before peaking, possibly in 2026. One reason for believing that the upswing is incomplete is that peaks were historically associated with mortgage lending booms: annual growth of US residential mortgages reached double-digits before downswings into lows in 1957, 1975, 1991 and 2009. The high so far in the current cycle has been 9% (in 2022), with lower numbers in the Eurozone and UK.

The mid-year commentary suggested that defensive equity market sectors would outperform as a H2 double dip unfolded. They did through early September but cyclical sectors rebounded on hopes of rapid Fed easing and large-scale Chinese stimulus. Even if forthcoming, the economic effects will be delayed and may already be discounted in relative valuations – chart 5.

Chart 5

Chart 5 showing MSCI World Cyclical ex Tech* Relative to Defensive ex Energy Price / Book & Global Manufacturing PMI New Orders *Tech = IT & Communication Services

Markets have historically correlated with the stockbuilding cycle, so one approach to assessing investment potential is to compare returns so far in the current cycle with an average of prior upswings. As shown in table 1, US equities, cyclical sectors and gold have performed more strongly than the historical average in the 18 months since the cycle trough in Q1 2023, suggesting limited further upside and possible reversals, even assuming a late cycle peak.

Table 1

Table 1 showing Stockbuilding Cycle & Markets

International equities – particularly emerging markets – have, by contrast, underperformed relative to history in the current cycle, while commodity prices have been unusually weak. Though also likely to suffer in any near-term hard landing scare, these areas have catch-up potential in the baseline scenario of global economic acceleration through 2025 driven partly by the stockbuilding cycle upswing entering a second phase.

The “double dip” downturn in global manufacturing continued last month.

Global manufacturing PMI new orders fell steeply from a peak in May 2021 to a trough in December 2022 (first dip), with a subsequent recovery ending in May 2024. The second dip was confirmed by a sharp fall to below 50 in July, with the index unchanged in August – see chart 1.

Chart 1

Chart 1 showing Global Manufacturing PMI New Orders & G7 + E7 National Survey New Orders / Output Expectations

As the chart shows, an alternative global indicator based on national surveys weakened further last month.

The alternative indicator implies a shorter interim recovery between the two dips than the PMI, starting from May 2023 and ending in January 2024. These timings align better with turning points in global six-month real narrow money momentum (low in June 2022, high in December 2022) – chart 2.

Chart 2

Chart 2 showing G7 + E7 National Survey New Orders / Output Expectations & Real Narrow Money (% 6m)

The September 2023 low in real money momentum suggests that the double dip will bottom out by end-2024.

A key issue is whether manufacturing weakness will now transfer to services.

Services indicators remain mixed. The global services PMI new business index regained its May high last month and is close to the pre-pandemic average – chart 3.

Chart 3

Chart 3 showing Global PMI New Orders / Business

Order backlogs, however, fell further and are well below the corresponding average, as they are in manufacturing – chart 4. The decline suggests that current output is running above the (increased) level of incoming demand.

Chart 4

Chart 4 showing Global PMI Backlogs of Work

Accordingly, services firms are curbing hiring, with the sector employment index falling sharply in August and almost as weak as in manufacturing – chart 5.

Chart 5

Chart 5 showing Global PMI Employment

Rises in the global services PMI activity and new business indices last month partly reflected further strength in US components. The corresponding measures in the US ISM services survey are weaker, however, especially relative to pre-pandemic averages – chart 6.

Chart 6

Chart 6 showing US Services PMI Business Activity

The PMI surveys continue to support the expectation here of rapid easing of services price pressures and likely inflation undershoots by H1 2025. Output price indices for consumer goods and services remain close to their 2015-19 averages, a period when G7 annual core CPI inflation averaged 1.6% – chart 7.

Chart 7

Chart 7 showing Global Consumer Goods / Services PMI Output Prices

Global six-month real narrow money momentum is estimated to have moved sideways for a fourth month in July at a weak level by historical standards – see chart 1.

Chart 1

Chart 1 showing Global Manufacturing PMI New Orders & G7 + E7 Real Narrow Money (% 6m)

The baseline scenario here remains that global economic momentum – proxied by the global manufacturing PMI new orders index – will move down into late 2024, echoing a fall in real money momentum into September last year. Based on more recent monetary data, a subsequent recovery may prove limited, with weakness persisting well into H1 2025.

The unchanged July global real money momentum reading conceals a rise in the US offset by further weakness in China. The E7 ex. China component also cooled, while G7 ex. US momentum remained negative, moving sideways – chart 2.

Chart 2

Chart 2 showing Real Narrow Money (% 6m)

The Chinese series incorporates an adjustment* for a recent portfolio shift by non-financial enterprises from demand to time deposits in response to a regulatory change (a clampdown on payment of supplementary interest by banks). Chinese momentum would be significantly more negative without this adjustment, while the global series would be at its weakest level since February. (The adjustment may, however, underestimate the negative distortion to Chinese narrow money.)

Chart 3 shows additional DM detail. Real narrow money momentum is relatively strong in Canada and Australia as well as the US.

Chart 3

Chart 3 showing Real Narrow Money (% 6m)

Japan moved deeper into negative territory but recent weakness partly reflects f/x intervention, so may abate.

Real money momentum is higher in the UK than the Eurozone but the difference is small, with both still negative. Recent UK economic outperformance is unlikely to last.

The pick-up in US real narrow money momentum suggests improving economic prospects but confirmation is required and lags should be respected.

The US July reading was boosted by a favourable base effect – narrow money contracted by 0.6% month-on-month in January. The base effect remains favourable for August but turns significantly negative in September / October.

Six-month growth of US broad money is weaker than for narrow and has edged lower since May, though hasn’t yet fallen to the extent suggested by a contractionary shift in the joint influence of Treasury financing operations and Fed QT, discussed previously. The latest Treasury financing projections imply that this influence will turn expansionary again in Q4.

For perspective, US six-month real narrow money momentum had recovered to the current level in September 2008 as the financial crisis was reaching a crescendo with the recession having nine more months to run. In the prior 2001 recession, the current level was reached three months before the economy hit bottom. In both cases, the NBER business cycle dating committee had yet to determine that a recession had begun.

*The adjustment assumes that the share of demand deposits in total bank deposits of non-financial enterprises would have been stable at its March level in the absence of the regulatory change. The adjustment does not take into account any shift from bank deposits to non-monetary instruments (e.g. wealth management products) or effects on other money-holders.

The assessment here remains that the global economy has entered a “double dip” currently focused on manufacturing but likely to extend to services / labour markets, reigniting worries about a hard landing. Economic weakness is expected to be accompanied by an inflation undershoot into H1 2025.

DM flash manufacturing PMI results for August were mixed across countries but on balance weak, suggesting a further small reduction in global manufacturing PMI new orders following a July plunge to below 50 (assuming no change for China and other non-flash countries) – see chart 1.

Chart 1

Chart 1 showing Global Manufacturing PMI New Orders & G7 + E7 Real Narrow Money (% 6m)

Services results were again much stronger than for manufacturing but there are hints of emerging weakness in a fall in output expectations since May and a drop in US / Eurozone employment indices to below 50 this month.

A previous post suggested that the OECD’s US composite leading indicator has reversed lower since publication of the last official data point, for June. An update based on partial data points to a further decline in August – chart 2. The OECD will release July / August data for its indicators on 5 September.

Chart 2

Chart 2 showing OECD US Leading Indicator* *Relative to Trend

The OECD’s Chinese leading indicator has been falling since late 2023 and the decline is estimated to have continued in July / August – chart 3.

Chart 3

Chart 3 showing OECD China Leading Indicator* *Relative to Trend

Weaker economic momentum and pricing power are feeding through to company earnings. Revisions ratios have turned down since April in the US, Eurozone and UK, with the August Eurozone reading the weakest since 2020 – chart 4.

Chart 4

Chart 4 showing Earnings Revisions Ratios (MSCI / IBES, sa)

By MSCI World sector, August revisions ratios were most negative in consumer discretionary followed by energy, consumer staples and materials. The ratios for consumer discretionary and staples were the weakest since 2020, suggesting that a fall-off in consumer demand has been a key driver of the renewed downturn in manufacturing – chart 5.

Chart 5

Chart 5 showing Global Manufacturing PMI New Orders & MSCI World Consumer Discretionary / Staples Earnings Revisions Ratios

This week’s announcement by the BLS of a preliminary 818,000 or 0.5% downward revision to the March 2024 level of non-farm payrolls, meanwhile, raises the possibility that US employment has already stalled.

The revision is based on the comprehensive Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW). A monthly QCEW employment series is available through March but is not seasonally adjusted. Chart 6 compares the monthly change in non-farm payrolls, as currently reported before incorporating the revision, with the change in a seasonally-adjusted version of the QCEW measure.

Chart 6

Chart 6 showing US Employment Measures (mom change, 000s)

The increase in non-farm payrolls was 133k per month higher than growth of the seasonally-adjusted QCEW series during Q1. If overstatement of this magnitude has continued since Q1, reported growth of 108k and 114k in non-farm payrolls in April and July could imply small declines in “true” employment in those months.