The baseline view here has been that the global stockbuilding cycle would enter a downswing in 2026 into a low in H1 2027.

The stockbuilding cycle is a repeating fluctuation in the demand for production inputs and goods for final sale caused by inventories periodically over- and undershooting the level desired by manufacturers and distributors.

The approach here is to monitor the cycle using measures of the rate of change of G7 stockbuilding from national accounts data and business surveys.

The national accounts measure places the last cycle low in Q1 2023, implying that the current cycle is well-advanced – see chart 1.

Chart 1

The business survey measure is more timely and recently crossed below zero, consistent with the cycle moving into a downswing.

The original research on the cycle – by Joseph Kitchin, published in 1923 – used data on commodity prices, bank clearings and interest rates. Kitchin attributed the cycle to “psychological causes”, making no explicit link with inventory behaviour.

The cycle is evident in commodity prices because changes in demand for production inputs affect their price as well as volumes – chart 2.

Chart 2

Tech investors often dismiss the cycle as an “old economy” phenomenon but electronic components are a key production input subject to the same inventory-related demand swings as traditional industrial commodities.

There is no single price index capturing the changing nature of electronic components. However, export prices of key supplier economies are a rough proxy. Chart 3 shows that the annual rate of change of an average of Taiwanese and Korean export prices in US dollars tracks the national accounts-based measure of G7 stockbuilding changes.

Chart 3

Chart 4 overlays the annual rate of change of an average of 12-month forward earnings estimates, showing a similarly significant correlation.

Chart 4

Based on the cycle assessment here, the implication is that momentum of component prices and earnings should be at or close to a peak.

Why could this prove wrong? One possibility is that the current stockbuilding cycle will extend. This cycle is judged to be the last of a set of five constituting the current housing cycle (which began in 2009). Final cycles tend to be longer than the 3.5-year average, with one recent example (1986-91) reaching 4.5 years. The next low, therefore, could be delayed until H2 2027, in turn suggesting a later start to the downswing.

Another counter-argument is that strong demand for components is being driven by an ongoing upswing in the business investment cycle – narrowly focused on AI-related spending in the current cycle – as well as peak stockbuilding. This cycle last bottomed in 2020 and has ranged between 7 and 11 years historically, so the upswing could – in theory – continue for several more years. The thinking here is that the current cycle is more likely to be short, reflecting a long prior cycle (11 years) and a drag from the expected stockbuilding downswing.

Cycle analysis indicates that the global economy is in a time window for weakness, suggesting a significant risk that the Gulf War III shock triggers a recession. Real money trends will be key for assessing whether a negative scenario is playing out.

The housing, business investment and stockbuilding cycles average 18, 9 and 3.5 years respectively. The most recent lows are judged to have occurred in 2009, 2020 and 2023, suggesting that the next bottoms will be reached around 2027, 2029 and 2027. All three cycles, therefore, are expected to be in downswings over the next 1-3 years.

Cycle history suggests two possibilities. If the three downswings coincide, a major recession is likely. Historical precedents include the severe global downturns of 1974-75 and 2008-09.

If the cycle lows are spaced out over several years, the template would be the early 1990s – a longer period of rolling economic weakness involving a less damaging recession.

An earlier episode of triple cycle weakness in the late 1950s was also associated with a less pronounced recession but the fall in output on that occasion was limited by strong trend economic growth, reflecting post-war reconstruction.

The impact of shocks on the global economy depends on the cyclical backdrop. Activity bounced back strongly after the 2020 covid shock partly because the stockbuilding and business investment cycles were in time windows to enter recovery phases, while the housing cycle remained in an upswing.

Similarly, economic damage from the 2022 energy shock due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was limited by support from the business investment and housing cycles, with only the stockbuilding cycle then in a weak phase.

The timing of the Gulf War III shock echoes the 1973 Arab oil embargo, which hit as the three cycles were peaking and resulted in synchronised and self-reinforcing downswings into 1975 lows.

There are important mitigating differences from the 1973 shock. The oil price rise has been much smaller, while the oil intensity of GDP has fallen significantly. The 1973 shock occurred against a backdrop of double-digit G7 money growth, ensuring an inflationary outcome – current expansion is still low. Surging inflation forced major monetary policy tightening, the combined result being a severe real money squeeze – see chart 1.

Chart 1

Real money trends appeared modestly supportive before the current shock: global / G7 growth had firmed into early 2026, suggesting that economic expansion was on course to hold up through Q3.

The mechanical impact of higher energy and other costs on consumer price inflation will ensure a sharp slowdown in real money momentum into mid-year – chart 2. The extent of the decline will be key for assessing the likely degree of economic weakness. As noted, modest money growth argues against significant “second-round” inflation effects but central banks are hinting at precautionary tightening, which would magnify monetary weakness.

Chart 2

A further risk is of “endogenous” monetary tightening if the Gulf War III shock interacts with recent problems in private lending, leading to a generalised reduction in credit availability. Such a shift could be signalled in ECB and Fed loan officer surveys due in late April and early May respectively.

Country real money numbers through February suggest that US economic prospects were improving absolutely and relative to other majors before the shock – chart 3.

Chart 3

Japanese monetary weakness continues to argue that BoJ policy tightening – via large-scale QT as well as rate hikes – has been misguided. As expected, core CPI inflation – ex. food and energy – has fallen and is below 2% even stripping out the impact of government subsidies.

Recoveries in Eurozone and UK real money momentum have stalled at unimpressive levels, suggesting dull economic prospects before the shock. Within the Eurozone, readings are similar across the large economies, with France no longer a negative outlier.

Chinese real money momentum has slowed but may hold up better than elsewhere going forward, reflecting stable interest rates and government intervention to limit price rises. A strong balance of payments position, partly stemming from a still significantly undervalued currency, is generating monetary inflows.

Cyclical equity market sectors had started to underperform before the shock. The cyclical / defensive relative is correlated with the stockbuilding cycle, which is not expected to bottom before late 2026 at the earliest – chart 4.

Chart 4

 

The long-standing forecast here has been that the three key global economic cycles – stockbuilding, business investment and housing – would enter downswings by 2026-27.

In the event that the downswings were synchronised, the result would be a major recession, on the scale of 1974-75 or 2008-09.

If the downswings occurred successively, the result would be a long period of rolling weakness including a less severe recession – the early 1990s scenario.

Chart 1 is an exhibit used in 2018, suggesting – based on average cycle timings – a recession bottoming in 2019-20, a slowdown into 2023 and a major recession around 2027. The former two played out.

Chart 1

The housing cycle is already in a downswing, the stockbuilding cycle is at or close to a peak, while the business investment cycle is well-advanced. The Gulf War III energy price shock could be the trigger for synchronised weakness.

There have been six oil price “shocks” since the 1960s, defined here as episodes in which the spot price rose 50% or more above its two-year moving average for at least three months. All were followed by a significant contraction in G7 industrial output and five were associated with a US recession, as determined by the NBER – chart 2.

Chart 2

Spot Brent of $100 per barrel represents a 37% premium to the two-year moving average. Oil would have to be sustained at about $115 for three months for the current spike to qualify as a “shock”.

The oil intensity of GDP has fallen dramatically since the 1970s, suggesting less vulnerability to shocks. This could explain why the most recent shock – in 2022 – did not involve a US recession.

An alternative view is that a recession was avoided because the cyclical backdrop was less unfavourable and there was pent-up demand due to pandemic disruption, reflected in a large monetary overhang. The stockbuilding cycle turned down in 2022 but the housing and business investment cycles were in late upswing and recovery phases respectively.

The prior shocks caused short-term inflation spikes and were associated with upward pressure on interest rates, contributing to a fall in nominal narrow money momentum. G7 real money contracted ahead of maximum economic weakness. Real money data will be key for assessing the extent of current economic damage.

Cycle analysis suggests economic and market weakness in 2026-27. A recent monetary slowdown is consistent with this perspective but needs to extend to confirm a negative scenario.

Global (i.e. G7 plus E7) six-month real narrow money momentum moved sideways in August, following a March-July fall. The previous low in real money momentum in October 2024 was reflected in a low in global manufacturing PMI new orders in May. Accordingly, the monetary slowdown since March could be mirrored by a peak and reversal in PMI new orders from around October – see chart 1.

Chart 1

The fall in real money momentum has been modest but an expected economic slowdown could become more serious than others in recent years, for two reasons. First, the stockbuilding and housing cycles have entered time windows to begin downswings. Secondly, labour markets are showing signs of weakness for the first time since the pandemic recession, raising the risk of self-reinforcing negative dynamics.

The working assumption here has been that the stockbuilding cycle will reach another low in Q1 2027, implying a four-year current cycle versus a 3.5-year historical average. Recent G7 national accounts stockbuilding data as well as an indicator based on business surveys are consistent with the cycle being at or near a peak – chart 2.

Chart 2

The housing cycle bottomed in 2009 and has ranged between 15 and 25 years historically, averaging 18 years. The pandemic-related money growth surge of 2020-21 appears to have resulted in the current cycle peaking early, in 2022. G7 housing starts or permits have been range-bound since early 2023 but rising unemployment could be the trigger for a break lower.  China has been leading in the current cycle and starts are still falling – chart 3.

Chart 3

The suggestion that unemployment is on a rising trend is supported by consumer surveys, with a composite G7 indicator of negativity recently reaching a four-year high – chart 4.

Chart 4

Monetary policy easing, if sufficiently dramatic, could short-circuit negative cyclical dynamics. A dramatic move could occur conventionally if additional evidence of labour market weakness is accompanied by a downside inflation surprise, or unconventionally if the Trump administration succeeds in gaining control of the Fed. A large cut in US rates would magnify US dollar weakness, forcing other central banks to follow.

Inflation prospects are judged here to be favourable, at least through early 2027. G7 annual broad money growth remains subdued (4.3% in August versus a 2015-19 average of 4.5%), while stockbuilding cycle downswings are usually associated with weakness in commodity prices – chart 5.

Chart 5

Near-term US inflation numbers, however, will continue to reflect tariff effects. Elsewhere, central bankers focused on fighting the last war may be slow to respond to favourable surprises. As an example of hawkish bias, the ECB has gone on hold despite forecasting below-target inflation.

The alternative route to a large near-term fall in rates – a take-over of the Fed by the executive branch – still seems far-fetched, with the administration lacking scope to push through personnel changes on the necessary scale.

Among major economies, six-month real narrow money momentum is weakest in Japan and the UK, suggesting over-restrictive monetary policies and downside economic risk. Momentum is similar in the US and Eurozone but the US has slipped to a 17-month low, while a Eurozone recovery has stalled since Q1 – chart 6.

Chart 6

The Eurozone story seems to be that higher bond yields triggered by fiscal loosening along with a stronger euro have offset ECB easing. Optimists argue that German fiscal stimulus is only now arriving but the impact could be balanced by an early stockbuilding downswing – the stockbuilding share of GDP rose by 0.7 pp in the year to Q2 and is above its long-run average.

The recent decline in global six-month real narrow money momentum has been driven by the G7 component. Chinese momentum fell back in April-May but has recovered since, giving a modestly favourable signal for economic prospects.

The assumption of a Q1 2027 trough implies that the current stockbuilding cycle has entered its final 18 months. The 18-month windows before previous lows were usually negative for risk assets and marked by credit events or “crises” – chart 7. The possibility of simultaneous housing cycle weakness, as well outsized gains in the upswing phase of the current cycle, suggests greater-than-normal downside.

Chart 7

These 18-month windows were usually associated with cyclical equity market sectors underperforming defensives, following outperformance during the upswing (unusually strong in the current cycle). Stylewise, there was a weak tendency for quality to outperform, while momentum lagged its upswing gains significantly. The recent drawdown in relative performance of the MSCI EAFE Quality index versus MSCI EAFE was exceeded in magnitude and duration only in the early 1980s – chart 8.

Chart 8

Six-month growth rates of global real narrow money and industrial output have been tracking closely with a small monetary excess on the latest readings – chart 9. The strength of markets appears to reflect a rise in the financial velocity of money more than ample liquidity, suggesting reversibility in the event of a cyclical deterioration in sentiment.

Chart 9

The two monetary conditions historically favouring EM equities – E7 real money growth above the G7 level and global real money growth above industrial output expansion – are currently in place, suggesting EM outperformance in the event of a near-term further rise in markets.

Global money growth has picked up since late 2024 but remains subdued, while the stock of money is no longer in excess relative to nominal economic activity and asset prices. The monetary backdrop, therefore, appears insufficiently supportive to offset economic / market damage from US-led tariff hikes.

Prospective tariff effects, meanwhile, require a revision to the previous forecast here of a downside global inflation surprise in 2025 related to extreme monetary weakness in 2023. A price level boost this year is unlikely to yield second-round effects given disinflationary monetary conditions, so a near-term lift to annual inflation should reverse in 2026. The effect may be to extend the lag between the money growth low of 2023 and the associated inflation low from two to three years.

The elimination of a surplus stock of money has been mirrored by erosion of excess labour demand, with job openings / vacancy rates mostly now around or below pre-pandemic levels. Economic weakness, therefore, may be reflected in a rise in unemployment that eventually dominates central bank concerns about inflationary tariff effects, suggesting that current policy caution will give way to renewed easing later in 2025.

Global six-month real narrow money momentum – the key monetary leading indicator followed here – fell between June and October 2024 but has since rebounded, reaching a post-pandemic high in February. (The timing of the mid-2024 dip has changed slightly from previous posts, mainly reflecting annual revisions to seasonal adjustment factors for US monetary data.) Real money momentum, however, remains below its long-run average – see chart 1.

Chart 1

The lead time between real money momentum and manufacturing PMI new orders has averaged 10 months at the four most recent turning points. Based on this average, the 2024 real money slowdown and subsequent reacceleration suggest a PMI relapse in Q2 / Q3 followed by renewed strength in late 2025 – chart 2.

Chart 2

Tariff effects – including payback for a front-loading of trade flows – are likely to magnify mid-year economic weakness and could push out or even abort a subsequent recovery: delayed central bank easing, a confidence hit to business / consumer credit demand and a near-term inflation lift could reverse the recent pick-up in real money momentum.

Previous posts, meanwhile, argued that stocks of (broad) money in the US, Japan and Eurozone are no longer higher than warranted by prevailing levels of nominal economic activity and asset prices, implying an absence of a monetary “cushion” against negative shocks. Excess money appears to be substantial in China but could remain frozen as US trade aggression and domestic policy caution sustain weak business / consumer confidence.

Chart 3 shows six-month real narrow money momentum in major economies. Chinese strength is a stand-out but may partly reflect payback for earlier weakness – momentum needs to remain solid to warrant continued (relative) optimism. A Eurozone recovery still leaves momentum lagging the US (where revised numbers show less of a recent slowdown), with the UK further behind. Japanese weakness is alarming, suggesting significant downside economic / inflation risk and consistent with recent lacklustre equity market performance.

Chart 3

European economic optimism has been boosted by a relaxation of German fiscal rules and a wider drive to increase defence spending. This is significant for medium-term prospects but has limited relevance for the near-term economic outlook, which hinges on whether an uplift from monetary easing will prove sufficient to offset trade war damage.

The two flow indicators of global “excess” money followed here are giving a mixed message: six-month growth of real narrow money has crossed above that of industrial output (positive) but 12-month growth remains below a long-term moving average (negative). This combination was associated with global equities slightly underperforming US dollar cash on average historically.

From a cyclical perspective, a key issue is whether the US tariff war shock brings forward peaks and downswings in the stockbuilding and business investment cycles, which are scheduled to reach lows in 2026-27 and 2027 or later respectively. The previous baseline here was that upswings in the two cycles would extend into 2026, a scenario supported by the current monetary signal of a rebound in economic momentum in late 2025.

The next downswings in the two cycles are likely to coincide with a move of the 18-year housing cycle into another low. Triple downswings are usually associated with severe recessions and financial crises. Such a prospect is probably still two years or more away but the US policy shock may have closed off the possibility of a final boom leg to current upswings before a subsequent crash.

Table 1 updates a comparison of movements in various financial assets so far in the current stockbuilding upswing (which started in Q1 2023) with averages at the same stage of the previous eight cycles, along with changes over the remainder of those cycles. Three months ago, US equities, cyclical sectors, the US dollar and precious metals were performing much more strongly than average, suggesting downside risk. By contrast, EAFE / EM equities, small caps and industrial commodities appeared to have catch-up potential.

Table 1

Q1 moves corrected some of these anomalies, with the US market falling back, Chinese / European equities performing strongly, US cyclical sectors lagging, the dollar falling and industrial commodity prices recovering. Precious metals, however, became even more extended relative to history, while small cap performance has yet to pick up.

The updated table suggests potential for further strength in EM and to a lesser extent EAFE equities, along with industrial commodities. Cyclical sector underperformance and dollar weakness could extend, while gold / silver appear at high risk of a correction. The larger message, however, is that, even assuming a delayed peak, the stockbuilding cycle has entered the mid to late stage that has been unfavourable for risk assets historically.

The suggestion of EM outperformance is supported by monetary considerations. Six-month real money momentum is stronger in the E7 large emerging economies than in the G7, while – as noted earlier – global real money is outpacing industrial output. EM equities beat DM on average historically when these two conditions were met, underperforming in other regimes – chart 4.

Chart 4

Recent outperformance of non-US equity markets may be a signal of the end of the bull market rather than a harbinger of broadening strength.

Previous analysis comparing returns in the current stockbuilding cycle with history suggested weaker prospects for risk assets, a reversal of US equity market / cyclical sector outperformance, a decline in the US dollar, stronger industrial commodity prices and a correction in precious metals. Several of these themes are playing out and appear to have potential to extend.

The stockbuilding cycle averages 3.5 years in length and last bottomed in Q1 2023, suggesting another low in H2 2026. The previous view here was that the current cycle would be longer than normal, to balance a shorter previous cycle (2.75 years) and to harmonise with the business investment cycle, which isn’t scheduled to bottom before 2027.

There is, however, anecdotal evidence of firms / importers stockpiling inputs / finished goods to avoid tariffs, raising the possibility of an earlier cycle peak and start to the downswing.

The cycle indicators followed here do not currently support this alternative scenario. The annual change in G7 stockbuilding, expressed as a percentage of GDP, is usually significantly positive at cycle peaks but stalled just above zero in Q4. A more timely indicator based on business surveys was little changed through February – see chart 1.

Chart 1

The previous view – that a cycle peak is still several quarters away and a downswing will be delayed until 2026 – will, therefore, be maintained. This assessment is consistent with a recent rise in global six-month real narrow money growth, suggesting a recovery in economic momentum in late 2025 following Q2 / Q3 weakness – see previous post.

Risk assets typically rally strongly in the first half of a stockbuilding cycle, partially retracing gains in the run-up to the next trough. Table 1, reproduced from the earlier post, compares movements in the current cycle through end-2024 with averages at the same stage of the previous eight cycles, along with changes over the remainder of those cycles.

Table 1

US equities, cyclical sectors, the US dollar and precious metals had outperformed relative to history, suggesting a stronger likelihood that they would lose ground between end-2024 and the next trough. Areas that had lagged and appeared to have catch-up potential included EAFE / EM equities, small caps and industrial commodities.

Table 2 updates the comparison through 11 March. The US market correction and rallies in Europe / China have narrowed the US / EAFE and US / EM performance gaps but they remain wide relative to history. Other moves in the “right” direction with apparent potential to extend include weakness in cyclical sectors, a decline in the US dollar and a rise in industrial commodity prices.

Table 2

By contrast, there has been no correction of the “anomaly” of small cap underperformance, while unusual strength in precious metals has extended further.

The larger message is that, even assuming a delayed peak, the stockbuilding cycle has entered the mid to late stage that has been unfavourable for risk assets historically.

Monetary trends suggest that the global economy will remain soft in H1 2025, while inflation rates will fall further, undershooting targets. Cycle analysis holds out a prospect of economic reacceleration later in the year but risk assets might have limited further upside even in this scenario, although international / EM equities might regain relative performance.

Global six-month real narrow money momentum recovered from a low in September 2023 into Q2 2024 but has since moved sideways at a weak level by historical standards – see chart 1. Based on a normal six to 12 month lead, this suggests below-trend economic growth through Q2 2025, at least.

Chart 1

Economies exhibiting monetary weakness are at greater risk from negative policy or other shocks. As an example, a fizzling-out of a recovery in UK six-month real narrow money momentum in H1 2024 signalled an approaching growth stall but the Budget tax shock appears to have tipped the economy into contraction.

With job openings / vacancy rates back in pre-pandemic ranges, below-trend global growth is likely to be associated with greater deterioration in labour markets than in 2024. In economics parlance, a movement down the Beveridge curve may be approaching a gradient shift such that a further fall in vacancies will be associated with a significant unemployment rise.

A further issue for monetary economists is the “false” US recession signal of 2022-23. Most annual contractions in US real narrow money historically were associated with recessions, and all on the scale of the 2023 decline – see chart 2. On three occasions (highlighted), however, the interval between the start of the contraction and the onset of recession was unusually long, i.e. up to 32 months.

Chart 2

On inflation, the monetarist rule of thumb that price momentum follows the direction of broad money growth roughly two years earlier suggests a further slowdown into undershoot territory in H1 2025. Chart 3 shows the relationship for the Eurozone but the message of headline / core deceleration is the same for the US, Japan and the UK.

Chart 3

Global PMI output price indices in manufacturing and services are close to 2015-19 averages, when headline / core inflation averages were below target.

Financial market prospects, on the “monetarist” view, depend on whether there is “excess” or “deficient” money relative to the economy’s needs. Two flow measures of global excess money were used here historically – the gap between six-month rates of change of real narrow money and industrial output, and the deviation of the annual change in real money from a slow moving average. A “safety first” approach of holding global equities only when both measures were positive would have outperformed buy-and-hold significantly over the long run.

The flow measures, however, remained mixed / negative in 2023-24, understating the availability of money to boost markets because they failed to capture a stock overhang from the 2020-21 monetary surge. To assess whether this stock influence remains positive, the approach here has been to use a modified version of the quantity theory in which the money stock is compared with an average of nominal GDP and gross wealth.

Chart 4 shows that an average of US nominal GDP and gross wealth remained below the level implied by the money stock through mid-2024, consistent with a positive stock influence on asset prices / the economy. Equivalent analysis for Japan and the Eurozone shows the same. In all three cases, however, the nominal GDP / wealth average moved ahead of the money stock during H2 2024, implying that stock and flow indicators are now aligned in suggesting a neutral / negative backdrop.

Chart 4

While monetary indicators suggest near-term softness, cycle analysis holds out a prospect of stronger economic performance later in 2025 and in 2026. A key consideration is that the stockbuilding and business investment cycles appear some way from reaching peaks, with the next lows unlikely before H2 2026 and 2027 respectively.

The last trough in the stockbuilding cycle is judged to have occurred in Q1 2023, with national accounts inventories data and business surveys suggesting that the upswing is around its mid-point – chart 5. The previous cycle was shorter than the 3.5 year average, so the current one could be longer, with a low as late as H1 2027. An associated downswing might not start until H1 2026.

Chart 5

The 7-11 year business investment cycle appears to have bottomed in 2020, although a case could be made that this was a false low due to the pandemic, with the last genuine trough reached following a mild downswing in 2015-16. On the more plausible former view, the next low is scheduled for 2027 or later, implying potential for a 2026 boom.

The longer-term housing cycle, which bottomed in 2009 and has averaged 18 years, is in the time window for a peak but significant weakness could be delayed until H2 2026 or later.

Monetary and cycle signals could be reconciled if near-term economic weakness / favourable inflation news triggers faster monetary policy easing and a strong pick-up in money growth into mid-year.

Would such a scenario be associated with further significant gains in risk assets? The history of the stockbuilding cycle suggests not.

Risk assets typically rally strongly in the first half of a stockbuilding cycle, partially retracing gains in the run-up to the next trough. Table 1 compares movements so far in the current cycle with averages at the same stage of the previous eight cycles, along with changes over the remainder of those cycles. US equities, cyclical sectors and precious metals have outperformed relative to history, suggesting a stronger likelihood that they will lose ground between now and the next trough.

Table 1

Areas that have lagged relative to history include EAFE / EM equities, small caps and industrial commodities, hinting at catch-up potential in the event of a delayed stockbuilding cycle peak and late (H1 2027) trough. This prospect would be enhanced by a reversal of unusual US dollar strength so far in the current cycle.

Still, any such catch-up might be a relative rather than absolute move against a backdrop of a maturing cycle upswing, a possible US market correction and neutral / negative excess money conditions.