Recent US equity market buoyancy is likely to be related to a rebound in broad money momentum during H2 2023. The previous post argued that this was driven by monetary financing of the federal deficit – specifically, large-scale issuance of Treasury bills that were bought mainly by money funds and banks.

A more contentious interpretation is that the Treasury has been operating a form of QE that has overridden the monetary effects of the Fed’s QT.

The federal deficit can be financed by running down the Treasury’s cash balance at the Fed or issuing bills / coupon debt. The first option injects money directly. Issuing bills is also likely to expand broad money, since money funds and banks usually absorb the bulk of new supply. Coupon issuance usually has the smallest monetary impact because coupon debt is purchased mainly by non-banks.

So a summary measure of the monetary influence of financing operations is the difference between Treasury bill issuance and the change in the Treasury balance at the Fed – henceforth “Treasury QE”.

Chart 1 shows six-month running totals of Fed QE / QT and the suggested Treasury monetary impact along with the six-month change in broad money. The sum of the Fed and Treasury series “explains” most of the variation in money momentum in recent years – chart 2.

Chart 1

Chart 2

“Treasury QE” was a major contributor to the 2020 monetary surge and became significant again in late 2022 / early 2023, mainly reflecting a run-down of the Treasury’s cash balance. Following suspension of the debt ceiling in June 2023, the Treasury rebuilt the balance but the monetary impact was more than offset by bumper bill issuance – see the previous post for details.

The Treasury’s recently released financing plans imply a swing from expansion to contraction during H1 2024. The cash balance at the Fed is targeted to fall from $769 billion at end-2023 to $750 billion at end-Q1, remaining at this level at end-Q2. The stock of bills, meanwhile, is projected to rise by $442 billion in Q1 but fall by $245 billion in Q2. “Treasury QE” would remain strong at $461 billion in Q1 – far ahead of expected Fed QT of about $240 billion – but a dramatic shift would occur in Q2, with “QT” of $245 billion.

If Fed QT were to continue at its current pace, the suggestion is that the six-month change in broad money would return to negative territory by mid-year, unless other monetary counterparts were to show offsetting strength – chart 2.

Note that the above argument is distinct from the notion that ongoing Fed QT risks pushing reserve balances and / or deposits at the overnight reverse repo (ON RRP) facility below the level required for money market stability. The possibility of a broad money shortage due to a withdrawal of Treasury monetary support would remain even if the minimum reserves / ON RRP level proves to be lower than feared. The two risks, however, could interact.

A possible conclusion is that markets face a monetary air pocket in Q2 unless the Fed halts QT at its March meeting. A cynic might speculate that the Treasury’s financing plans are designed to increase pressure for an early Fed cessation, which might be followed by a H2 resumption of bill financing to swell monetary support ahead of the November election.

The six-month rate of change of US broad money has recovered from negative territory in early 2023 to 3.9% annualised in December – close to an average of 4.2% over 2010-19, when economic performance was generally favourable.

Does this signal that the economy has adjusted to higher interest rates and monetary conditions are no longer particularly restrictive, in turn suggesting less need for Fed easing?

The analysis below of the “credit counterparts” to monetary expansion indicates that the recent revival has been driven by exceptionally large-scale purchases of Treasury bills by money market funds.

Such buying will fall back but its recent importance highlights a larger point. If the fiscal deficit remains at its current level (or rises further), and the Treasury continues to choose to fund a large proportion of the deficit by expanding the Treasury bill issue, the contribution of deficit financing to monetary growth is likely to be significant, even assuming no return to QE. In this scenario, a higher average level of interest rates may be necessary to constrain money growth to a pace – of perhaps 4-5% pa – compatible with trend economic expansion and on-target inflation.

On the suggestion that the recovery in money growth obviates the need for policy easing, a key point is that the effects of prior monetary restriction are still feeding through and may not be fully apparent for another year or more. Rate cuts are likely to be warranted to cushion near-term economic weakness and avert an inflation undershoot.

The numbers quoted above for US broad money expansion refer to the “M2+” measure calculated here, which adds large time deposits at commercial banks and institutional money funds to the official M2 measure. The inclusion of these items is important as they capture a significant proportion of money holdings of non-financial businesses and non-bank financial institutions. As previously discussed, US business money holdings have been rising rapidly in recent quarters, resulting in six-month momentum of M2+ diverging positively from that of M2 since late 2022, i.e. M2 is understating broad money growth at present.

Six-month broad money momentum has recovered by much more and to a higher level in the US than in the Eurozone and UK – see chart 1.

Chart 1

The credit counterparts analysis links changes in broad money to movements in other items on the monetary sector’s balance sheet, the US monetary sector being defined as the Fed, commercial banks and other depository institutions, and money funds. The following simple formulation is used for the analysis here:

Change in broad money = monetary financing of federal deficit + change in commercial banks’ loans and leases + other counterparts (residual)

Monetary financing of federal deficit = net purchases of Treasury securities by Fed, commercial banks and money funds – change in Treasury general account balance at Fed

The table shows the contribution of these items to the six-month change in M2+, not annualised, in December 2022 and December 2023.

The positive swing in six-month momentum between the two periods was driven by monetary deficit financing and, in particular, a huge change in money funds’ transactions in Treasuries, from selling in H2 2022 to exceptionally large-scale buying in H2 2023.

What caused this turnaround? Following the suspension of the debt ceiling in June 2023, the Treasury issued a net $1.21 trillion of Treasury bills in H2 2023, up from $170 billion in H2 2022 and the second-highest half-year amount ever (after H1 2020).

Money funds and commercial banks are natural buyers of Treasury bills because of the maturity structure of their liabilities. The market mechanism that induced them to increase demand was a rise in Treasury bill yields relative to other short-term rates, including the emergence of a premium over the Fed’s overnight reverse repo rate.

Money funds moved $1.1 trillion out of the Fed facility during H2 2023, buying an estimated $900 billion of Treasury securities and placing the remainder (and an additional amount) in the private repo market (with those funds probably also used to buy Treasuries, suggesting further indirect monetary financing).

Money funds’ Treasury buying is likely to slow dramatically in H1 2024, for two reasons. First, expansion of the Treasury bill issue will be scaled back to $200 billion (from $1.21 trillion in H2 2023), according to refunding plans. Secondly, money funds’ balance in the Fed facility was down to $800 billion at end-2023 (from $2.3 trillion a year earlier), with a further decline in early 2024. The rate of Treasury bill purchases will plausibly slow as the balance approaches exhaustion.

It would, however, be misleading to suggest that purchases of Treasuries by money funds and banks face a constraint in terms of the availability of investible resources. The first-round effect of the fiscal deficit is to swell the broad money stock, i.e. it creates the liquidity necessary to absorb associated debt issuance. If new Treasuries are sold to non-banks, the monetary boost is reversed. If, alternatively, money-holders choose to retain their higher balances, banks and money funds have additional funds with which to buy Treasuries. The money creation due to the deficit then remains unsterilised.

How large a boost could this private form of monetary financing give to broad money growth over the medium term? The federal deficit was $1.78 trillion in calendar 2023, equivalent to 6.5% of GDP and 6.8% of the M2+ stock at end-2022. Suppose that 1) the deficit remains stable as a proportion of the money stock, 2) it is half-financed via Treasury bills and 3) money funds and banks take up half of the issued bills. Assuming no QE / QT and a stable Treasury balance at the Fed, monetary deficit financing would contribute 1.7 pp to annual M2+ growth.

For comparison, Treasury buying by money funds and banks contributed 0.6 pp to average annual growth of M2+ over 2010-19.

Suggested conclusions are: 1) prior monetary weakness will be the dominant influence on economic developments over the next few quarters; 2) the recovery in broad money growth is likely to stall in H1 2024; and 3) a persistent large fiscal deficit could cause funding indigestion and force a renewed increase in reliance on bill financing (or, in the extreme, a resumption of QE), in turn posing an upside risk to medium-term money growth and inflation.

China’s economic woes partly reflect restrictive monetary policy. The latest money numbers suggest still-deteriorating prospects and urgent need for a policy reversal. It is unclear whether such a pivot is under way.

Two-quarter growth of nominal GDP (own seasonal adjustment) remained historically weak at 2.7% annualised in Q4, after 2.6% in Q3. Official real GDP numbers show a recovery in two-quarter growth from 3.6% annualised to 4.7%, so the implication is that GDP prices fell at a faster rate (1.9% annualised versus 1.0%) – see chart 1.

Chart 1

The stabilisation of two-quarter nominal GDP growth in H2 2023 mirrors sideways movement of six-month narrow and broad money growth during H1. Money trends, however, weakened sharply during H2, suggesting a further slowdown in nominal / real GDP in H1 2024 – chart 2.

Chart 2

Six-month narrow money momentum turned negative in late 2023 and is challenging the record low reached at end-2014. Weakness then rang policy alarm bells, contributing to an aggressive easing shift in 2015 that succeeded in reflating the economy and stocks.

Monetary optimists note that broad money growth is above the level reached then and in the middle of its range in recent years. A widening narrow / broad money divergence, however, suggests a faster rate of decline of broad money velocity, plausibly related to structural weakness in real estate and lack of confidence in policy.

Will the economy and markets be rescued by 2015-style easing? Developments in 2023 don’t inspire hope. The PBoC loosened policy during H1 but a new upswing in term money rates began soon after the appointment of new Governor Pan Gongsheng in July, with three-month SHIBOR closing 2023 at a 32-month high – chart 3.

Chart 3

Another change under Governor Pan has been the suspension of publication of the PBoC’s informative quarterly surveys of entrepreneurs, consumers and bankers – the Q3 surveys were never released and Q4 results would normally have appeared by now.

A possible interpretation is that the PBoC has switched to prioritising currency stability, managing rates higher to discourage capital outflows while passing the baton of economic support to fiscal policy (and withdrawing from providing information on economic developments).

Foreign exchange reserves were boosted by valuation effects in late 2023 (weaker US dollar, rally in Treasuries) but settlements data suggest sustained intervention to support the currency during H2, consistent with a persistent sizeable forward discount on the offshore RMB – chart 4.

Chart 4

Fiscal stimulus focused on government-directed investment is unlikely to be sufficient to reverse economic weakness without accompanying monetary accommodation to lift private sector confidence and broad money velocity.

Are there any signs of the PBoC pivoting back to easing? One glimmer is that its lending to the banking system continued to expand rapidly in late 2023, which, together with a slower rise in government deposits at the PBoC, resulted in the second-largest quarterly rise in bank reserves on record – chart 5.

Chart 5

The PBoC’s injections, however, may have been intended to moderate rather than reverse the rise in money rates. Three-month SHIBOR eased in early January but has stalled since – chart 3. Recent renewed US dollar strength may bolster the hard-liners.

This is the second in a series of short posts focusing on whether incoming economic news supports or contradicts the forecast of a global “hard landing” suggested by monetary trends.

The US ISM manufacturing new orders index rose to a 13-month high of 49.2 in September, apparently supporting soft landing hopes.

A post in July flagged the possibility of a near-term rebound but suggested that this would prove to be a “head fake” preceding a move back below 45. 

The main reason for expecting a recovery was that the stockbuilding cycle was judged to be moving towards a low, i.e. a drag on new orders from customer inventory adjustment was likely to abate. 

The reason for expecting the recovery to be brief and followed by a relapse was that US real narrow money momentum remained heavily negative, suggesting that a stockbuilding boost would be outweighed by weakness in final demand. 

Historical instances of ISM new orders recovering through 50 when real money contraction was negative include 1957, 1970, 1980 and 1990. The orders index subsequently fell back below 45, with the relapses associated with recessions – see chart 1. 

Chart 1

Six-month real narrow money momentum has recovered since mid-year but remains significantly negative. 

The earlier suggestion of a recovery in ISM new orders was supported by a sharp rebound in Korean FKI manufacturing expectations between February and July – Korean exports are sensitive to changes in global industrial momentum. FKI expectations relinquished most of the February-July gain in August / September. 

Verdict: inconclusive.

This is the first of a series of short posts focusing on whether incoming economic news supports or contradicts the forecast of a global “hard landing” suggested by monetary trends. 

Flash results suggest that the global composite PMI new orders index – a timely indicator of demand momentum – fell for a fourth month in September, consistent with the monetary signal of a slide into early 2024, at least. 

The flash results, available for the US, Japan, Eurozone, UK and Australia, imply a decline through 50 to the lowest level since December, assuming no change in all other countries in the global aggregate – see chart 1. 

Chart 1

Weakness in the flash surveys was driven by a further slowdown in services new business, with manufacturing new orders little changed – chart 2.

Chart 2

Any hopes of manufacturing stabilisation, however, may be dashed by full September results incorporating China and other emerging economies. The equity analysts’ earnings revisions ratio correlates with Chinese manufacturing PMI new orders and weakened sharply this month – chart 3. 

Chart 3

Renewed deterioration in Chinese / Asian manufacturing is also suggested by the Korean FKI survey for September, showing a relapse in the assessment of business prospects to the weakest since February – chart 4.

Chart 4

Global six-month real narrow money momentum is estimated to have broken to a new low in August, reinforcing pessimism here about economic prospects and casting strong doubt on now widely-held “soft landing” hopes. 

Real money momentum bottomed in July 2022, recovered during H2 but suffered a relapse in early 2023, retesting the 2022 low in April. The relapse has been reflected in a renewed downswing in economic momentum, as proxied by global composite PMI new orders – see chart 1. 

Chart 1

A tentative stabilisation of real money momentum over the summer suggested that PMI new orders would bottom out around year-end. The further move down in August, if confirmed, signals deeper and more extended economic weakness. 

The August estimate is based on monetary data covering 70% the global (i.e. G7 plus E7) aggregate and near-complete CPI results. 

The suggested fall to a new low reflects both additional nominal money weakness and an oil-price-driven recovery in six-month CPI momentum – chart 2. 

Chart 2

The ongoing oil price rally suggests a further near-term rise in headline CPI momentum – chart 3. A core slowdown, however, is expected to continue and may accelerate as higher oil costs squeeze spending on other items. 

Chart 3

The further fall in real narrow money momentum has been driven mainly by China and India – chart 4. An earlier post attributed Chinese monetary weakness to misguided policy tightening in late 2022, which has since been partially reversed. Chinese August money numbers suggest greater damage from the misstep than previously assumed, implying a more urgent need for additional policy easing. 

Chart 4

An August estimate of global industrial output is not yet available but a large negative differential between six-month rates of change of real narrow money and output is likely to have persisted – chart 5. 

Chart 5

As previously noted, global equities have underperformed cash since this differential turned negative in early 2022 (allowing for reporting lags), despite a rally over the last 12 months. 

Why was weakness compressed into the first nine months of 2022, with a subsequent strong rebound? 

One explanation is that the Ukraine invasion and associated immediate further upward pressure on energy prices exaggerated the market response to monetary deterioration. Positioning and sentiment reached oversold extremes in late 2022, creating the potential for a relief rally as energy markets adjusted and prices fell back. 

Another possibility – admittedly difficult to assess – is that the “excess” money backdrop has been less unfavourable than suggested by the six-month momentum differential shown in chart 5, because of the existence of an overhang from the 2020-21 monetary surge. An excess stock of money, in other words, may have persisted despite the flow turning negative. 

The ratio of the stock of real narrow money to industrial output has trended higher over time, with the increase reflected in rising real asset prices and wealth – chart 6. 

Chart 6

A huge overshoot in 2020-21 has been correcting since late 2021 but the ratio was still above its pre-pandemic trend at end-2022, i.e. the negative flow differential had not fully offset the prior period of excess.

The stock and flow signals, however, are now aligned: the real money / output ratio moved below trend in early 2023 and its July level was the lowest since February 2020 before the policy response to the pandemic and subsequent monetary surge.