Zone euro Archives

A June / July rebound in the composite PMI output index has raised hopes that Eurozone growth is picking up pace. Monetary trends continue to send a cautious message.

The PMI rebound may reflect a boost to sentiment from a May / June fall in energy prices, which has since reversed – see chart 1.

Chart 1

Money trends were soft even before June’s rate hike. The preferred broad measure here – non-financial M3, comprising holdings of households and non-financial corporations (NFCs) – rose by an annualised 4.1% in the six months to June, below a pre-pandemic (i.e. 2015-19) average of 4.9%. Narrow money developments are more worrying, with six-month growth of non-financial M1 falling to 2.5% last month, having peaked at 5.2% in September 2025 – chart 2.

Chart 2

The sector breakdown shows similar weakness in household and NFC M1 components. Meanwhile, six-month real narrow money momentum, which led the PMI recovery over 2023-25, turned negative in April, remaining so in May-June – chart 3.

Chart 3

Optimists cite respectable bank loan growth, of 4.6% annualised in the latest six months. Statistical studies, however, have long shown that lending is a coincident or lagging economic indicator, whereas money leads. Six-month loan growth may have peaked at 4.9% in March. The latest ECB quarterly bank lending survey, while less downbeat that the previous poll conducted at the height of Gulf hostilities, suggests a slowdown – chart 4.

Chart 4

Eurozone and UK April money numbers signal rising recession risk and suggest that policy-makers should be considering easing not tightening.

Three-month annualised growth of Eurozone narrow money – as measured by non-financial M1 – slumped from 5.3% to 1.5% between January and April. UK growth fell from 3.8% to 0.7% over the same period, with a large contraction in April alone.

The nominal slowdowns compound a squeeze on real money from consumer price acceleration due to the Gulf War III supply shock. Six-month momentum of real narrow money fell to zero in the UK in April while turning negative in the Eurozone – see chart 1.

Chart 1

Real money contractions have been a recession warning signal historically. An obvious push-back is that much greater weakness in 2022-23 was not reflected in a subsequent economic slump. Negative momentum was a misleading indicator of monetary conditions then because of a large overhang from the 2020-21 money growth surge. There is no such overhang now, so dismissing current weakness on the basis of that experience is dangerous.

Broad money trends are also worrying, with nominal growth of only 3.5% and 3.6% annualised respectively in Eurozone non-financial M3 and UK non-financial M4 in the three months to April. US broad money, by contrast, expanded at a 7.6% pace over the same period (M2+ measure).

Globally, six-month real narrow money momentum fell for a second month in April, supporting the forecast of a fall in manufacturing PMI new orders during H2 – chart 2.

Chart 2

The ECB and Bank of England have signalled an expectation of policy tightening, while the latest Fed statement maintained an easing bias. Economic / monetary conditions argue for the opposite relative positions.

Eurozone core inflation is lower than in the US, labour market indicators softer, money growth slower and credit conditions weaker. The UK resembles the Eurozone in most of these respects.

Last week’s ECB bank lending survey signalled tighter credit standards and notably weaker loan demand – see previous post and chart 1. The corresponding Fed survey this week, by contrast, shows little change from last quarter – chart 2. (Note that the Fed survey asks about current conditions, while the ECB survey additionally canvasses expectations.)

Chart 1

Chart 2

The last Bank of England credit conditions survey, released on 9 April, was benign but partly pre-dated Gulf hostilities.

US annual broad money growth – as measured by “M2+”* – was 5.9% in March versus an increase of 3.3% in both Eurozone non-financial M3 and UK non-financial M4 – chart 3.

Chart 3

US annual core PCE inflation rose to 3.2% in March versus a Eurozone core CPI increase of 2.2% in both March and April. UK core CPI inflation was 3.1% in March but the number still incorporates a boost from large rises in water bills and vehicle excise duty last April – the policy-adjusted measure calculated here was 2.7%.

The US trimmed mean PCE inflation measure preferred by incoming Fed Chair Warsh was 2.4% in March but there are no Eurozone / UK numbers for comparison. The calculation excludes 31% and 24% respectively of the top and bottom “tails” of the distribution, i.e. included items have a combined weight of only 45%.

Labour demand is weaker in the Eurozone / UK than the US, with Indeed job postings making new lows versus US stability – chart 4.

Chart 4

Unemployment expectations have picked up in the EU Commission consumer survey, suggesting a rise in the official jobless rate – chart 5.

Chart 5

The Fed model used here predicts policy direction based on current and lagged values of annual core PCE inflation, the unemployment rate and the ISM manufacturing delivery delays index. A rise in the latter has pushed the model estimate further into the tightening zone – chart 6.

Chart 6

*M2+ adds large time deposits at commercial banks and institutional money funds to the official M2 measure.

The April bank lending survey signals an “endogenous” tightening of monetary conditions, which the ECB should – but won’t – offset with policy easing.

A previous post suggested that the Gulf War III shock would interact with concerns about private credit exposure to cause banks to tighten lending standards. April Fed and ECB lending surveys were flagged as important markers.

The ECB survey confirms the thesis, showing significant rises in reported and expected credit tightening balances across loan categories – see chart 1. (The Fed survey is expected next week.)

Chart 1

The shock, however, appears to have had an even greater negative impact on the risk appetite of borrowers. An average of expected demand balances fell to a level historically consistent with GDP contraction – chart 2.

Chart 2

With both supply and demand weakening, loan growth may slow sharply, in turn threatening a fall in meagre broad money expansion. Non-financial M3 rose by only 3.3% in the year to March.

Prospective monetary weakness argues for pre-emptive policy loosening but the ECB, following new Keynesian convention, is focused on upside risk to inflation expectations. Expectations measures, unlike money trends, failed to give timely warning of the 2021-22 inflation surge, contributing to policies remaining excessively loose. An opposite mistake may be brewing.

The Gulf War III energy shock has been compounded by a dramatic repricing of interest rate expectations, partly reflecting hawkish central bank communications, particularly from the ECB and Bank of England.

The central banks fear a repeat of the inflation upsurge around the Russian invasion of Ukraine, their accepted wisdom being that higher energy prices destabilised inflation expectations, resulting in significant “second-round” effects.

The “monetarist” view is that the impact of a shock on price- and wage-setting depends on the prevailing monetary environment. The Russia-Ukraine shock generated large second-round effects because it occurred against a backdrop of strong money growth. Eurozone and UK broad money – as measured by non-financial M3 and M4 – rose by 9.1% and 10.5% annualised respectively in the preceding two years – see chart 1.

Chart 1

The latest two-year growth rates, by contrast, are 3.2% and 3.9%, with little sign of acceleration in shorter-term data. Money to nominal GDP ratios have returned to around end-2019 levels. Unlike in 2022, there is no monetary “excess” to accommodate a sustained inflation rise.

Policy tightening against this backdrop would likely result in much more serious economic weakness than in 2022-23, with attendant risk of a medium-term inflation undershoot.

One caveat to a relaxed view of second-round effects is that political pressure to respond to a new cost-of-living shock could trigger a fiscal / funding crisis, forcing a return to QE that results in another money growth surge. Still, the suspension of central bank independence implied by such a scenario will be more likely if officials compound their 2021-22 policy error by making the opposite mistake now.

Eurozone and UK money trends have shown disappointingly small responses to policy easing, suggesting that rates remain in restrictive territory and casting doubt on hopes of stronger economic growth.

The preferred monetary aggregates here are “non-financial”, covering households and non-financial corporations. Money holdings of financial institutions are volatile and less informative about near-term economic prospects.

A recovery in six-month growth rates of Eurozone narrow and broad money stalled in early 2025 despite the ECB continuing to cut rates through June, with both well below pre-pandemic averages – see chart 1.

Chart 1

The UK profile is different. The laggardly pace of rate cuts appears to have contributed to a relapse in growth rates in H1 2025 but these recovered into November, moving sideways in December – chart 2.

Chart 2

While suggesting UK relative improvement, narrow money expansion remains beneath its pre-pandemic average (and the Eurozone level), with annual broad money growth a below-par 3.8% (versus 2.7% in the Eurozone).

One reason for the disappointing responses is that policy rate cuts have yet to translate into a decline in longer-term yields. Relatedly, UK QT has been a significant and unnecessary drag.

A hopeful scenario is that low inflation implied by weak broad money trends will allow longer-term yields to subside. Still, additional policy adjustment will likely also be required to generate a monetary response sufficient to warrant economic optimism.

Eurozone monetary trends suggest that interest rates remain above a “neutral” level.

The ECB’s deposit rate has been stable at 2.0% since June, following a 200 bp reduction over the prior 12 months. Lower rates should be feeding through to money trends by now.

Six-month growth of non-financial M3, however, was 2.4% annualised in October, half its average in the five years before the pandemic and slightly below the level when rate cuts started.

Chart 1

Non-financial M3 comprises broad money holdings of households and non-financial corporations (NFCs). Six-month growth of headline M3, including volatile financial sector money, was even weaker, at 1.8% annualised.

Narrow money growth – as measured by non-financial M1 – is stronger but also below its pre-pandemic average.

There is no sign of acceleration in the latest numbers, with three-month rates of change close to six-month levels.

Broad money probably needs to expand by at least 4% pa to accommodate potential growth of about 1.25% pa and 2% inflation, allowing for a long-run decline in velocity. (The ratio of nominal GDP to non-financial M3 fell by 1.9% pa on average over 2000-19.)

Money growth below this level implies downward pressure on output relative to trend and / or inflation – inconsistent with rates being at “neutral”.

Slow broad money growth is partly attributable to sluggish credit trends: lending to households and NFCs rose by 2.8% annualised in the six months to October, with momentum stable recently.

A drag from ECB QT, meanwhile, has been fully offset by solid buying of government bonds by banks. Purchases have been spread across countries but were largest in France over the past 12 months – chart 2.

Chart 2

Money growth would have been weaker without support from external inflows, reflecting a basic balance of payments surplus and a corresponding rise in banks’ net external assets – chart 3.

Chart 3

Eurozone narrow and broad money measures rose respectably on the month in September but six-month momentum remains sluggish, at roughly half the pre-pandemic pace – see chart 1.

Chart 1

Six-month real narrow money momentum is below a peak reached in February, consistent with a stalled recovery in the manufacturing PMI – chart 2. A recent pick-up in services results may prove short-lived.

Chart 2

Country details show French relative weakness, with M1 deposits of households and non-financial firms stagnant in nominal terms over the last six months, implying real contraction – chart 3.

Chart 3

Six-month bank lending growth has cooled, with expected credit demand balances in the latest ECB loan officer survey suggesting a further slowdown – chart 4.

Chart 4

Bullish economic hopes rest on German fiscal easing but restriction elsewhere will temper the impact. The Eurozone cyclically adjusted fiscal deficit is projected by the IMF to widen by a modest 0.3% of GDP in 2026, after no change this year.

A downturn in the stockbuilding cycle could more than offset fiscal support. A rise in stockbuilding accounted for 0.8 pp of GDP growth of 1.5% in the year to Q2 2025. (The “true” contribution will have been smaller because of an associated increase in imports.)

Stockbuilding is a key influence on firms’ demand for short-term credit. Year-on-year changes in credit demand balances in the bank lending survey have weakened, consistent with a prospective stockbuilding downswing – chart 5.

Chart 5

Eurozone money trends have been giving a downbeat signal for economic prospects. Incoming evidence is consistent with a loss of momentum.

Eurozone GDP rose by only 0.8% at an annualised rate during H1 excluding distorted Irish numbers – see chart 1. Growth was dependent on an increase in stockbuilding, to an above-average level as a percentage of GDP – chart 2.

Chart 1

Chart 2

Rises in bond yields and the euro exchange rate have tightened monetary conditions, offsetting ECB rate cuts. Six-month Eurozone real narrow money momentum peaked in March, although the subsequent reversal has been modest – chart 3.

Chart 3

German Ifo manufacturing business expectations – closely correlated with Eurozone / German manufacturing PMIs – reached a two-year high in July, consistent with earlier monetary acceleration. Expectations moved sideways in August, with the March peak in real money momentum suggesting an inflection weaker soon.

Other evidence supports this forecast. The one-month change in the OECD’s German leading index also anticipates turning points in Ifo expectations and has eased since May – chart 4.

Chart 4

European cyclical sector equities often start to lag as business surveys inflect weaker and have given back some outperformance since mid-August – chart 5.

Chart 5

The Sentix and ZEW surveys of financial analysts correlate with Ifo results, with Sentix September numbers already available and showing a second monthly decline – chart 6.

Chart 6

The slowdown in Eurozone / German real money momentum is not yet alarming and may prove temporary, particularly if bond yields and the euro subside. Still, the ECB’s move to the sidelines was premature, with near-term data likely to bolster the case for further easing.

Recent Eurozone money trends cast doubt on economic optimism based on German / regional fiscal expansion. Weakening job openings suggest that a negative economic scenario is already starting to crystallise.

Six-month real narrow money momentum peaked in March at a modest level by historical standards, declining into June. The fall was driven by weakness in corporate deposits, suggesting that firms would cut back investment and hiring – see chart 1 and previous post for more discussion.

Chart 1

Indeed numbers on job postings are a timely coincident indicator of labour demand and appear to display less volatility than official survey-based measures of job openings or vacancies. The level and rate of decline of the UK Indeed series signalled recent job losses – chart 2.

Chart 2

The latest numbers show signs of stabilisation in the UK / US. By contrast, job postings in Germany and France are falling rapidly, with the Italian series breaking below its late 2024 low and even Spain rolling over.

The German / French results chime with elevated consumer expectations of a rise in unemployment – chart 3*.

Chart 3

Why haven’t ECB rate cuts and German fiscal expansion energised the Eurozone economy? The initial impact of the fiscal news has been to push up longer-term yields and the euro, offsetting ECB stimulus.

Fiscal expansion, even if well-executed, will play out over the medium term, with growth implications dependent partly on the extent of monetary financing. The direct and confidence effects of the unfavourable US-EU trade “deal”, meanwhile, are a further near-term negative.

*The Spanish series has been suspended.

Groupe financier Connor, Clark & Lunn ltée

Catégorie : Zone euro