Official M2 rose by an annualised 7.3% between December and June, the strongest six-month increase since March 2022. The broader M2+ measure calculated here – which additionally includes large time deposits and institutional money funds – expanded by 8.5% over the same period. Growth of narrow money M1A (currency plus demand deposits) was faster still, at 10.6% – see chart 1.

Chart 1

Money growth is reflected in some combination of real GDP expansion, inflation and falling velocity. Even optimists would doubt that current potential GDP growth is more than 3% pa. Broad money expansion of more than 8%, therefore, requires a contraction in velocity of at least 3% pa to be consistent with 2% inflation. Such a decline is implausible on a trend basis: M2+ velocity fell by an average 0.8% pa over 1960-2025.

US monetary acceleration contrasts with weakness or slowdowns in other developed economies. Six-month broad money growth in June was 4.1% annualised in the Eurozone (non-financial M3), 2.9% in the UK (non-financial M4) and 1.3% in Japan (M3) – chart 2.

Chart 2

Six-month real narrow money momentum remains negative in the Eurozone, UK and Japan even as US growth moves above a 2024 high – chart 3.

Chart 3

The scale of the monetary divergence goes beyond signalling a stronger case for US policy tightening, suggesting that other central banks should be moving in the opposite direction to the Fed.

What explains US acceleration? Unlike other central banks, the Fed has never published a “counterparts” analysis of broad money. However, the key drivers are likely to have been stronger bank lending – commercial bank loans and leases grew by 8.2% annualised in the six months to June, up from 6.3% in the prior half-year – and the Fed’s resumption of QE (“reserve management purchases”) from December. External flows may also have contributed, partly reflecting strong foreign buying of US equities.

“Monetary financing” is a broader concept than QE, encompassing purchases of Treasury bills and notes by commercial banks and money funds as well as QE and changes in the Treasury’s balance at the Fed. The level of money growth in the US continues to be inflated relative to other developed economies by monetary financing of a much larger fiscal deficit – chart 4.

Chart 4

The PMI rebound may reflect a boost to sentiment from a May / June fall in energy prices, which has since reversed – see chart 1.

Chart 1

Money trends were soft even before June’s rate hike. The preferred broad measure here – non-financial M3, comprising holdings of households and non-financial corporations (NFCs) – rose by an annualised 4.1% in the six months to June, below a pre-pandemic (i.e. 2015-19) average of 4.9%. Narrow money developments are more worrying, with six-month growth of non-financial M1 falling to 2.5% last month, having peaked at 5.2% in September 2025 – chart 2.

Chart 2

The sector breakdown shows similar weakness in household and NFC M1 components. Meanwhile, six-month real narrow money momentum, which led the PMI recovery over 2023-25, turned negative in April, remaining so in May-June – chart 3.

Chart 3

Optimists cite respectable bank loan growth, of 4.6% annualised in the latest six months. Statistical studies, however, have long shown that lending is a coincident or lagging economic indicator, whereas money leads. Six-month loan growth may have peaked at 4.9% in March. The latest ECB quarterly bank lending survey, while less downbeat that the previous poll conducted at the height of Gulf hostilities, suggests a slowdown – chart 4.

Chart 4

L’intelligence artificielle (IA) est souvent présentée comme un défi technologique, mais son adoption réussie repose avant tout sur le leadership et la transformation des activités.

Dans un récent article de Human Resources Director, Ankur Saxena, directeur, Stratégie technologique, et Diana Bartolic, chef des Ressources humaines, expliquent pourquoi l’adoption de l’IA exige bien plus que de nouveaux outils et de nouvelles technologies. Elle nécessite un leadership dédié, une gouvernance efficace, une gestion du changement réfléchie et un engagement à aider les employés à s’adapter à l’évolution des rôles et des façons de travailler.

Comme le souligne Ankur, l’IA est « en grande partie une initiative de transformation des activités, plutôt qu’une initiative technologique ». Diana insiste pour sa part sur l’importance de soutenir les employés pendant cette période de transformation importante du milieu de travail et de veiller à ce que les organisations disposent des structures nécessaires pour gérer le changement de façon responsable.

Au Groupe financier CC&L, nous croyons que la création de valeur à long terme grâce à l’IA exige d’investir non seulement dans la technologie, mais aussi dans le capital humain, les processus et le leadership nécessaires pour en assurer une adoption efficace, responsable et conforme aux objectifs d’affaires.

Lire l’article complet : AI enablement officer: the new sheriff in transformation town (en anglais seulement)

Investor views on China have become increasingly polarized, creating both challenges and opportunities for active managers. While concerns about economic growth, geopolitical tensions and market regulation continue to shape sentiment, China’s scale and importance within the emerging markets universe make it difficult for investors to ignore.

In a recent interview with Benefits and Pensions Monitor, Michael Mortimore discusses the factors influencing China’s investment outlook and why a selective, fundamentals-driven approach remains essential in today’s environment. He explores the structural challenges facing the Chinese economy, the implications for investors and the developments that could help support a more sustainable path forward.

As Michael explains, « If China was able to reinvigorate domestic demand and also curb the incentives that basically fuel all this excess capacity, we think that that would be a really, really positive development and really bullish for long term prospects for China as a whole and the sustainability of its economic model. »

Read the full article for Michael’s perspective on navigating uncertainty, evaluating risk and identifying long-term opportunities in one of the world’s most consequential investment markets: Is China still worth the risk for emerging market investors?

The Fed’s latest semi-annual Monetary Policy Report to Congress contains a paragraph discussing recent trends in the M2 money measure, included, apparently, at the behest of Chair Warsh.

In follow-up Q&A, Chair Warsh explained that he is not a “monetarist” but nevertheless holds the “old-fashioned view that monetary policy has something to do with money”.

Meanwhile, perhaps not coincidentally, former Fed Governor Miran has co-authored a paper that attempts to rehabilitate the P* monetarist approach to inflation forecasting.

P* is the level of prices implied by the current money stock, incorporating assumptions about trend GDP and velocity. The gap between P* and the prevailing price level P is a measure of future inflationary (or disinflationary) pressure. Miran et al present estimates of the price gap based on M2 and other (Divisia) money measures, showing that these gaps exhibit a statistically significant relationship with future inflation.

Both the Fed report and the Miran paper suggest that current monetary trends are non-inflationary. The former notes that annual M2 growth averaged 4.7% in the first five months of the year, which is “closer to the range typically observed in the 2010s”, when inflation undershot the 2% target.

Similarly, the current price gap estimates presented by Miran et al are all around zero, implying that “the stance of monetary policy is quite close to neutral right now, putting neither upward nor downward pressure on the inflation rate”.

A cynic might wonder if the appearance of these references to monetary trends has been motivated by a search for arguments to push back against a strengthening case for policy tightening based on conventional economic data (reflected in the Fed policy direction model discussed in previous posts).

In any case, the assessment that current trends are unthreatening may soon be out-of-date. Year-to-date annual M2 growth of 4.7% conceals a pick-up in six-month expansion to a 7.1% annualised pace in May. The broader M2+ measure calculated here rose by 8.2% over the same period – see chart 1.

Chart 1

The recent acceleration suggests that the Miran et al price gap estimates are now positive.

By contrast, six-month growth of the Bank of England’s M4ex broad money aggregate was 4.4% annualised in May, with the non-financial M4 measure preferred here rising by just 2.8%.

The Bank’s quarterly Monetary Policy Report (or Inflation Report before November 2019) contained no mention of money between May 2019 and May 2023, a period during which annual non-financial M4 growth reached 16.0%. A reappearance in August 2023 coincided with the annual rate of change turning negative. Editions in May 2024 and May 2025 included boxes discussing broad money developments in detail.

Still, there is no evidence from the minutes that monetary considerations have played a role in any decisions of any MPC member. Regular references to money trends are, it appears, little more than a box-ticking exercise. The same will likely be true at the Fed.

Peter Muldowney a corédigé, pour Plans & Trusts, un guide pratique à l’intention des administrateurs de régimes de retraite et d’avantages sociaux. L’article présente des mesures concrètes pour cerner, évaluer et gérer les risques, tout en protégeant la réputation des régimes, en renforçant leur résilience et en préservant leur valeur à long terme.

Veuillez noter que cet article est écrit en anglais.

La Chine vaut-elle toujours le risque pour les investisseurs des marchés émergents?

Dans une récente entrevue accordée à Benefits and Pensions Monitor, Michael Mortimore explique comment les investisseurs devraient envisager le rôle de la Chine dans les portefeuilles de marchés émergents, les risques qui y sont associés et l’importance de maintenir une approche de placement rigoureuse.

Michael souligne que, même si les mesures de relance annoncées par la Chine à la fin de 2024 ont brièvement stimulé les actions liées à la consommation, cet élan s’est rapidement essoufflé et la conviction que Pékin soutiendra les dépenses des ménages s’est affaiblie. Il déclare à ce sujet : « La demande et la confiance des consommateurs semblent extrêmement faibles, dans un contexte déflationniste. »

 
Lire l’article complet (en anglais seulement)

What is the Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation?

The Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation (SFDR) was introduced by the EU Commission as a core component of its 2018 Sustainable Finance Action Plan. As a key pillar of the EU Sustainable Finance agenda, SFDR aims to improve transparency, prevent greenwashing and help investors make informed sustainable investment decisions. To do so, the SFDR introduced mandatory disclosure requirements around environmental, social and governance (ESG) metrics at both the entity and the product levels.

An imperfect system

Since taking effect in March 2021, the SFDR has faced implementation challenges and criticism from market participants. In a 2023 consultation, the EU Commission found that 83% of respondents believed the regulation was being used as a product label and marketing tool, rather than solely as a disclosure framework. Respondents highlighted several concerns, including greenwashing risks linked to inconsistent product classifications, unclear definitions, limited ESG data availability and higher compliance costs. Together, these challenges have made implementation more difficult and limited SFDR’s ability to provide transparent, comparable information on sustainable investments.

This has prompted the EU Commission to consider revisions to the framework, culminating in the draft SFDR 2.0 proposal.

Is it the end of Article 8 and 9?

Not quite. Rather than eliminating these categories altogether, the proposal replaces the existing Article 6/8/9 disclosure framework with a revised product classification system that introduces clearer definitions, eligibility criteria and sustainability thresholds.

What might change?

Contribution requirement

• One of the most significant proposed changes is that at least 70% of a fund’s assets would need to satisfy the sustainability criteria of its chosen category, whereas the current SFDR provides managers with greater flexibility to determine the applicable threshold.

Transition (Article 7)

• This entirely new proposed category, Transition, is intended for funds investing in companies that are on a credible pathway towards improved sustainability performance.

ESG Basics (Article 8)

• To qualify under the category of ESG Basics, investments would generally need to satisfy at least one of several sustainability tests such as: outperforming the benchmark on ESG ratings or key sustainability indicators, demonstrating improved sustainability characteristics or meeting minimum sustainability standards. This marks a significant shift from the current framework, replacing the broad flexibility currently afforded to managers with more standardized qualification criteria.

Sustainable (Article 9)

• The Sustainable category remains the highest sustainability classification and is expected to be subject to the most stringent eligibility criteria. Although there is broad support for maintaining this as the highest sustainability category, negotiations continue around how sustainable investments should be defined in practice.

Mandatory exclusion criteria

• Under the current regulation, investing in an ESG or sustainable fund does not necessarily prevent exposure to controversial sectors, such as fossil fuels, tobacco or prohibited weapons. Under the proposed SFDR 2.0 framework, mandatory exclusion criteria would apply across all sustainability categories, with the scope and stringency of exclusions increasing for higher-ambition categories.

These proposed changes would work to ensure that a fund could substantiate its sustainability claim with clearly measurable criteria, assuaging greenwashing risks.

Where do negotiations stand?

The legislative process is progressing rapidly. The EU Council published its negotiating position in June, while the European Parliament is expected to adopt its position shortly. Once both institutions have finalized their positions, trilogue negotiations with the European Commission will begin alignment on the final SFDR 2.0 framework.

Implementation timeline

The trilogue negotiations are expected to begin this autumn. While the timing remains uncertain, the legislative process is likely to extend through 2027, followed by a transition period before the new rules apply. Based on the current timetable, SFDR 2.0 is unlikely to become applicable before 2029, although the exact implementation date will depend on the pace of negotiations and the final transition period.

What does this mean for investors?

While the final rules are still being negotiated, the overall direction is becoming increasingly clear: sustainability claims will need to be supported by more objective and measurable criteria. An analysis by Clarity AI estimates that around 40% of current Article 9 funds would not meet the proposed exclusion rules of the highest sustainability category. 80% of Article 8 funds would experience the same challenge.

For asset managers and investors, these reforms could materially affect how sustainable funds are designed, marketed and compared, making the final outcome particularly relevant for investment strategies with ESG objectives. Funds currently designated as sustainable under Article 8 or 9 may need to be strategically revisited with portfolio or policy adjustments if the intent is to maintain the same designation levels.

At Global Alpha, we are following these developments closely. While SFDR 2.0 remains subject to negotiation, the direction is clear: sustainability claims will increasingly need to be supported by objective, measurable criteria. We will continue to monitor the legislative process and its implications for the sustainable investment landscape as the final framework takes shape.

Banyan Capital Partners (Banyan) est heureuse d’annoncer la nomination de Simon Gélinas au poste de directeur général et chef des placements. Dans le cadre de ses nouvelles fonctions, Simon assumera la direction quotidienne des activités de placement de Banyan, notamment le repérage, la sélection et l’exécution des placements, ainsi que la gestion des actifs du portefeuille de la société.

Jeff Wigle continuera de diriger Banyan à titre d’associé directeur. Il assumera la responsabilité globale de la direction de l’entreprise, notamment en ce qui a trait à la philosophie de placement, au développement des associés, la stratégie d’origination et la supervision du fonds. Cette nomination témoigne de l’engagement continu de Banyan à renforcer son équipe de direction et à maintenir un haut niveau d’excellence dans l’exécution de sa stratégie tout au long de sa croissance.

« Simon a joué un rôle déterminant dans l’évolution de Banyan et a gagné la confiance de notre équipe, de nos partenaires et des sociétés de notre portefeuille. Cette promotion officialise le rôle de leadership qu’il exerce déjà et positionne Banyan favorablement pour la prochaine étape de sa croissance. »
— Jeff Wigle, associé directeur, Banyan Capital Partners

Simon s’est joint à Banyan en 2015 et a participé à tous les aspects des activités de placement de la société. Il possède plus de vingt ans d’expérience en capital-investissement, en gestion opérationnelle et en finance d’entreprise. Avant de se joindre à Banyan, Simon a occupé des postes de haute direction chez TRU Simulation + Training (une société de Textron) et son prédécesseur, Mechtronix Inc. Il a également été vice-président chez Richardson Capital Limited. Simon est titulaire d’un baccalauréat en commerce de l’Université McGill, d’une maîtrise en administration des affaires de l’Université de la Colombie-Britannique et détient le titre de CFA.

The conventional explanation is that monetary policy remains too loose. Inflation is back and the Bank of Japan is “behind the curve”. Investors are reluctant to buy bonds until a rate peak is in sight.

The “monetarist” view is opposite. Bonds are selling off because monetary conditions are restrictive. M3 and M1 grew at annualised rates of just 1.3% and 0.1% respectively in the six months to June – see chart 1.

Chart 1

Money growth is being crushed by massive and still-rising QT. The BoJ’s net disposal of JGBs amounted to 7.0% of GDP in the year to June. Plans to reduce monthly purchases further imply an increase to c.8.5% by mid-2027 – charts 2 and 3.

Chart 2

Chart 3

Consistent with the monetarist view, annual core CPI inflation is below 2% and falling even adjusting for government subsidies, despite upward pressure on import prices from the weak yen – chart 4.

Chart 4

Real yields may be reaching an attractive level but potential buyers are understandably reluctant to fight the BoJ “whale”. With JGBs off-limits, available money is being directed towards equities and foreign markets, contributing to the yen’s slide.

Stopping QT would probably trigger a surge in demand for JGBs, including by foreigners. Lower yields would ease concerns about fiscal sustainability. Capital inflows would strengthen the yen and add to the lift to money growth from ending the QT drag. Stronger money growth would support medium-term achievement of the inflation target without reliance on currency depreciation.

Continued QT on the planned scale, by contrast, promises sustained monetary weakness and an eventual return to deflation.